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N^'^ Point 

in 

Jur Next War 

riie Only Way to Create 
''p'! to Maintain an Army 



Jtfaxwell Van Zandt Woodhull 




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COFVRIGHT DEPOSm 



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West Point 



in 



Our Next War 



The Only Way to Create 
and to Maintain an Army 



By 

Maxwell Van Zandt WoodhuU, A.M. 

Late Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General 

15th Army Corps and Army of the Tennessee 

Brevet Brigadier-General United States Volunteers 



SECOND EDITION ^ 



FIRST EDITION PUBLISHED IN DECEMBER I915. 
SECOND EDITION PUBLISHED IN DECEMBER I919. 



Gibson Brothers 

Washington, D. C. 
1919. 

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Copyright, 1915 

BY 

MAXWELL VAN ZANDT WOODHULL 
Copyright, 1919 

BY / 

MAXWELL VAN ZANDT WOODHULL v' 



DEC -5 lUiS •^ 

Eeoorded 

(Q)CI.A585984 ^ 



Uo 

THE MEMORY OF 
MY DEAR AND GALLANT FATHER 

COMMANDER MAXWELL WOODHULL 

UNITED STATES NAVY 
THESE PAGES ARE AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED 

By THE Author 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



HUNDREDS of millions of dollars— I had al- 
most written thousands of millions of dollars — 
could have been saved in the prosecution of the 
war with Germany had the Government of the 
United States adopted the recommendations of 
this book, and have given the country an expan- 
sible military organization for war in the period 
between the date of its pubUcation, in December, 
19 15, and our declaration of war against Germany, 
on the 6th of April, 191 7, a period of one year and 
foiu" months in which nothing, absolutely nothing, 
was done to put the country in a condition of 
defense, and, through defense, in a condition to 
meet war whenever war should come. 

A year and four months of the most valuable 
time for preparation was lost to the nation by the 
failure of the President and the Government of 
the United States to heed the warnings brought to 
their ears by every wind from the battlefields of 
the European War, a war which held within itself 
the constant threat of war for the United States, 
either immediately or within six or eight years 
after its termination. 

This period of temporary peace, which should 
have been a period of preparation for the United 



VI 



Preface 



States, if availed of, would have put us at least 
six months or a year ahead of the time, when un- 
prepared, we might hope to get our troops in the 
field, whenever war should break out. It should 
not be forgotten that while we were organizing 
our war army after war had broken out, that we 
were doing so under the protection of the guns of 
France, of Great Britain, and of Italy, otherwise 
we should not have had so peaceful a period of 
organization as we had, and never again shall we 
be so fortunate when sad war shall come to us 
and to our dear country. 

When this book was pubUshed I doubt if there 
were five hundred people in the United States who 
favored raising an army by conscription. England 
was still wedded to the volunteer system of rais- 
ing armies. I wrote the book because, although a 
volimteer soldier of the United States in the War 
of the Rebellion, I believed that the day of the 
volunteer soldier had passed, and that the only 
way to create and to maintain a modern army was 
by conscription: I consequently adopted that 
principle of organization as the controlling princi- 
ple of this book. 

I wrote the book in the summer and autumn of 
1915, a year and a half before we entered the war, 
and published it at my own expense, entirely from 
a sense of duty to my country. I saw clearly the 
danger our country ran in drifting, unprepared 
for war, and I reahzed the sacrifices, the loss of 
inestimably valuable time, the possibility of de- 
feat which she might incur, should we enter war 



Preface 



Vll 



unprepared, and I wished to awaken her from the 
fool's paradise in which she was so complacently 
living. 

I distributed, with my compliments, upward of 
five hundred copies of the book, sending copies 
to those whom I thought, because of their official 
position, would be interested in the discussion of 
the subject of the defense of the country, especi- 
ally since the National Security League, of which 
organization, by the way, I am a life member, was 
holding congresses of the order in advocacy of 
universal miHtary service, which I believed to be 
an utterly chimerical plan of organization, if the 
object was the creation of soldiers, and it seemed 
to me that soldiers, and not masses of men with 
arms in their hands, was and should be the only 
object of the nation. I attended two of the con- 
gresses of the order as a delegate from two uni- 
versities with which I had affiliations, and opposed 
openly the plan of the organization, advocating 
conscription as the only practical method of 
mobiHzing and creating soldiers, and out of such 
soldiers an army capable of maintaining the honor 
of the nation in war. Of course, my proposition 
was voted down in a congress organized to advo- 
cate a fad of the moment, but I was encouraged to 
observe that the affirmative vote on my pro- 
position in the second congress of the order was 
much larger in volume than in the first congress, 
which proved to me that a part of the congress was 
at least groping toward the light. 

I sent copies of my book to the President of the 



Vlll 



Preface 



United States, to the Secretaries of State, of War, 
and of the Navy; to the Chief of Staff and the 
Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army, and to a 
number of Bureau Chiefs of the War Department; 
to the Admiral of the Navy ; to every Senator of 
the United States, and to the leading members of 
the House of Representatives, including every 
member of the Military Committee; to a number 
of officers of the Army and the Navy; to the 
libraries of the War and Navy Departments, of 
the Mihtary Academy at West Point, of the Naval 
Academy at Annapolis, of the War Colleges of 
the Army and the Navy; to the five leading 
clubs of Washington, the Army and Navy, the 
Metropolitan, the Cosmos, the University and 
the Press Club, and generally to a certain number 
of gentlemen in different parts of the country, who 
might be supposed to be interested in the subject 
of national defense. My publishers meanwhile 
reporting the sale of between three and four hun- 
dred copies of the book, and that the first edition 
was practically exhausted. 

I do not claim that my book, as widely as it was 
thus distributed, was the cause of the awakening 
of the Government and of the country to the 
wisdom of raising the army of several millions of 
men which the war demanded, by conscription. 
But I fancy that I have the right to think that it 
was one of the moving causes to such wisdom of 
action. 

The great war is now over. The great bulk of 
the vast army which was created has been 



Preface ix 

demobilized. The country is now facing the 
creation of a peace army; and Congress seems to 
be almost as much at sea as to a military policy, 
and as uncertain as to the best method of creating 
an army, as in the period of peace before the out- 
break of the late war. 

We now face the probable establishment of 
universal service as the principle of military organ- 
ization, the experience of the creation and main- 
tenance of our war army apparently being for- 
gotten, and Congress is showing a disposition, com- 
mon to fallible human nature, of forsaking experi- 
ence for theory, regardless of the fact that there 
are few directions in which the path of theory is 
fuller of thorns than that of military organization. 

The War Department has submitted its plan 
of military organization in which it asks for a 
regular army of upward of five hundred thousand 
men, supplementing this demand with clauses 
providing for universal military service, with 
three months' training for the men so called to the 
colors, as its main reliance in war for a war army 
fit to meet an enemy in the field. 

By mutual agreement between the House and 
Senate Military Committees, or their respective 
Chairmen, bills providing for universal military 
training, with six months service with the colors, 
have been presented to the two Houses of Congress. 

I respectfully protest against both of these 
plans on the broad ground that neither of them will 
give the country soldiers ready to take the field 
against a well-organized and disciplined enemy's 



X Preface 

army the moment war breaks out. Soldiers, in 
the fullest acceptation of the term, are what we need, 
and the only kind of soldiers that we should have. 

I have insisted in my book, and I insist even 
more strongly here and now, that what the United 
States needs is an army thoroughly disciplined 
and trained, ready to meet any enemy, no matter 
who he may be, or whence he may come, on a 
plane of appreciable superiority, allowing for the 
influence of patriotism added to efficient training, 
to give our army the superiority in actual battle. 
We should not wish to place before a veteran 
European or Japanese army in battle an army 
undertrained and inferior in morale to our enemy, 
and such will siu-ely be the case if either the military 
plan of the General Staff or the plan of the House 
and Senate Military Committees' bill is enacted 
into law. 

We are told that our soldiers of six months' 
training met and sustained successfully the shock 
of the best troops of the German army in battle. 
But remember that we declared war upon Ger- 
many on the 6th of April, 19 17, and that our first 
serious encounter with the German army in the 
open took place toward the end of July and in 
August, 191 8, or fully one year and five months 
after we entered into the war. If in that year and 
five months our General Staff was only able to 
give our troops six months' training before putting 
them into battle, there was gross blundering on the 
part of the General Staff. But I do not beUeve 
the statement in its baldness. Our best infantry, 



Preface 



XI 



the United States Marines, hold the honor of our 
first decisive victory over the enemy, and I do 
not think, with their glorious record in all of our 
wars, that the Marines should be classed as six 
months' troops, and unless my memory misleads 
me, our regular troops supported the gallant 
Marines at Chateau Theirry; and they surely 
can not be spoken of as six months' troops. 

Remember that in the war with Germany we 
had all the time necessary to create, in a most 
leisurely manner, an army of soldiers, because we 
organized our army behind the protecting fire 
of the French, the English, and the Italian guns, 
precisely as Great Britain organized her volunteer 
army behind the French guns which rang out 
victory in the battle of the Marne. 

Do not let us be fooled by this experience. It 
will never come again, unless we are to do our 
fighting round the world, under the auspices of 
the League of Nations, and I have very little doubt 
that we shall have fighting enough under the 
League to satisfy all the lovers of peace in the 
country, who are now saying that the heart of the 
world will break unless we ratify the German 
treaty of peace, with its attachment of the cove- 
nant of the League of Nations, as it stands written 
at Versailles. 

As for the Plan of the General Staff, aside from 
its provisions in respect to the regular army, 
which I do not now discuss, it is unwise in its 
proposition of three months' training for the men 
of the Reserve Army. The Chief of Staff of the 



xii Preface 

Army, if he be a soldier, and it is fair to assume 
that he is a soldier, must know that the advice 
which he has given the Congress to rely upon a 
Reserve Army which has had but three months' 
training, is utterly unsound and misleading advice 
and that such advice is opposed to every principle 
of military organization and training. 

A soldier can not he made in three months, nor can 
a dependable army he created out oj soldiers who have 
had hut three months' training. Perhaps the Chief 
of Staff is thinking of completing the training of 
his three months' men after war breaks out. But 
it is to oppose such reliance upon the training 
of our soldiers ajter war breaks out that I wrote 
this book, and am now writing this preface to its 
second edition. I want my country to start 
fair in the next war in which we engage, or to be 
so fully prepared for war that that condition of 
preparedness will prove its worth by saving us 
from war. 

Three months' men may, and have been known 
to fight well, but it is a toss of a copper whether 
they may not fiee the field, as the militia fled the 
field of Bladensburg, leaving the gallant Barney 
and his handful of sailors and marines to maintain 
the battle, and to cover the flight of the mihtia. 
It is no reflection upon the courage of these mili- 
tiamen that they fled the field. The reason that 
they ran was that they were not soldiers. With 
proper training and discipline they would have 
stood their ground, and possibly have saved our 



Preface 



XIll 



capital from the degradation of the presence of 
the hostile British flag. 

Congressional legislation, even if directed by the 
advice of the Chief of Staff of the Army, can not do 
the impossible. And I say, what every soldier 
knows to be true, that soldiers can not be made in 
three months. Every officer of the army, who is 
himself a soldier, knows this to be true as well as I 
know it to be true, and consequently a recom- 
mendation from the General Staff advising the 
creation of the Reserve Army on the basis of three 
months' service with he colors, should be rejected 
by Congress as utterly improper and bad advice. 

I have rarely seen a well thought out, clearly 
expressed, consistent and well balanced plan of 
military organization come out of the War De- 
partment or from the General Staff. There is, of 
course, always something to commend in their 
plans, but they are overloaded with what may be 
called camouflage; by that something which is 
thought to render the chief objects of such meas- 
ures acceptable to Congress. I have always 
wished that the War Department or the General 
Staff would give Congress a clear and well-balanced 
plan of military organization, unclouded by what 
they may think good poHtics. Then we should 
have a direct issue made for the action of Congress. 

Congress wants sound military advice. It needs 
clear and honest thinking. It needs the best, and 
only the best plan of military organization which 
the best thought of the army can give it, free from 



xiv Preface 

surplusage, and free from all absurdities of an 
overloaded military system. 

Congress is as honest and as patriotic as the 
army, and is earnest in its effort to give the coun- 
try the best army organization possible. But it 
needs professional or rather technical guidance. 
This it has a right to look to the officers of the 
regular army to give it. 

The bad form of some of the legislation advised 
and presented by the General Staff, or by the War 
Department, in its present miUtary bill, which is 
clogged with various classes of officers and en- 
listed men, is manifested by the provision of a 
couple of miUtary bands, or of one large band 
with various classes of musicians, and a number of 
trumpeters for the equipment of the Department 
of the Adjutant General, which, I think I may 
say that I know, as an Adjutant General of an 
Army Corps in the field in time of war, to be not 
only unnecessary, but an amusing adjunct to the 
Adjutant General's Department. But perhaps 
the esoteric thought of the General Staff may be 
contemplating a return to the employment of the 
Adjutant General as a herald of medieval times, 
and as those officers were found in the armies, let 
us say, of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, and to 
add to his present duties, that of appearing in 
person before a beleaguered fortress to formally 
demand the surrender of the fortress and its 
garrison to the puissant arms of the United States. 
The Adjutant General is to be supphed with trum- 
peters, who could sound a fanfare on their bugles 



Preface 



XV 



before the portcullis of the hostile fortress before 
he should demand the surrender of the garrison, 
but I fear his summons would fail of the effect of 
its medieval antetype, because of his lacking in 
picturesqueness, and it will be necessary to add to 
the circumstance of our khaki-clad Adjutant 
General before he can rival the heralds of medieval 
times. Tabards must be allowed to him and his 
followers to conceal the very simple effect of the 
khaki, and pursuivants must be accorded to him 
to form his suite, so as to impress the minds of the 
defenders of the fortress, and to convince them of 
the might of the United States. There should be 
found a use in this form of ceremony for the mili- 
tary band of the Adjutant General, but I confess 
great difficulty in finding a place for it in this 
effort at the reestablishment of medievalism in 
our military system, except that should it be dis- 
covered that there were some small boys within 
the walls of the fortress, the band might strike up 
such a sterling martial air as "There is a Hot Time 
in the Old Town Tonight," and to trust to their 
delight to put the commandant in a surrendering 
frame of mind. 

I think I can perceive in the miUtary bill pre- 
sented by the Chairmen of the House and Senate 
Military Committees, the influence, even if un- 
conscious influence, of this book upon its com- 
position. 

There is a manifest effort made in this House 
and Senate bill to create a Reserve Army which 
shall, through its organization and training, sup- 



xvi Preface • 

plement the Active Army, represented by what is 
called the Regulr Army of the United States. 
And there is a suggestion of the thought of this 
book that this Reserve Army shall be a part of 
the Regular Army, which shall consist of the 
Active Army and the Reserve Army, and there is 
an effort made to give this Reserve Army a firm 
and consistent military organization, through six 
months' intensive training, with a recognition of 
the necessity of requiring two or three weeks of 
training with the colors in each year, after this six 
months' period of intensive training, to freshen up 
and keep the men of the reserves in actual touch 
with the army. This very important yearly 
return to the colors of the reservists is entirely 
wanting in the universal miUtary service pro- 
visions of the War Department's or General Staff's 
military bill, which is an utterly inexplicable 
omission, assuming honesty in the preparation of 
the bill submitted to the Congress by the War 
Department and the General Staff. 

As much more valuable as I regard the miUtary 
bill of the House and Senate than the military 
bill of the War Department, I do not regard it as 
answering the need of the country for a satisfac- 
tory army; and therefore I hold that the plan of 
organization set forth in this book is much better 
than this plan of the House and Senate Commit- 
tees. Nor do I think that the army will need the 
number of young men which this bill is susceptible 
of yielding under universal military service. 

I believe that an organization aggregating 200,- 



I 



Preface 



XVll 



ooo or 250,000 men in the active army is ample to 
form the backbone of our army, and that a reserve 
army of 800,000 or 750,000 men, both the active 
and the reserve armies to constitute the Regular 
Army of the United States, is sufficient to main- 
tain the honor and the safety of the country. 
But because I am thinking of an army wholly 
consisting of soldiers, ready at a moment's notice 
to be mobilized for war and to be sent anywhere, 
and at any time, by order of the President, I advise 
that the Active Army should consist of men con- 
scripted for five years to serve their whole term of 
enlistment with the colors, and that the men of 
the Reserve Army should also be conscripted for 
five years' service, the first year to be spent with 
the colors, in intensive training, and the other 
four years of their term of service to be disposable 
according to their pleasure, except that each Re- 
servist must expect to serve, and is to be called for 
three weeks' service with the colors, in each of the 
four years, after the first year of his reserve service 
in the army. 

There need be no longer a shock produced to 
the nerves of the nation by the use of the word 
conscription. The people know what conscrip- 
tion is, and how fairly it acts, taking the yoimg 
man for service in the army with absolute im- 
partiality, whether he be rich or poor, cultured or 
uncultured, with the fairness, the implacability 
of fate. My plan is not so sweeping in its seizure 
of the youth of the nation as the two plans for 
universal military service which I am criticising. 



XVIU 



Preface 



It calls a certain percentage of the youth of the 
country to the army for a year of service, at the 
period of their life when it is most to their ad- 
vantage to learn the great lesson which the army 
teaches, obedience, a lesson which the youth of our 
country is now more than ever in need of learning. 
We hear a great deal about the excellence of the 
physical training which the army gives to the 
youth of the country serving in its ranks, which is 
entirely true, but the moral influence of its teach- 
ing of obedience, and its correlative, the power of 
commanding men, is of much more importance 
to the youth of our country today than all the 
physical culture which they may get from the 
army. 

I shall not discuss the method of filling the ranks 
of the active army by conscription, because I have 
already and fully discussed this branch of the sub- 
ject in this book. I may refer to such discussion 
as expressing my views today, matured and in- 
tensified if such a thing could be possible, as I favor 
supplying our active army with recruits by — and 
only by — and through conscription. 

I am opposed to the plan of recruitment by 
individual appeal and personal enUstment, for the 
active army as well as for the reserve army. Both 
the active, and reserve armies constituting in them- 
selves the Regular Army of the United States, 
should be filled by conscription, the only difference 
being that the active army should have the first 
claim upon the proceeds of conscription in any 
one year, and after the ranks of the active army 



Preface 



XIX 



have been filled, then the claim of the Reserve 
Army for recruits should take the balance of the 
draft or conscription for the year. This plan of 
filling the active and the reserve army by con- 
scription insures that the ranks in both classes of 
the army, the active and the reserve armies, shall 
always be full so that the country may always 
know how many troops it can depend upon, and 
their character and worth. Under the plan of 
voluntary enlistment for the regular army, the 
army never knows exactly what its strength is, 
and rarely has its ranks full. It results in main- 
taining an unnecessarily large number of officers for 
the men in the ranks and thus spending a very 
considerable sum of the pubhc money to little or 
no purpose. 

It is a marvel to me, who wrote, in 1915, in 
favor of conscription to a doubting and almost 
hostile country, now to find not only that the War 
Department is asking for the services of the whole 
of the youth of the country between certain ages, 
but that so reconciled is the Congress of the United 
States to this plan of raising armies, that bills 
have been presented to the Senate and the House 
by the Chairmen of the Military Committees 
providing for a similar call upon the youth of the 
country to constitute the Reserve Army. 

I sincerely trust that Congress will hold to the 
policy of conscription although it has masqueraded 
under the phrasing of "selective draft," because 
under that meaningless term it produced with ease 
and certainty an army of four milhon of men for 



XX 



Preface 



the war. It is the only philosophical, efficient, and 
prompt method of creating armies. 

I hold him in such high respect that it is with 
sincere regret that I find myself in opposition to 
the Honorable Mr. Kahn, Chairman of the Mili- 
tary Commiteee of the House of Representatives, 
on the subject of universal service, but holding 
that his views upon this subject are not only 
wrong in theory, but that in a vast country like 
ours, destined to be unproductive of the results 
which he is aiming to accomplish, the production 
of soldiers, and of dependable armies, I find my- 
self compelled to differ with him as pointedly as I 
can. 

It is understood that Mr. Kahn visited Switzer- 
land this past summer to study, in that country, 
the effect of universal military training upon the 
people and upon the Swiss army, failing to realize 
that the Swiss government had no alternative but 
the adoption of universal service, at the risk of 
allowing their country to remain undefended and 
at the mercy of its neighbors. 

Switzerland had to face the problem of provid- 
ing as suitable an army as possible at the smallest 
cost. She has not our thousands of milUons of 
dollars to squander. She has not a sufficient 
revenue to allow her to differentiate her population, 
and to create an army of sufficient strength to 
defend her frontiers in the only way that such an 
army could be created, by conscription. Swit- 
zerland is a small, a mountainous, and a poor 
country. A large part of her national income is 



Preface 



XXI 



derived from tourist travel, and like all small, 
mountainous, and poor countries she has been 
compelled to convert her whole population into 
an army. Therefore every Swiss is compelled to 
serve his country in the ranks of her army, which, 
as a measure of further economy, is commanded 
by a Colonel. The amazement of our Generals, 
and Lieutenant Generals, and Major Generals 
whom it is proposed to create in bulk by the 
Military Bill of the War Department now before 
Congress, can be imagined should it be suggested 
to put our army under the command of a Colonel, 
except in time of war, when a few gentlemen under 
the inspiration of the Swiss system would doubt- 
less be selected for the command of the army 
with the ranks of Brigadier and Major General. 
Our continental country, with its hundred 
millions and more of population, is entirely un- 
suited to the system found to be the only system 
of military defense permissible for Switzerland. 
In that country every citizen old enough, and not 
too old, is liable to service in the army when war 
demands that its citizenry shall be called to the 
colors. Doubtless in the small country of Swit- 
zerland patriotism reconciles her people to such 
a levy en masse, because it is the only possible 
way that her independence may be maintained. 
But our recent levy of 4,000,000 of men for our 
war army only claimed 4 per cent of our popu- 
lation. The contrast is startling. In place of 
the Swiss army which proposes to call to the colors 
in time of war all of her citizens of miUtary age. 



xxu 



Preface 



we should probably not call to the colors over 
4 per cent or 5 per cent of our citizens, and so far 
as the peace army which I recommend is con- 
cerned, including both the active and the reserve 
armies amounting to one million men, the demand 
on our citizenry would not be over i per cent of our 
population. 

It is wise in Switzerland to prepare for war as 
she has done, surrounded by possible enemies, 
any one of whom, if free to act out her part, would 
delight in seizing Switzerland, and annexing her 
mountains and her brave mountaineers. Swit- 
zerland has created her army in the only way 
possible to her. Her army looks to be a good 
army. It is surely a patriotic army, but just how 
good an army it actually is no one knows, because, 
as now constituted, it has not been tested, and 
consequently no one can know whether it is a 
dependable army or not until it is tested in war. 

Why then should we adopt the Swiss system of 
military organization, of actually unknown value, 
disregarding our own experience during the war 
with conscription, which produced a satisfactory 
army? Nor is it wise to accept too readily the 
claimed experiences of the recent war as demon- 
strating beyond question the actual sufficiency of 
six months' training, because it should be remem- 
bered that our army fought side by side with the 
veteran armies of France and Great Britain, and 
under the superior command of a French soldier, 
Foch, receiving the stimulus of such an associ- 
ation, which, acting upon the emotions of our 



Preface xxiii 

army, encouraged them to emulate and to sur- 
pass in advancing upon the enemy, the heroism of 
the French and British armies. Thank God, our 
soldiers were not subjected to the trial and the 
test of efficiency, which defeat would have given. 
Their morale in advance was fine. It is a thankless, 
but a very necessary inquiry, whether it is be- 
lieved by our own general officers in the field, 
that the morale produced by six months' training 
of our troops, let us say, would have insured their 
being as steady and as excellent in defeat as in 
victory. Let it be noted that I am referring to 
the six months' term of service proposed for the 
reserve army by the Senate and House bill, not 
that I am assuming that six months' training was 
the limit of training of our army in France. 

During the great war in the United States fifty 
odd years ago, many regiments were rushed to the 
field the moment they were organized entities, and 
they were required to learn everything which con- 
verts a man into a soldier, after they were in the 
presence of the enemy. These raw troops were 
pushed into battle, before they could have pre- 
tended to be soldiers, and in many cases they acted 
well and nobly, but in this calm moment of dis- 
cussion as to the best method of creating an effi- 
cient army, do not let us be misled in our judgment 
by the gallantry of these patriotic regiments which 
had volunteered in the sacred cause of liberty and 
for the maintenance of the integrity of the union. 
These men were not soldiers when they first went 
into battle directly from the farms, the counting 



XXIV 



Preface 



rooms, the law offices of the country, and it took 
them many weary months of bitter service to be 
created into soldiers, notwithstanding the stimulus 
of patriotism under which they were acting. 

It would be amusing to hear the snort of con- 
tempt with which General von Ludendorff would 
dismiss the subject of three months' soldiers, and 
it is in this connection that I venture to advise the 
Chairmen of the MiUtary Committees of the Sen- 
ate and the House to read General von Ludendorf 's 
memoirs, now appearing in the American press, 
or so much thereof as bears upon the loss of morale 
of the German army. 

Pause, my reader, and ask yourself what you, 
as a citizen of our dear country, want to have 
created? Do you want soldiers, actual soldiers, in 
your army, or do you want a large aggregation of 
men in your army, who are only half soldiers, or 
quarter soldiers, as your Chief of Staff proposes, 
something a little better and only a little better, 
perhaps, than the militia who fled the field at the 
Battle of Blandensburg. 

I believe with every force of my intellect that 
the only method of producing a dependable army 
in time of peace is through conscription, with, 
for the reserve section of the army, one year's 
service with the colors, in intensive training and 
association with the active army, a part, and by 
no means the least important part, of their training 
being this association with the active army, under 
the orders of the President of the United States. 
Therefore I protest against any and every other 



Preface xxv 

method of attempting the production of an army 
as empirical and unworthy of the action of my 
country. I want, and I beheve that the Congress 
of the United States, and the people of the United 
States, my countrymen, also want an army of 
soldiers, not make-believe soldiers — of thoroughly 
trained soldiers — and consequently I hold to the 
only principle of military organization which will 
give us soldiers, and I urge the rejection of every 
other system or principle of mihtary organization, 
as illogical, unscientific and unable to produce 
what the nation needs — a dependable army made 
up of thoroughly trained and disciplined soldiers. 
General Pershing in his speech to the Congress 
of the United States on the i8th of September, 
1 91 9, in acknowledgment of the thanks of Con- 
gress, says: 

"To you gentlemen of the Congress we owe the 
existence and maintenance of our armies in the 
field. With a clear conception of the magnitude 
of the struggle you adopted the draft as the surest 
means of utilizing our man power. You promptly 
enacted wise laws to develop and apply our 
resources to the best effect." 

This clear and appreciative expression from 
General Pershing should class him with the advo- 
cates of raising our armies by conscription. 

Whereas the War Department appears to be in 
favor of fining the ranks of the Regular Army by 
voluntary enlistment, an entirely archaic method 
of procedure, and prepares one for the equally 
unimaginative statement of the Chief of Staff of 



XXVI 



Preface 



the Army to the House Military Committee, 
in reference to the force of three months' men to 
be provided for by the MiUtary Bill fathered by 
the General Staff, that in no sense of the word are 
these men to be regarded as a part of the regular 
army, nor does the War Department contend for 
the right to treat these men, when they may have 
been called to the colors, as other soldiers of the 
United States are treated, subject to the orders 
of the President of the United States, for service 
wherever he may direct. 

This latter remark discloses equally unfortunate 
advice with that unfortunate advice which he gave 
to the Congress as to the length of instructive 
service of Reserves when serving under the colors. 

To both of these policies I am unalterably 
opposed. 

But presumably the Chief of Staff and I are 
thinking of soldiers of a different type. I am 
thinking of soldiers taught to be obedient to 
command, and the Chief of Staff of soldiers merely 
so in name, with the creation of which he proposes 
to titilate the fancy and to calm the conscience of 
Congress to the end that rioters may riot without 
the fear of consequences, and at the same time 
the Congress may point to the advice given by the 
Chief of Staff of the Army as the assurance that 
they have done their duty in providing amply for 
the defense of the nation, and the quietude of our 
home cities. 

To my mind a soldier is a man who is taught to 
obey the orders of his superior officer : To go where 



Preface 



XXVll 



he may be bidden to go, and to do what he may be 
bidden to do ; and to shoot straight when ordered to 
fire, whether upon a pubHc enemy or a mob at 
home. 

And if the Congress will calmly think of the 
subject as herein clearly stated, I think that they 
will agree that the kind of soldiers the Nation 
needs are those subject to and obedient to the 
orders of the head of the Army and of the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

It is to be regretted that the officers of the army 
should not feel entire freedom to express their 
opinions upon military subjects. They could be 
of inestimable service to Congress if they would 
tell Congress exactly what the army thinks upon 
the subject of the best method of furnishing the 
countr)'^ with adequate defense. Personally I do 
not accept the philospohy of military organization 
of the Chief of Staff, and I do not believe that the 
majority of the officers of the Regular Army agree 
with him any more than I do. 

There is no reason to anticipate another great 
world war for the next forty or fifty years, cer- 
tainly not for twenty-five years, if we shall main- 
tain, in its purity, the doctrines of Washington, 
Hamilton, Adams, Madison, and Monroe, of 
avoiding entangling alliances; meanwhile main- 
taining an army of adequate size and quaUty to 
serve as notice to the world that we are capable of 
making a defense of our country should our in- 
dependence ever be threatened with attack. 

It will be observed that I rest my prediction of 



XXVIU 



Preface 



our exemption from war for forty or fifty years 
upon the condition that we should avoid entang- 
ling alliances with foreign powers. This, of course, 
means that we should have nothing to do with the 
so-called League of Nations, recently arranged in 
Paris under the auspices of Great Britain, and in 
the interest of the British Empire. The covenant 
of the League of Nations is sown with dragons' 
teeth, and rightly regarded, so far as the interests 
and the fate of our country are concerned, full of 
the threat and danger of war. It is my deliberate 
judgment that the only danger of war which we 
have to fear, if we maintain a sufficient army of 
defense, is from the League of Nations. 

It was the height of folly that we should have 
become entangled in the meshes of this conven- 
tion, and I sincerely hope that the Senate will 
amend the covenant so as to preserve our entire 
liberty of action and our national sovereignty. 

"In time of peace prepare for war" is as sound 
advice today as it was when uttered by Wash- 
ington, and it is as sound as that other piece of 
advice given to the people of our then young 
Republic by the Father of his Country, to avoid 
entangling alliances. It is quite true that Wash- 
ington did not use the expression "entangling 
alliances." But he embodied the idea and the 
injunction in quite as strong and quite as clear 
language, and it has been up to the present time 
the controlling principle of our diplomacy. The 
words "entangling alliances" were given to the 
thought by, I believe, Jefferson, who was especi- 
ally addicted to phrase making. 



Preface 



XXIX 



Here we have in these two injunctions the chart 
by which we should guide and order the destinies 
of our country. 

If we would maintain the peace of the Nation, 
let us create an active and a reserve army such as I 
recommend in this book, and no nation will risk 
the chance of war with the United States thus 
adequately prepared for war. And if in addition 
to such adequate preparation for war, we refrain 
from entangHng alliances, and from taking part 
in the quarrels and the brawls of Europe, we may 
repose in the safe conscieousness that the peace 
of the Nation will not be disturbed. 

Apropos of the leading part Great Britain 
played in the negotiation of the treaty of peace 
with Germany and the proposed creation of the 
League of Nations, the Boston News Bureau of 
September 4, 19 19, pubHshes this item of news 
from Paris: 

"Paris reports state Belgium will receive por- 
tion of former German East Africa, in return for 
which she will cede to England considerable part 
of Congo hne, Britain thus securing direct way 
from Cape to Cairo." 

It is impossible to verify this news item, but 
from its vrai-semblance it may be assumed to be a 
truthful summary of the negotiation. It shows 
how completely Great Britain has assumed that 
the mandate in her favor for the government of 
the German territories in Africa, which she expects 
to receive from and under the peace treaty 
with Germany and the League of Nations, is 



XXX Preface 

equivalent to the annexation of these territories 
to her empire, otherwise how would she dare to 
exchange with Belgium a certain portion of 
German East Africa for a considerable part of the 
Congo basin, which Belgium is to cede to her? 

In this case Great Britain is acting as she has 
always acted. She has built her empire by a 
succession of similar encroachments, supported by 
diplomatic bluff, as notably in the case of Egypt, 
and in this negotiation with Belgium, exchanging 
with that power territory which is not hers to 
dispose of, receiving, however, territory in exchange 
actually belonging to Belgium under the sanction 
of the world : thus disposing of a trust estate and 
receiving in exchange a fee simple estate from 
Belgium. I remember smiling incredulously as I 
read Mr. Gladstone's statement of Great Britain's 
intention to retire from Egypt so soon as she should 
have restored peace and order to the land of the 
Khedive. I did not believe Mr. Gladstone's 
statement when I read it, and I think I can appeal 
to the history of Egypt since the British occu- 
pancy for the proof of the correctness of my judg- 
ment. 

It would have been much better diplomacy in 
reference to Africa if our President had not given 
so much thought to saving the heartbreak of the 
world, and had considered our interests in Africa 
which demanded that he should have provided in 
the treaty for the expansion of the Territory of the 
Republic of Liberia, or for the acquisition of New 
African territories, lately belonging to Germany, 



Preface 



XXXI 



as the future home of our negro population. In 
either case we should not have taken over the 
territory so accorded to us, for our own profit, but 
to hold as trustee for the benefit of the negro 
race. But the President was altogether too much 
under the influence of world politics to enter- 
tain such liberty of thought. When he surren- 
dered the freedom of the seas to Great Britain 
he virtually underwrote all of her wishes and 
demands. 

I cannot allow it to be thought, by not referring 
to the subject in this preface to this the second 
edition of my book, that I have lessened in the 
fervor of my advocacy of the argument for the 
enlargement of West Point which I made in the 
book itself. I maintain the wisdom of every- 
thing that I contended for in this respect, and 
heartily renew my recommendations in respect 
to the expansion of the corps of cadets to the size 
of a brigade of thirty-six hundred men. 

Congress in its war legislation, it is true, in- 
creased the strength of the corps of cadets to 
I, GOO men, but in doing so the Congress acted 
without considering the principle involved, and 
except that it gave the army the chance to receive 
an additional number of graduates of the Academy 
in its list of officers, it accompUshed nothing of 
value to the army. 

The proposition is a very simple one. Is it 
worth while to maintain the West Point Academy ? 
Is it of value to the army to receive educated 
officers from West Point to command its troops? 



xxxii Preface 

To both of these questions I answer, Yes. I had 
the honor to serve in the Volunteer Army of the 
United States during the war of the rebellion, and 
I felt in my own case the need of such miUtary 
education as West Point affords. Thus impressed 
as to the advantage of military training in my own 
case through the lack of it, I should be false to 
my sense of right and justice should I not advo- 
cate it for the army. 

Nor do I deem it wise to have a relatively small 
proportion of the officers of the army graduates of 
the MiUtary Academy. Nor do I think it wise to 
create a caste in the army, which, by instinct, 
differentiates the officers of the army into two 
classes, "the graduates" and the "non-graduates." 

Relying upon the affirmation of the two prop- 
ositions above stated, I advocate a large enough 
corps of cadets to insure the ultimate supply 
of officers for the active army altogether from 
the Military Academy, with the certainty that 
in time the officers of the Reserve Army can 
be supplied by the two-year graduates of the 
MiHtary Academy. 

And I think it wise that the corps be increased 
to the proportions of a brigade of 3,600 men, 
consisting of three regiments of 1,200 men each, 
each regiment consisting of three battalions of 
four companies each, as I consider the instructive 
value of such an augmented corps of cadets as incal- 
culable to the efficient development of the cadets as 
soldiers. I advocate the instruction of the cadets 
through their eyes as well as through their ears. 



Preface xxxiii 

This would give the cadets the opportunity 
which their predecessors at the Academy have 
never had, of seeing and being a part of a full 
brigade, with the opportunity of treating the brig- 
ade of cadets as a tactical division by consider- 
ing each battalion a regiment, and each Regiment 
a brigade in tactical and strategic maneuvers. 

Does the Congress of the United States reaUze 
that very few of the officers of the army had ever 
seen so large an aggregation of forces as a brigade 
before the Mexican war, and that very few even 
so large a force as a regiment in formation? 

Does the Congress of the United States realize 
that relatively few of our officers, except those who 
had served in Mexico during the war and in the 
brief operations in Utah, had at the outbreak of the 
War of the Rebellion, ever seen a full regiment, 
and scarcely any one of them had ever seen a f ul 1 
brigade of troops in formation, and that their 
acquaintance with the association of the three 
arms of the service under the flag of one com- 
manding Officer was so limited that it might be 
said to consist of nothing but vague imaginings 
on their part? 

The philosophy of my contentions in this book 
is that I urge upon the Congress the creation of 
an army of soldiers, commanded by a body of 
educated officers: of officers as highly educated 
as possible, all of whom shall have served in and 
been a part of comparatively large bodies of troops. 

I contend that it is true economy to create such 
a dependable army, composed of dependable 



XXXIV 



Preface 



soldiers, led by dependable officers, because such 
an organization will save us fronl war; should 
we, however, be forced to go to war, we shall be 
strong enough through such an organized army to 
uphold the honor of our country. 

I think that my contention is sound that the 
only way that the country can secure such a 
dependable army so commanded is by accepting 
and following the recommendations in this book. 
I have thought over the question for years, and I 
feel that I have thought out the subject to a 
logical conclusion, and I am so impressed with the 
importance of the subject that I have been im- 
pelled to write my beliefs in this book. Had I 
spared myself the necessary effort, which I may 
say has been quite a serious one for one of my age, 
I should have felt that I had failed in my duty to 
my country. 

Returning to the consideration of the Senate as 
a constituent part of the treaty-making power 
of the United States, its intervention in respect to 
the modification of treaties may be said to have 
been singularly fortunate. Its restraining action 
has improved the greater number of the treaties 
submitted to it for ratification. The only occasion 
of regret in reference to this participation of the 
Senate in the ratification of treaties is that it has 
been entirely too lenient in the use of its power of 
consent. These remarks apply not only to our 
historical relations, but to those treaties still in 
the indeterminate stage of treaties awaiting the 
examination and ratification of the Senate; not- 



Preface 



XXXV 



ably in reference to the pending treaty with 
Colombia in respect to the Panama Canal. In 
the chapter on the Diplomacy of National 
Defense in this book, I point out the omis- 
sions in this treaty with Colombia, and express 
the hope that it will not be ratified until after its 
amendment in several particulars, notably until 
Colombia shall cede to the United States the 
Valley of the Atrato and the valleys of the con- 
fluent streams on the Pacific side of the isthmus. 
We should have control of the Atrato route to the 
Pacific to protect the Panama Canal both strate- 
gically and commercially, and to complete our 
hold upon the various crossings of the Isthmus. 

In fact I discuss fully the relationships of the 
Panama Canal to our diplomacy in the Chapter 
on "The Diplomacy of National Defense." I 
endeavor to show the vulnerability of the Canal 
to attack by a combination of powers of great 
naval strength, such for instance as Great 
Britain and Japan, and how utterly defenseless 
it lies awaiting seizure by such a combination, and 
I sought to suggest a diplomatic association with 
Mexico, the nations of Central America, and 
Colombia for its defense and protection. 

It should be our object to obtain control of all 
of the practicable canal routes between the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, so as to 
protect, by such ownership, the Panama Canal. 
It would be a serious blow to our commerce 
and to our naval power should a foreign nation 
own or control a canal, using for the construe- 



xxxvi Preface 

tion of such a canal the Valley of the Atrato; or 
the valley through the mountains connecting 
the Chiriqui Lagoon with the Gulf of Dulce; or 
through the occupancy of the historic Nicaragua 
route. It is as sure as anything can be in the 
future, unless we foreclose such action by the 
ownership of all practicable routes for a canal 
between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, 
that some hostile and powerful nation or com- 
bination of nations will attempt the construct ion 
of another canal, connecting the Atlantic with the 
Pacific, and so enjoy an interior line between our 
ports and the Panama Canal. 

Concerning the Nicaragua Route for a canal, 
a most favorable treaty giving us control of that 
route, with a good harbor on the Gulf of Fonseca, 
was placed before the Senate for ratification, which, 
if it has not yet been ratified, should be ratified at 
once. The sum to go to Nicaragua in payment 
for this valuable concession is but $3,000,000, 
which would be the wisest investment of such a 
sum of money that the United States could make. 

Now that we have a treaty before the Senate 
under which we shall be required to pay Colombia 
twenty-five milHons of dollars for nothing but to 
reopen for consideration a fait accompli, we 
should see that we get something for our money. 
Twenty-five milHons of dollars to the statesmen 
of Colombia represents the wealth of the Indies, 
and no other government in the world would be so 
silly as to propose to pay to her that, or any other 
measureably large sum of money, to induce her to 



Preface 



XXXVU 



smooth down her ruffled plumage. Any sensible 
nation would look over her assets, and before 
agreeing to pay her this sum of money would 
select what she deemed to be of use to herself, and 
to base the proposed payment upon her acquies- 
cence in such a cession of territory. The possession 
of the route and the adjacent territory of the 
Valley of the Atrato through to the Pacific would 
be worth the sum of twenty-five millions, on the 
basis of the free and easy method of throwing 
about milhons which our Government has fallen 
into under the influence of the war appropriations, 
or at least it would represent the possession of 
territory in exchange for millions of dollars, and 
to that extent would make the treaty with Col- 
ombia a better bargain for the United States than 
it is now. A larger knowledge of international 
relationships in some of our countrymen would 
be an asset of incalculable value to the United 
States, and is to be earnestly prayed for by all of 
our citizens who believe in the efficacy of prayer. 

But Colombia should be required to consent as 
well, and for the same reason, to the cancellation 
of all especial rights inuring to her benefit under 
the Canal Treaty now before the Senate. It 
should be our object to free the Canal from all 
obUgations pertaining to foreign powers of every 
sort and condition, so that it should be our Canal 
and ours only. 

It should be remembered that I wrote this book 
in the summer and autumn of 19 15, while yet the 
President of the United States was holding and 



xxxviii Preface 

expressing pacifist views of our relation to the 
war and impressing the duty of neutraUty upon 
our people. I confess frankly, that, as I could 
not contemplate such abysmal stupidity as was 
shown by the German Emperor in forcing us into 
war with Germany by a revival of German attack 
upon the commerce of the world through a 
resumption of submarine activity, I could not 
bring myself to beUeve in the ultimate defeat of 
Germany by the entente powers. Nor do I think 
that Germany would have been defeated had we 
not entered the war by the side of Great Britain, 
France, and Italy. Hence, as I reaUzed fully the 
vulnerability to attack of the Panama Canal, I 
conceived the idea of insuring the guarantee of our 
possession of the Panama Canal by Germany 
through the sale to her of the PhiHppine Islands 
after the conclusion of the war, as, should she be 
placed in possession of the Philippines, it would 
be manifestly more to her interest to have its in 
possession of the Panama Canal than to be in 
possession of the Canal herself. Reahzing that 
under the existing military situation in the PhiUp- 
pines we are simply the locum tenens of Japan, I 
thought it would be a wise move for the United 
States to sell the Islands while yet we should have 
anything in the Islands of salable value, and also 
I thought of the creation of a balance of power in 
the Pacific Ocean, to counterbalance the united 
power of Great Britain and Japan in that ocean. 

The result of the world war, ending through our 
entrance into the war in the defeat of Germany, 



Preface 



XXXIX 



has made all these speculations nothing but dreams. 
Germany, in defeat, passes out of the immediate 
scope of vision so far as a sale to her of the Philip- 
pines is concerned, and the guarantee by her of 
our possession of the Panama Canal, and the 
creation of a balance of power in the Pacific 
through association with her. 

Situated as we are at present in reference to the 
Philippinos we should endeavor to develop a 
sentiment of loyalty to the United States among 
them, basing such sentiment upon the creation of 
a United States- Philippine army in the Islands of 
at least two hundred and fifty thousand men : the 
army to be created by conscription. Such a plan 
is, at least, theoretically practicable, and I suggest 
it for thought, because it seems to me to be the 
only alternative to our surrender of the Islands to 
Japan whenever that nation shall deem that the 
time has arrived for her to enter into possession 
of them. 

As to the establishment of a balance of power 
in the Pacific Ocean, I confess the problem is 
much more difficult than it seemed to me to be 
when I wrote this book, and while yet a powerful 
Germany was in arms, with the prospect of victory 
in the world war. 

But it can be created by careful work, and 
thought and courage by the United States through 
the modernization of China, and her development 
as a mihtary and naval power. Therefore, since 
the downfall of Germany, and as a first step 
toward the realization of this thought, I am 
strongly in favor of the excision of the Shantung 



xl Preface 

provisions from the treaty of peace with Germany 
by the Senate, at least so far as the United States 
is concerned. 

But the process of the mihtary and naval 
development of China will be a slow process, and 
one which can only succeed in its accomplishment 
through the action of the United States along the 
lines of a fixed poUcy. 

The United States in association with a strong 
China, should it be possible to create a strong 
China, would establish a power which could give 
peace to the Pacific, as both the United States and 
China are not war-provoking nations, both of 
them standing for peace within their sphere of 
influence. As between such an alliance and a 
union with Japan and Great Britain in respect 
to the Pacific, I think that a revived and reorgan- 
ized Russia could be relied upon as a sympathetic 
component part of such a peaceful combination 
of powers. Russia's interests are all in line with 
peace in the Pacific, and consequently she should 
be in sympathy with the poUcy and the aspirations 
of the United States. I do not despair of a rebirth 
of Russia and Russian power under a hmited 
monarchy. I fear it will be impossible to establish 
a RepubHcan form of government in Russia, as 
it is impossible to create a Republic without 
Republicans, and the present regime enthroned at 
Moscow has demonstrated that Russia is without 
Republicans. It is the fervent wish of all well 
wishers of Russia that her gallant people may 
soon find themselves, and under peace and calm- 
ness reorganize within her wide realm a govern- 
ment of power and order. 



Preface xli 

Major General McAndrew, Chief of Staff of the 
American Expeditionary Forces in France, re- 
cently testified before a committee of Congress 
upon the subject of the military policy of the 
United States, in which testimony he says that, 
in the event of war, we must hold both the Pan- 
ama Canal and the Hawaiian Islands. 

Of course; but how? 

The gallant General's plan would appear to be 
to estabhsh one full division of troops on the 
line of the Panama Canal, and another full divi- 
sion of troops in the Hawaiian Islands, admitting 
that, "It is likely that in any war in the Pacific 
we might not at first have the preponderance of 
naval strength." 

But why confine the war to the Pacific? Is it 
not entirely probable that Japan will have an ally 
or allies in the Atlantic, where war would be 
made upon us as well as in the Pacific? 

It would be interesting to have his opinion, in 
view of the ease with which we transported two 
million of men to France, holding the sea, at the 
rate of 250,000 and even 300,000 men a month, 
how, ajter we shall have lost control of the sea, 
as he admits that we should lose control of the 
sea, we can hope to reinforce our garrisons in the 
Panama Canal Zone and in the Hawaiian Islands? 
Pending his further consideration of the subject, 
and assuming that he has stated his full plan for 
the defense of the Panama Canal and Hawaiian 
Islands, I venture to think that under that plan 
we should surely lose the Hawaiian Islands, 
Alaska, and the Panama Canal. 



xlii Preface 

Should our enemy be, for instance, Japan and 
Great Britain, they would absolutely command 
the sea, and consequently they would open the 
war by an attack upon the Panama Canal, which 
great waterway they would be successful in seizing, 
notwithstanding the gallant General's full Division 
of troops. 

In my book I say that the very smallest force 
that should be allotted for the defense of the Pana- 
ma Canal in war is a mobile force of 150,000 men 
aside from and in addition to the allotment of 
Coast Artillery for the defense of the fortifications 
of the Canal Zone. 

Conceding that in a war with Japan and Great 
Britain, or in a war with Japan and reorganized 
and revived Germany, we should lose command 
of the sea, I have prefigured, as I have stated in my 
book, the establishment of a zone of influence for 
the United States covering Mexico, Central 
America, and Colombia, with the right of the con- 
struction and maintenance by the United States of 
a line of railway from the Rio Grande south to 
the Panama Canal. 

I recognize fully that such a railroad would be 
liable to interruption by an attack from the 
enemy, but as we should have the right not only 
to construct but to defend the raihoad from the 
Rio Grande to Panama, we should be in the 
position of being able to pour troops south from 
the Rio Grande over this line of railway, and of 
concentrating our forces against the enemy who 
might have affected a landing anywhere between 



Preface xliii 

the Rio Grande and the Canal, and through 
their defeat, reestabHsh our communication with 
Panama. 

The method of our abihty to make good our 
hold upon such a railroad may be a subject of 
discussion, but I do not regard the plan of such a 
strategic railroad as an open question. It is not 
only a possible, but it is the only possible, plan 
under which we can have a chance of holding the 
Panama Canal in war with any one or two naval 
powers of superior naval strength to the United 
States, the American fleet having been driven from 
the sea. Should the railroad be broken by the 
landing of the enemy and the seizure of the rail- 
road, he must be defeated, and the integrity of our 
line of railway communication with Panama must 
he reestablished. There is no discussing this pro- 
position. The enemy in possession of this line of 
communication with Panama must be defeated 
and our communication with Panama must be 
restored; nor should this be at all impossible, as 
we would be able to pour our troops into the gap 
in sufficient numbers to destroy the enemy. 

But the maintenance of our hold upon Panama 
in any case is not merely a matter of men, but of 
guns, of munitions of war, and of supplies as well. 
In no war have armaments and munitions counted 
for so much as in the recent European war. Such 
a strategic railway will be quite as necessary in 
supplying our garrison in time of war in the Canal 
Zone with guns and ammunition and food for our 
troops, as with reinforcements, and with the 



xliv Preface 

command of the sea lost to the United States, we 
may count upon the loss of the Panama Canal, 
without such a railway from the Rio Grande to 
Panama. Nor will it be possible for us to build 
such a line of railway to Panama after war begins. 
We could not then acquire the right to construct 
such a railroad from the nations through which it 
is proposed that it shall run. That would be 
the work of peacible negotiation. I quite under- 
stand that laisser-faire is the cornerstone of our 
military system, but we must abandon it in respect 
to the Panama Canal unless we are prepared to 
lose the Canal during the period of the war. 

I have discussed this subject quite fully in this 
book, and I refer to the subject in this preface to 
bring the question of the proper garrison for the 
Panama Canal Zone, and the proper method of 
reinforcing and supplying the garrison in war, to 
the attention of the army in order that they may 
formulate a practical and a practicable plan for 
holding the Panama Canal, should we find our- 
selves face to face with a preponderance of naval 
power in war. But in asking the army to give 
attention to this question, I do not mean that the 
General Staff should draw up a beautiful theoretic 
plan of operations and then, having admired their 
handiwork sufficiently, to put it away in a drawer 
of a cabinet at the War College, proclaiming to the 
world that the problem has been solved. 

I have long entertained the hope that should 
Japan attack us that it may be in alliance with 
Great Britain, because our northern frontier 



Preface xlv 

marches for three thousand miles on England's 
flank, and should we lose possession of the Panama 
Canal, of the Hawaiian Islands, and of Alaska by 
our fleets being driven from the sea, that we should 
so firmly have established ourselves in Canada 
during the progress of the war as to be in a position 
to dictate the terms of peace to our enemies, and 
to compel the restoration of the Panama Canal, 
the Hawaiian Islands and Alaska, and possibly the 
Philippine Islands, should we want them back, to 
the jurisdiction of our Flag, as a condition prece- 
dent to any treaty of peace that we should be will- 
ing to negotiate. I have long held that almost the 
only power that Great Britain need hold in dread 
is the United States, because, should she ever go 
to war with the United States, she would find the 
war a long one, and one which can end in but one 
way, in the disintegration of the British Empire. 

Why do not our soldiers and our sailors, and our 
statesmen as well, see situations as they are? 
Why do they shut their eyes to the military and 
naval needs of the nation ? 

If it is possible for me to see clearly what the 
nation needs for its defense, why can not they? 
Why should they trifle with half measures, or 
quarter measures? Why should our army officers 
in giving testimony on military matters before 
committees of Congress hold back anything that 
they think should be said to Congress? 

I have said, and I repeat it here again, that the 
advice which our military and naval officers should 
give Congress is the whole truth and nothing but 



xlviii Preface 

ideas of my book. Considering the bearing of 
these letters upon the subject of preparation for 
war, I may be excused from the charge of vanity 
in presenting them to my readers, especially as 
I do not allow myself the liberty of pubUshing 
the names of the authors, which, if published, 
would add weight to their remarks. 

I end this discussion with the expression of the 
most loyal and earnest hope that I may not have 
written in vain. 

Maxwell. Van Zandt Woodhull. 

Washington City, D. C. 
October i6, 19 19. 



Preface xlix 



LETTER FROM AN OFFICER OF THE ARMY. 

The Army and Navy Club, 
Washington. 

1st February, igi6. 
Dear General: 

I have finished with much interest your book on 
"West Point in Our Next War." You say a good 
deal which some of us are only authorized so far 
to think, but I believe that the movement of 
thought is toward your ideas. I write, however, 
to tell you that the British army by a late royal 
warrant has adopted your ideas about the proper 
organization of machine guns. They now form 
a corps like the corps of artillery in that service, 
and are independent of the infantry and cavalry 
in the sense that artillery is. This change is of 
course a result of the experience of the present war. 
As it is quite possible you may not have heard of 
this, for the order is quite recent, I thought you 
might be interested in hearing that the plan which 
you recommend has been carried into effect. 
Yours sincerely, 

LETTER FROM AN OFFICER OF THE NAVY. 

Washington, July ig, 1916. 
My Dear General : 

I have read your book with the greatest interest 
and do not hesitate to say that it presents the 
best exposition of the unprepared condition our 
country is in and the very best and only remedy 
for an improvement. 

I particularly commend the West Point pro- 
position. It is fundamental. 



Preface 



Without a body of officers to train the con- 
scripts they would be useless, and your project 
would procure them at comparatively Uttle ex- 
pense. If you could induce intelligent Members 
of Congress to read your book I am sure there 
would be action at once. 

I fully agree with you in everything the book 
contains except perhaps some little difference in 
your estimate of some of the higher officers of the 
Rebellion. 

With high regards, believe me, 

Very sincerely yours, 



INTRODUCTION 

I AM the son of an officer of the old navy, a 
Regular of Regulars, and I had the honour to 
serve in the Volunteer Army of the United States 
during the War of the Rebellion. 

My Father was a consistent advocate of a large 
and powerful navy. As a youth I met and knew 
many officers of the two services, friends of my 
Father, many of whom distinguished themselves 
in the army and navy of the United States, and 
in the service of the South, during the great war. 

My Father's loyalty was of the sacred kind, 
which made his devotion to his country a part 
of his religion. Admiral Ammen, writing to me 
several years after the war, speaking of my Father, 
said, "His gallantry was unquestioned by all who 
knew him." 

Reared under such auspices, associated from 
my earliest days up to the period of his untimely 
death with so noble a character as my Father, it 
would have been impossible for me not to have 
assimilated as my own some of his feelings and 
beliefs as to the service, and as to the officers of 
the army and navy, his associates and comrades. 

liii 



liv Introduction 

Owing to the temper of the times, and to the 
spirit of secession which filled the air, my Father, 
whose belief in the national character of our people 
was unchangeable, wisely, very wisely as I have felt 
throughout my life, sent me to Miami University 
in the State of Ohio, instead of sending me to 
Harvard, for my college education. He told me 
that I should find the boys with whom I should 
play on the college campus the same kind of boys 
with whom I had been playing in Washington; 
that in character and in all essentials these boys 
were Americans, differing from the boys in the 
East only in non-essentials. I was the only boy 
from the east of the Alleghenies in the college. 
^My associates were from Ohio, Indiana, Michi- 
gan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. After the novelty 
of my association wore off, and after I had be- 
come used to the difference of intonation between 
the East and the West, I found that my Father 
had been right: that the boys — of course we 
called ourselves young men — whom I met in the 
classrooms and on the college campus were in all 
essentials the same kind of boys as my young 
friends in Washington — all Americans, whether 
they happened to come from Indiana or Michigan, 
from Kentucky or Ohio. I look back, across the 
dead years, upon my residence at Miami with 
profound thankfulness for the judgment shown by 
my Father in sending me to this Western college, 
and with the tenderest recollections of my in- 



Introduction Iv 

structors and my college associates, from what- 
soever part of the country they may have 
come. 

While at college, in anticipation of entering the 
army, I read several military books, notably 
Jomini's Art of War, which was quite the vogue in 
the earnest days of 1 861-1862. I followed the 
movements of the armies, as reported in the public 
press, with close attention, often, I fear, to the 
prejudice of my studies ; but, like most of the young 
men about me, talked and thought much of military 
matters, impatiently awaiting the coming of the 
time when I should have the opportunity of going 
into the army. 

After entering the army, guided by experience, 
I had to modify m.any of my impressions which 
I had considered as firmly bedded as the great hills, 
and to form new impressions as time passed and 
experience grew. In the army, in time of war, 
men grow rapidly; they think fast, they observe 
acutely, and they form impressions readily. If 
this be not the effect of service upon them they 
are useless in the army. If a man does not grow, 
and grow rapidly, as experiences unfold them- 
selves, he may have all the technique of the pro- 
fession at his fingers' ends, and yet be worthless 
as a soldier. 

I think I may say that I carried into the army a 
clear and observing mind, disciplined by study, 
and a disposition to do my duty cheerfully and 



Ivi Introduction 

to the best of my ability, a disposition which 
I afterward found to be the true spirit of dis- 
cipHne. 

So much by way of introduction to my entrance 
into the volunteer army of the United States, 
shortly after I had passed my nineteenth birthday, 
toward the end of 1862. 

That my experience in the army during the 
great war entitles me to speak upon military sub- 
jects will become apparent from the perusal of the 
following extract from the "Rebellion Records," 
and the three following letters, two from Major- 
General John A. Logan of the volunteers, and 
one from Major-General Oliver O. Howard of 
the army, two as gallant gentlemen as ever wore 
swords. 

The extract from the "Rebellion Records" is 
from the official report of Major-General Lew 
Wallace of the battle of the Monocacy, which was 
fought on the 9th of July, 1864, in which battle 
I acted as General Wallace's Adjutant-General. 
Although one of the smaller battles of the war, 
the battle of the Monocacy was one of the most 
important in its results fought during the war, as it 
undoubtedly saved Washington from capture by 
the army of Lieutenant-General Early, giving 
time for the arrival of reinforcements at the 
national capital. In his very interesting account 
of the battle given in his Memoirs, General 
Wallace mentions me several times by name. 



Introduction Ivii 

The extract from General Wallace's report of the 
battle will be found at page 199, series I., vol. 
xxxvii., part I., War of the Rebellion. Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 
pubhshed by the War Department; 

Extract. — Besides the officers mentioned in my 
infonnal report of loth of July, the following de- 
serve similar notice for their excellent behaviour 
in action and the services they rendered: Lieut. - 
Colonel Lynd Catlin, Assistant Inspector-General; 
Major Max V.Z. Woodhull, Acting Assistant Adjutant- 
General; and Major James R. Ross, Senior Aide-de- 
camp, all of my Staff. 

After the battle of the Monocacy I was ordered 
to duty in the War Department, in the office of 
the Inspector-General of the army, Colonel James 
A. Hardie: and here I would venture to remind 
the gentlemen of the army of today, that during 
the great war the position of Inspector-General 
of the army only carried the rank of Colonel. I 
served with Colonel Hardie for about sk weeks, 
when, on my own request, I was ordered to the 
Western Army. 

I had known the Adjutant-General of the army. 
General Townsend, as a youth, but I made the 
acquaintance, while on duty in the War Depart- 
ment, of Colonel Vincent, General Fry, Colonel 
Ruggles, Colonel Williams, Colonel Pelouze — 
all of the Adjutant-General's department, General 



Iviii Introduction 

Fry then being on duty as Provost Marshal 
General. I learned to esteem highly as officers 
of especial worth Colonel Vincent and General Fry. 
It had been my fortune to receive my training 
as an Assistant Adjutant-General under the eye 
of Colonel Wm. D. Whipple, an officer of the 
army, and I wrote to him immediately on report- 
ing for duty in the War Department, asking for 
service in the Western Army. I received the 
following letter from him upon which I based my 
request to the Adjutant-General for orders to the 
Army of the Tennessee. 

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, 
Near Atlanta, Ga., Aug. i6, 1864. 
Dear Major: 

Your letter was received at the time changes were 
taking place in the commanders of our armies, and I 
deferred action upon it until things became a little 
more settled. I have since conversed with Major- 
General Howard, commanding the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, on the subject. 

I enclose a short telegram from him which explains 
itself. If you can get ordered to him, he would be 
glad to have you come. He is a very pleasant officer 
and I think you will like him, and it would afford you 
an excellent opportunity to participate in this glorious 
campaign. 

Sincerely yours, 

Wm. D. Whipple, 
A. A.-G. 
Maj. Maxwell Woodhull, 
A. A.-G. 



Introduction lix 

U. S. Military Telegraph 

15 186 

By telegraph from Howard. 
To Gen. Whipple. 

Let Woodhull come. I can assign him to duty. 

0. O. Howard, 

Maj.-Gen. 



I reported to General Howard in Georgia, and 
was assigned to duty on his staff as aide-de-camp, 
and also to duty with the chief of artillery of the 
Army of the Tennessee as Assistant Adjutant- 
General. 

Upon the capture of Savannah I was recom- 
mended by General Howard to General Osterhaus, 
then in temporary command of the 15th Army 
Corps, as Assistant Adjutant-General of the Corps, 
and upon the return of Major-General John A. 
Logan (a few days later) to the command of the 
Corps, I was promoted, on his recommendation, 
to be Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant- 
General of the 15th Army Corps. When General 
Logan was assigned to the command of the Army 
of the Tennessee he took me with him, under as- 
signment, as Assistant Adjutant-General of the 
army. 

General Logan's letters, referred to above, are 
as follows : 



Ix Introduction 

First Letter. 

Headquarters Army Tennessee, 
Louisville, Ky., July 31, 1865. 
Col. Max Woodhull, 

A. A. -Gen' I. 
My dear Sir: 

I cannot sever our official relations without express- 
ing to you my entire satisfaction with the manner in 
which you have conducted the Adjutant-General's 
Department since you have been with me, and also 
without giving you to understand that I recognize 
the fact that your conduct has at all times been that 
of a soldier and gentleman, ever ready and willing to 
perform any duty that was imposed upon you. You 
have a bright future before you; be energetic and 
assiduous hereafter as you have ever been while with 
me, and you have nothing to fear. Wherever you 
may go, or in whatever position you may be placed, 
be doubly assured that you have my kindest regards, 
as well as my best wishes for your future welfare and 
prosperity. 

Your true friend, 

John A. Logan, 
Major-General. 
Second Letter. 

Headquarters Army Tennessee, 

August I, 1865. 
Lt.-Gen'l U. S. Grant, 

Com'd'g, &c. 
Sir: 

Allow me to earnestly recommend Col. Max Wood- 
hull for a position in the regular army. He has 
served with me as A. A. -General since I left Savannah 
in the 15 A. C. and Army of the Tennessee, and a 



Introduction Ixi 

more efficient officer in his Department is not in the 
army anywhere. He is honest, energetic, and capa- 
ble; he is a young man of rare abilities, and such 
a man as should be placed in a good position. I think 
for his age I have not at any time made the acquaint- 
ance of a man with more attainments than he possesses. 
I think he should at least have the rank of Major in 
the Department of the Adjt.-General, and I do hope 
that you will give him such assistance as will insure 
him such position. 

Your friend truly, 

John A. Logan, 

Maj.-Geti'l. 

After the muster out of the Army of the Tennes- 
see I took a month's leave of absence, and then 
reported to Major-General Oliver O, Howard as 
Adjutant-General of the Bureau of Refugees, Freed- 
men, and Abandoned Lands, which position I held 
until May, 1866, when I resigned from the army. 

I was brevetted Colonel on the recommendation 
of Major-General John A. Logan, and Brigadier- 
General on the recommendation of Major-General 
Oliver O. Howard. 

Letter from General Howard. 

War Department, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands. 

Washington, May 20, 1866. 
Bvt. Brig.-General Max Woodhull. 
My dear General: 
As you have decided to leave the service, permit 
me to express to you the great satisfaction your public 



Ixli Introduction 

service has afforded me. You joined me in the midst 
of that trying campaign under General Sherman, just 
before Hood had crossed the Tennessee River, and 
before the eventful march from Atlanta to Savannah 
had been undertaken. You shared in that campaign 
on my staff and so conspicuous your merit appeared 
to me that I recommended you to Gen. Osterhaus for 
Adjutant of the 15th Army Corps. You were sub- 
sequently promoted to Lieut. -Colonel and Assistant 
Adjutant-General of that Corps. In this position 
Gen. Logan on his return honoured you with his confi- 
dence, and you aided in no small degree in promoting 
the system and order that prevailed in the 15th 
Corps during the remarkable marches and combats 
that occurred on the march from Savannah, Ga., to 
Washington, D. C. Your uniform courtesy to me, 
your promptitude and efficiency as an officer, and 
your fidelity to duty during that time, and subse- 
quently in the trying duties of this Bureau, will not 
soon be forgotten. 

Whenever the need calls you, look to me for any aid 
I may be able to extend to you. 

Wishing you a prosperous life and a sure immortality 
among the blessed, 

I am affectionately 

Your friend, 

0. O. Howard, 

Maj.-Gen., Com'r, etc. 

These letters from Generals Logan and Howard 
are autograph letters. General Logan's letter to 
Lieut.-General Grant was never presented, because 



Introduction Ixiii 

I had no wish to go into the regular army. It 
may not be inappropriate for me to say, however, 
that I could have gone into the regular army 
at the close of the war had I cared to do so. In- 
deed, the Adjutant-General of the army. General 
Townsend, said that I was one of the volunteer 
officers he wished to see transferred to the regular 
service. 

In the following pages I have written freely and 
frankly, and as I am giving my views and opinions 
upon military subjects, I have not hesitated to 
write personally, using with entire freedom the 
phrases "I think" and "I believe." 

I have stated what I believe to be the true 
method of preparing the army for the eventualities 
of the future, indeed, the o?ily method of prepar- 
ing the army for the eventualities of the future, and 
I submit this book to the consideration of my 
countrymen, asking for it their candid judgment. 

Maxwell Van Zandt Woodhull. 

Washington, D. C. 
November 20, 19 15. 



CONTENTS 

PAOR 

Preface v 

Introduction l»i 

CHAPTER I 
Unready: A Warning .... I 

CHAPTER II 

West Point: Its Expansion and Reor- 
ganization . . . . . -38 

CHAPTER III 

The Only Way to Create and to Maintain 
AN Army ....... 109 

CHAPTER IV 
The Organization of an Army for War . 179 

CHAPTER V 
The Diplomacy of National Defence . . 223 



POSTSCRIPT, NOVEMBER 20, 1915 

A Consideration of the Plan of the Secre- 
tary OF War for the National Defence 253 



West Point in our Next War 



CHAPTER I 
unready: a warning 

WITHIN the past two years a general officer 
of the army said to me, "The army of the 
United States is essentially a peace army. " 

The remark was made and was received as a 
matter of course : as merely 'the statement of an 
incontrovertible fact. 

Do the people of the United States know that 
their army is essentially a peace army? Do they 
want an army which is merely a peace army, or do 
they want an army capable of defending the country 
in the event of war being forced upon the nation? 

The United States is always for peace except 
when her vital interests and rights are attacked, 
and then she makes war in self-defence. She does 
not belong to the class of ambitious nations ever 
striving for the expansion of boundaries. She is 
content with her present boundaries, and yet she 



2 West Point in our Next War 

has assumed, within the past few years, serious 
international and terntorial responsibilities. 

She has the longest coast line of any nation in 
the world, and fronts the two great oceans, facing 
the military and naval powers of Europe and Asia. 
She is open to attack on the Atlantic and on the 
Pacific, in the Caribbean Sea, and in the Gulf of 
Mexico. 

Yet her army is "essentially a peace army," 
and her navy, upon which arm of the national 
defence the first shock of war would fall, is of 
insufficient strength to meet successfully the 
weight of attack of the fleets of any one of the 
three or four great Powers. 

Sea power, or the power to defeat an enemy in 
battle on the seas, is of pre-eminent importance to 
the United States. 

Without command of the sea we could not hold 
the Panama Canal, nor could we retain control of the 
Hawaiian Islands, of the Philippines, or of Alaska. 

As to the Monroe Doctrine, its life is in the 
power of our guns. So long as we can command 
the sea it is a sound and living force in interna- 
tional law. The moment we lose command of the 
sea, or find ourselves in a position where our com- 
mand of the sea may safely be questioned by a 
first-class Power, we shall be compelled to let the 
Monroe Doctrine drift into the abyss of withered 
ambitions. 

It was argued during the period of enthusiasm 



Unready 3 

under the influence of which the construction of 
the Panama Canal was undertaken, that the build- 
ing of the canal would double at least the efficiency 
of our navy. Visions of the concentration of our 
fleets in the Atlantic or in the Pacific as we should 
will, or as occasion should demand, victoriously 
to meet on either ocean the fleets of an enemy, 
filled the imagination of the country. 

Instead, however, of the canal furnishing an inte- 
rior line of communication and defence, the con- 
struction of the canal has increased in a vast degree 
not only the naval and military, but also the po- 
litical danger of complications with possibly am- 
bitious enemies. Instead of increasing our naval 
efficiency, the canal has brought into the problem 
of national defence new responsibilities, so that 
now not only are we compelled to be in readiness 
to defend ourselves on the Atlantic and the Pacific 
but also to hold command of the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Caribbean Sea in order to retain possession 
of the Panama Canal. 

The construction of the Panama Canal, assum- 
ing that the peace of the world could be guaran- 
teed, is a great accomplishment. But the peace 
of the world cannot be guaranteed, consequently 
the canal has become a prize of war of the 
nations. Instead of being an influence for peace, 
it IS an inducement to war, and has increased, by 
extending the sphere of our responsibilities, the need 
for increased armaments and more battleships. 



4 West Point in our Next War 

Our fleet is inferior to the fleets of Great Britain 
and Germany and will soon drop below that of 
France. While it is true that our Atlantic 
Fleet comprises the greater part of our fighting 
strength, the protection of our interests in the 
Gulf of Mexico, in the Caribbean Sea, and in the 
eastern and western Pacific compel a distinct 
allotment of ships to those seas, and our avail- 
able battle fleets on the Atlantic and the Pacific 
are consequently outclassed by the battle fleets 
of the other first-class Powers. They have re- 
stricted coast lines to defend whereas we have 
vast and, from a military and naval point of 
view, almost illimitable reaches of coasts to 
defend. 

The construction of the Panama Canal, instead 
of increasing the availability of our fleet for na- 
tional defence, renders necessary the construction 
and maintenance of a distinct Caribbean Sea fleet 
for the defence of that sea. Without such a fleet, 
strong enough to hold the Caribbean Sea against 
any probable enemy, the Panama Canal can be 
seized and held by any enemy dominating the 
Caribbean. 

Whereas the principles of the art of war are 
immutable, their application changes with the 
changing conditions of the world. 

In the days of sailing ships, and in the early 
days of steam men-of-war, there was a limit to 
oversea operations determined by the carrying 



Unready 5 

capacity of the merchant marine which could be 
commanded for the movement of troops. 

This rule holds good today, with the difference, 
however, that the carrying capacity of the mer- 
chant marine of the world has been so vastly in- 
creased that what was difficult then is easy of 
accomplishment now once command of the sea be 
obtained. During the great war we dispatched 
by sea large expeditions against Hatteras Inlet, 
Charleston, Fort Pulaski, Mobile, and for the cap- 
ture of New Orleans and Fort Fisher in co-opera- 
tion with the fleet, in all of which expeditions the 
arms of the United States were successful; and 
during the greater part of the war we maintained 
an entirely satisfactory supply service by sea 
for our armies in the coast States of the South, 
and for the vessels of the blockading fleet from 
the capes of the Chesapeake to the Mexican border. 
Now it is entirely possible to mobilize fleets of trans- 
ports of sufficient tonnage to transport large 
armies across the seas for the invasion of hostile 
shores, and to maintain such armies in the field 
by re-enforcements, and with supplies and muni- 
tions of war. 

The guns of the fleets of fifty years ago were 
inferior in effectiveness of fire to the guns of fort- 
resses, calibre for calibre. The stable gun plat- 
forms of the fortress guns rendered their fire more 
effective than that of the guns of fleets. 

But now, with almost stable gun platforms 



6 West Point in our Next War 

furnished by great battleships and dreadnoughts, 
the guns of the fleet and the guns of the fortresses 
are on a much nearer basis of equality, with the 
difference, however, still in favour of the land 
defence, gun for gun, and calibre for calibre, but 
by no means so clearly in favour of the army as 
was the case fifty or even twenty-five years ago. 
The determinative difference now is in range of 
fire, and here the dreadnoughts of foreign navies, 
with their 15-inch guns, have an advantage over 
the guns in our fortifications. 

Our coast defences were mostly planned and 
constructed before the day of the modem battle- 
ship and of the modem gun. Whether guns of 
present heavy calibre have been installed in all 
of our fortifications supplanting guns of an earlier 
date and construction, I do not know. I doubt, 
however, if the defensive power of our fortifica- 
tions has increased proportionally with the in- 
creased power of offence in the fleets of the great 
powers. 

The usual defensive work on our coasts is either 
an open work at the rear, or is weak on its land 
face. The effort of the engineers engaged in their 
construction has been directed to the development 
and maintenance of seaward fire, relying upon the 
protection of the good God for defence from land 
attack. Our defensive works have been built to 
defend our harbours from attack by hostile fleets 
without regard to the changed conditions of mod- 



Unready 7 

em war which not only provide for, but almost 
demand, simultaneous attacks by both land and 
sea forces. 

Without a mobile army of sufficient strength to 
defeat an enemy who may have effected a landing 
on our coast from the convoys of a hostile fleet, 
I do not regard a single harbour on our coast, or 
the cities lying on their shores, as safe from success- 
ful attack by the fleet and army of any one of the 
first-class Powers with whom we should be at war. 

The defeat, or serious crippling, of our fleet 
would open every harbour on our coast, and the 
coast States of the Union, to attack by a combined 
naval and military force of any one of the first- 
class Powers with whom we might be at war. Nor 
need there be the slightest doubt as to the suffi- 
ciency of transport capacity abroad to land, and 
to maintain by reinforcements, an army of from 
a quarter to a half milHon of men on our shores, 
once our naval defence had been broken or driven 
from the sea. 

The same argument and the same course of 
reasoning leads to the same conclusion as to the 
Panama Canal. The first condition for the de- 
fence of the Panama Canal is a powerful Carib- 
bean Sea fleet, which could meet on a basis of 
equality the convoying fleet of an enemy, and 
defeat or seriously cripple such fleet of the enemy 
before the army under its convoy could effect a 
landing on the Isthmus of Panama. The second 



8 West Point in our Next War 

condition for the defence of the Panama Canal is 
to be found, and can only be found, in the presence 
of a mobile army large enough to insure the defeat 
of any expeditionary force of an enemy which 
should succeed in effecting a landing on the 
Isthmus. 

It should not be doubted that the fortifications 
erected for the defence of Colon and Panama, and 
of the debouches of the canal into the Caribbean 
Sea and the Pacific Ocean, have been intelligently 
constructed and that the guns in place are of ade- 
quate calibre and range, but it is seriously doubted 
whether they are defensible from land attack. 

Equally must it be conceded that they would 
amount to little, so far as the defence of the canal 
is concerned, without the aid of an adequate 
mobile army on the Isthmus, because it is not 
thought that the canal would be attacked by a 
naval force alone. It is believed that any attack 
on the canal will be made by a combined naval 
and military force, the naval or convoying and 
covering force being deemed to be of sufficient 
strength to overcome our Caribbean Sea fleet, 
and the military force being deemed to be sufficient 
to overcome any military force which we might 
have on the Isthmus. 

It is not pretended that a mobile army of one 
hundred and fifty thousand men would be suffi- 
cient to hold the Panama Canal against the attack 
of one of the first-class Powers, but it may be 



Unready 9 

assumed that we should lose the canal in war with 
a first-class Power should we attempt the defence 
of the canal zone with a smaller army than one 
hundred and fifty thousand men. 

With this estimate of a mobile army of one 
hundred and fifty thousand men, in addition to 
the necessary coast artillery to man the guns in 
the coast defences, required for the defence of the 
Panama Canal, let us see how we are prepared 
at present to resist an attack on the canal. 

The Secretary of War says in his last admirable 
annual report addressed to the President, and 
dated November 15, 19 14: 

The regular army of the United States on June 
30, 1914, consisted of 4701 officers and 87,781 men, 
. . . which includes Quartermaster Corps 3809, 
and Hospital Corps 4055, ... at that time the 
various characters of troops were disposed of approx- 
imately as follows .... 

In the canal zone, i Regiment of Infantry, 3 Com- 
panies of Coast Artillery (aggregate strength 2179). 
... Of the troops that we now have, the numbers 
and organizations of which are shown above, It will 
be necessary In the near future to take from the 
United States and put in the . . . Panama Canal 
Zone I Regiment of Infantry, i Squadron of Cavalry, 
I Battalion of Field Artillery, i Company of Engineers, 
and 12 Companies of Coast Artillery, 4774 men. 

Assuming a force of between five thousand and 
six thousand men as constituting the strength of 



10 West Point in our Next War 

the army of the United States on the Isthmus of 
Panama — and I doubt if the force at present on 
the Isthmus is of such strength — how insufficient 
it appears to be for the defence of the canal! 
How utterly inadequate to defeat the landing of 
an hostile army under the protection of the guns 
of a victorious hostile fleet! 

All that the commanding general of our forces 
on the Isthmus of Panama could possibly do in 
the event of being attacked by a greatly superior 
force, would be to blow up the locks of the canal 
and render its use by an enemy during the progress 
of the war utterly impossible. 

Nor could we reinforce our garrison on the 
Isthmus of Panama, except through certain diplo- 
matic arrangements discussed in the concluding 
chapter of this book, should we find ourselves at 
war with one of the first-class naval and military 
Powers, without command of the sea; and with 
the demands upon our fleet, as the first line of de- 
fence of our home coasts and harbours, it is difficult 
to see how, unless vastly increased in ships and 
guns, our navy could meet the first attack of the 
enemy upon our coasts and yet provide a Carib- 
bean Sea fleet large enough to defeat a naval and 
military attack upon the Panama Canal. 

Holding the Panama Canal makes it imperative 
that we should command the sea: not only com- 
mand the Atlantic and the eastern Pacific, but 
also the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. 



Unready ii 

Losing command of the sea, we lose the Panama 
Canal, unless, before hostilities shall begin, we fill 
the fortresses defending the debouches of the 
canal with coast artillery, and establish upon the 
Isthmus a mobile army large enough to defeat a 
land attack from an 'enemy able to overcome, 
through the superiority of his fleet, the sea 
defence of the canal by our fleet. 

I have indicated the minimum of the mobile 
army needed for the defence of the Panama Canal 
as one hundred and fifty thousand men. But 
mere men without ammunition, and without suffi- 
cient military supplies and provisions, do not 
constitute an effective army. Without adequate 
supplies of ammunition, military supplies, and 
provisions — and modem war seems to demand an 
illimitable supply of ammunition — we could not 
hold the Panama Canal. 

Is there reason to believe that the country ap- 
preciates the danger there is of losing the Panama 
Canal should we find ourselves at war with a 
first-class Power? 

As shown above, the Secretary of War reported 
to the President under date of November 15, 
19 14, that the regular army "on June 30, 19 14, 
consisted of 4701 officers and 87,781 men," and 
that he hoped soon to be able to concentrate in the 
Panama Canal Zone between 5000 and 6000 men. 

With such a force, how can the Panama Canal 
be defended? 



12 West Point in our Next War 

With the demands on our fleet so great as they 
are, and as they will become the moment war 
breaks out, what reason is there to believe that 
the navy can furnish for the defence of the canal 
a fleet strong enough to command the Caribbean 
Sea? 

What is true of the Panama Canal is equally 
true of the Hawaiian Islands and of the Philip- 
pines, and equally true of Alaska, if it should profit 
an enemy, strong enough for the effort, to attack 
Alaska. 

In the same report of November 15, 1914, the 
Secretary of War gives our strength in the Hawai- 
ian Islands, in the Philippines, and in Alaska as 
follows : 

In the Hawaiian Islands, 3 Regiments Infantry, i 
Regiment Cavalry, i Regiment Field Artillery, i 
Company Engineers, 8 Companies Coast Artillery 
(aggregate strength 8195). 

In the Philippines, 3>^ Regiments Infantry, 2 
Regiments Cavalry, i Regiment Field Artillery, 2 
Companies Engineers, 11 Companies Coast Artillery 
(aggregate strength 9572). 

In addition to the above troops of the regular 
army there are in the Philippines fifty-two com- 
panies of Philippine Scouts aggregating 182 of- 
ficers and 5733 enlisted men. 

"In Alaska one Regiment of Infantry (aggre- 
gate 862)." 



Unready 13 

It is ludicrously absurd to suppose that these 
garrisons could defend these islands and hold 
Alaska in war. 

Nor is our Asiatic Fleet a war fleet: and it is 
difficult to see how it could be increased to the 
proportions required to give it strength to resist 
the attack of the fleet of any one of the first-class 
Powers because of the demands upon the navy 
for the defence of our Atlantic and Pacific coasts 
and of the Panama Canal. 

It would be matter of sincere regret should we 
lose the Philippine Islands in war, and yet lose 
them we should because it would be impossible 
for us to re-enforce the garrison, and maintain its 
supplies of ammunition during the war, without 
complete command of the sea, and it would be 
impossible for us to hope to hold command of 
the sea against the sea power of any one of the 
nations which would be likely to challenge our 
right to the possession of the islands, without an 
unhoped-for increase ot the navy. 

No attempt to estimate the number of troops 
required for the successful defence of the Philip- 
pines is undertaken because of its seeming futility. 

Should war break out with one of the first-class 
Powers, the commanding general in the Philip- 
pines would have but one course open to him. 
He should at once concentrate all the troops under 
his command, with all accessible ammunition and 
material of war, at some one defensible point in 



14 West Point in our Next War 

the islands, and there to provision himself for a 
siege of at least a year. The point selected for 
the final stand of our army in the islands should 
be chosen for purely military reasons, free from 
all political considerations ; and it should be chosen 
especially because of its freedom from dominance 
by commanding heights, which, if seized by the 
enemy, would demand the evacuation of the posi- 
tion or the surrender of the army. The only hope 
of the commanding general would be that he 
might be able to hold this position until the end 
of the war, a hope which it is feared would end in 
disappointment. 

All that our fleet could do on the breaking out 
of war would be to sail away and leave the islands 
to their fate. 

Instead of waiting for the outbreak of war the 
Philippine Islands should be sold to Germany at 
the conclusion of the present European War, re- 
serving to ourselves in the treaty of sale and ces- 
sion certain advantages of trade with the islands. 
The presence of Germany in the Philippines should 
be regarded as making for our interests, because 
her possession of the islands would create a much- 
needed balance of power in the Pacific, and would 
give her a direct interest in the maintenance of 
the neutrahty of the Panama Canal through its 
possession by ourselves. The chief consideration 
of the sale and cession of the Philippine Islands to 
Germany to be expressed in the treaty of sale and 



Unready 15 

cession shall be a stipulation on the part of Ger- 
many guaranteeing in perpetuity the possession 
of the Panama Canal to the United States. 

Germany could colonize the Philippine Islands, 
and could develop their resources as we cannot. 
They could become a constituent part of the Ger- 
man Empire. They can never become a constituent 
part of the Republic of the United States, because 
our Republic is founded upon the principle of the 
citizenship of its people. Germany could make 
the islands a great naval and military stronghold 
in the East by settling in the islands considerable 
military colonies, and she could find homes on 
the fertile lands of the islands for millions of her 
subjects, who, under her aggressive civilization, 
would assimilate the present inhabitants to herself 
greatly to their own advantage. 

With the Philippines in her possession, Germany 
need not let her eyes rest greedily upon southern 
Brazil, contenting herself with the commercial 
advantages which she derives from the colony of 
her people settled in that section of the southern 
republic. 

The Philippines, lying upon the line of commun- 
ication between British India and Japan, Ger- 
many would measurably neutralize, or at least 
limit to a certain extent, the offensive strength of 
those allies in the Pacific, thereby creating the 
much-needed balance of power in the Pacific Ocean. 

Under such circumstances the possession of the 



i6 West Point in our Next War 

Panama Canal by the United States would be so 
much more to the interest of Germany than the 
possession of the canal herself, that, so far as we 
may look into the future, the cession of the Philip- 
pines to Germany, with or without a guarantee of 
our possession of the canal in the treaty of cession, 
would, of itself, guarantee our possession of the 
canal. The inclusion of such a clause in the treaty, 
however, upon which we should insist as the chief 
consideration for the cession of the islands, would 
not only insure us the support of Germany in 
holding the canal should war come upon the 
United States through the desire on the part of 
any other nation to possess the canal, but the possi- 
bility that the flags of Germany and the United 
States should fly side by side in the breeze of battle 
would have a sensibly chilling effect upon the 
ambition of any of the Powers desiring the pos- 
session of the canal. 

That we have the legal right to sell the Philip- 
pines cannot be doubted. The capture of Manila 
took place after the signing of the preliminaries 
of peace between Spain and the United States, 
and consequently our title to the islands cannot 
be held to be a title by conquest. 

We paid Spain $20,000,000 for her property and 
rights in the islands, and the Philippines became 
ours to do with as we pleased. 

The officious in contradistinction to the offi- 
cial diplomatic attitude of our country toward 



Unready 17 

Russia during the Russo-Japanese War is unac- 
countable from any correct view of our interests 
in the Pacific. Our interests called for a strong 
Russia, with open ports on the Pacific Ocean 
throughout the whole year. The long and loyal 
friendship between Russia and the United States, 
and the absence of points of contest or conflict 
between the two countries, seemed to assure the 
continuance of friendly relations between Russia 
and the United States; and a strong Russia in the 
Pacific should have been taken as the guarantee 
of the maintenance of a balance of power in the 
North Pacific. Instead of a strong Russia we find 
a strong Japan, and the consequent complete 
destruction of the balance of power in the Pacific. 
This destruction of the balance of power in the 
Pacific places us vis-d-vis with Japan. 

This great and almost uncontrollable power of 
Japan does not appear, for the moment, to be 
matter of serious concern to us. The eyes of 
Japan are fixed upon the continent of Asia and 
she seems to see there the seat of her expanding 
power. She has annexed to her empire the king- 
dom of Corea, and she is advancing into the heart 
of China with, as yet, undeterminate plans, but 
with her eyes full of the light of the future. 

Japan knows very well that she can seize the 
Philippines the moment she deems that the time 
has come for action. She looks upon the United 
States as her locum tenens in the islands, and she 



1 8 West Point in our Next War 

does not wish us to leave the islands in behalf of 
any other Power. She knows our present impo- 
tence, and is content to let matters stand as they 
are. But when the hour strikes she proposes to 
drive us out of the islands. 

But she is venturing upon endeavours on the 
continent of Asia which hold within the mantle of 
time great surprises and possibly great misfor- 
tunes. At present her way seems clear and her 
future bright. Leaving out of account the great 
reserve force in a people so vast as the Chinese, 
occupying a country so vast as China, it would 
seem that Japan's hold upon the imperial country 
cannot be shaken. Japan occupies a place in 
China similar to that of England in France in the 
time of the Black Prince. 

Has the future the same transformation in store 
for Japan? 

But whether continuously victorious or ulti- 
mately vanquished Japan regards herself as the 
inheritor of the Philippines. She does not wish 
to disturb our present hold upon the islands 
because she is not ready at present to take pos- 
session of them herself. 

To anticipate this ultimate moment of contest 
would seem to be wisdom on the part of the United 
States, and especially so, if it could be possible 
to use the Philippines in such a way as not only 
to avoid the conflict ourselves but to transfer it to 
other shoulders; and especially wise would it be 



Unready 19 

if we could use the Philippines in such a way as 
to create a balance of power in the Pacific strong 
enough to make for peace in the Eastern world, 
and also to guarantee our possession of the 
Panama Canal by one of the great Powers of the 
world. 

Perpetual peace is an iridescent dream beyond 
the sphere of statesmanship. But the mainte- 
nance of peace for the present, or for the im- 
mediate future, is the duty of the statesman. 

The transfer of the Philippines to Germany 
after the present war would seem to solve the 
problem of the islands to the benefit of the United 
States, while insuring to the islands and their 
inhabitants an enlightened, an energetic, and a 
civilized government. 

The present policy of ultimate withdrawal from 
the Philippines in favour of a portion of the pre- 
sent population of the islands, when they shall be 
fit to assume the responsibilities of government, 
promises no advantage to the United States, no 
advantage to the people of the islands, and fur- 
nishes no guarantee of the maintenance of the 
peace of the Pacific. Indeed, wretched misgovem- 
ment, sanguinary conflicts, and the ultimate an- 
nexation of the islands by Japan as a welcome 
relief from useless bloodshed is the future of the 
Philippines should we withdraw in favour of a 
section of the population of the islands. And 
should we be so foolish as to accompany our act 



20 West Point in our Next War 

of withdrawal with a guarantee of the independ- 
ence of the islands, we should certainly be led 
into war with Japan, because the islands could 
not be expected to maintain their independence, 
unaided by us, and Japan is at hand ready to take 
them over when they shall have become ripe for 
annexation. Japan in the Philippines is of no 
advantage to the United States. Her possession 
of the Philippines not only does not create a 
balance of power in the Pacific, but aggravates 
the present condition of affairs in that ocean. The 
possession of the islands by Japan means the 
virtual closing of their ports to our commerce, 
because we cannot compete with Japan in the 
commerce of the East whenever she resorts to the 
advantages of position, and to the occult advan- 
tages which she affords her commerce. 

Whether our statesmen are clear-sighted enough 
to seize the opportunity which will be afforded at 
the close of the present war to retire from the 
islands in favour of Germany, it is impossible to 
say. But it is the logical solution of an almost 
impossible problem. 

As to the Hawaiian Islands and Alaska, we must 
defend these possessions at all hazards and to the 
death. But to do so, the United States will need 
a large army and a large navy. 

The present force in the Hawaiian Islands is 
barely enough to give warning to the world that 
they belong to the United States. As a war army 



Unready 21 

the force in the islands is a temptation, not a 
means of defence. 

Let it be assumed that our enemy is one of the 
first-class Powers in alliance with Japan, or Japan 
herself. 

How can it be supposed that 8195 men could 
defend the islands from Japanese attack? Ten 
times 8195 would scarcely be sufficient to insure 
the continued possession of the islands by the 
United States. 

In war with Japan, or with Japan and her ally 
Great Britain, what fleet has the United States in 
the Pacific that could keep the seas against the 
fleets of those allies? 

Alaska must be defended as an integral part of 
the United States. The loss of Alaska would be 
a staggering blow to the power and the prestige 
of the United States. Its surrender should only 
be thought of at the end of a long, a bloody, and a 
disastrous war. Meanwhile let us ask each other 
the question whether we are satisfied to rest the 
defence of Alaska upon its present garrison of 862 
men? 

And if we shall be disturbed by the question, 
let us ask ourselves further whether we prefer the 
loss of Alaska to an enemy or preparation for its 
defence? 

Upon the answer to those questions shall 
depend the solution of the problem of national 
defence. 



22 West Point in our Next War 

National defence! The vastness, the grandeur 
of the subject should stir the blood of the most 
stolid of our citizens. 

The United States at bay! 

The United States, facing the defeat of its fleet, 
and the invasion of its territory, should awaken the 
most sluggish of our people to action. 

And we may have to face the destruction of our 
fleet and the presence of an hostile army on our 
shores, unless we withdraw from the fool's para- 
dise in which we are living, and face the future as 
our forefathers faced it when the guns of Great 
Britain were soiinding in their ears. 

But the conditions of the problem of the de- 
fence of the country have changed wonderfully 
in the past fifty years. Fifty years ago, even 
thirty years ago, we might complacently have 
rested upon the reserve power in our people as the 
stronghold of our defence. But today there is no 
occult stronghold; no defence but the defence 
of soldiers with guns in their hands, and cannon 
in abundance, and in a fleet ready to meet upon 
the ocean the fleets of any Power which shall 
array herself against the United States. 

But where are our soldiers? Where our can- 
non? Where the great fleets that shall be strong 
enough to hold the seas against all enemies, and 
keep open communication with the Panama Canal, 
the Hawaiian Islands, and with Alaska? 

The soldiers do not exist; the cannon and the 



Unready 23 

ships are still in the ores of the mountains, un- 
mined and unconverted into the shapes of war. 

They are yet to be created, yet to be called into 
existence. 

In the very able report of Major-General Wother- 
spoon, chief of stafT of the army, dated November 
15, 1914, which report it is sincerely wished could 
be read by every one of our countrymen, the 
General says: 

The army is 154 officers and 7533 enlisted men be- 
low its authorized strength. 

Of the total present enlisted strength of the army 
27.50 per cent., including recruits and recruiting 
parties, belongs to the noncombatant and non-effec- 
tive class, and is not with the colours; 19.45 per cent. 
is in that branch whose special function is coast de- 
fence; and 58.05 per cent, belongs to the mobile forces 
(engineers, cavalry, field artillery, infantry). 

Of the actual strength of the army from the latest 
returns, 1067 officers and 19,899 enlisted men (includ- 
ing recruits and men engaged in recruiting) belong 
to the staff, technical, and noncombatant branches of 
the army. 

Seven hundred and forty-six officers and 17,201 
enlisted men belong to the coast artillery and 2738 
officers and 51,344 enlisted men belong to the mobile 
army (engineers, cavalry, field artillery, and infantry). 

The total strength of the field or mobile forces in 
our army is therefore less than 52,000 enlisted men. 
If from this strength the noncombatants and non- 
effectives, belonging to the regimental, troop, battery, 



24 West Point in our Next War 

and company organizations, such as the noncom- 
missioned staff, musicians, cooks, scouts, etc., which 
aggregate 5376, are deducted, the actual fighting 
strength oj the army with the colours, and without deduc- 
tions for officers and men sick, on furlough, detached 
service, etc., would be 2738 officers and 45,968 enlisted 
men. 

The enlisted men of the mobile army are distributed 
as follows : 

In the United States proper . . . 30,481 

In our foreign possessions 20,863 51,344 

Distributed as follows: 

In the Philippines 7,212 

In the Hawaiian Islands 6,832 

In the Panama Canal Zone. ... 1,681 

In China 690 

In Alaska 431 

In Vera Cruz (since returned to 

the United States) 3,434 20,280 

In Porto Rico Regiment 583 583 20,863 



As to the coast artillery branch of the army. . . . 

Its strength has no relationship to the strength of the 
mobile army other than that the strength of the latter 
must be adequate to protect the fortified positions 
from attack from the rear. . . . 

The coast artillery defences in the United States 
proper are to be manned at the rate of fifty per cent. 



Unready 25 

of the gun and mortar defences by the coast artillery 
corps of the organized militia. 



The strength of the coast artillery is at present 
566 officers and 13,108 enlisted men below the neces- 
sities as estimated by the chief of coast artillery in 
addition to the deficiencies in the coast artillery corps 
of the organized militia. The total deficiencies in the 
coast artillery corps of the regular army and the organized 
militia are, therefore, 856 officers and 24,489 enlisted 
men. 

Naval armament in the last few years has rapidly 
developed, particularly in respect to the calibre of the 
guns, their ranges, and the rapidity with which fire 
from these can be delivered. At the present time the 
tendency is to place on the higher type of battleships 
guns as large as fifteen inches calibre. These guns, 
whilst carrying a projectile of less weight than those 
used with our direct fire type of seacoast guns, have, 
owing to the greater length of the guns and the higher 
powder pressure used, a very distinct advantage in 
range, their range exceeding that of our fourteen-inch 
guns from 2000 to 3000 yards. 

In other words, it is my opinion that careful con- 
sideration should be given, at least in the estab- 
lishment of new defence districts, to the question of 
the calibre, length, and range of the seacoast guns, 
as well as to the question whether the turret system 
for the protection of the gun and its crew should not 
be adopted, in order to put the land defences someivhat 



26 West Point in our Next War 

nearer on a parity with the naval guns which are liable 
to attack them. As a fleet of eight battleships of the 
most modern type can throw against a single turret 
ii8 projectiles per minute, the danger that must 
arise from the possibility of fragments of these shells 
and the debris thrown up from their impact against 
the concrete parapets which protect the guns to the 
crews as well as to the delicate and complicated ma- 
chinery which operates the guns, would indicate that 
overhead protection against such fragments should 
be provided in order to insure the most effective 
operation of the coast armament. 

There is a serious deficiency, however, in ammunition 
for these defences, the supply which the department has 
been attempting to maintain being on the basis of approxi- 
mately an hour's full and active operation of the guns 
in the United States proper and a two hours' full and 
active operation of the guns in oversea fortifications. 
According to the report of the chief of coast artillery, 
the amount of ammunition now available and provided 
for by appropriations is equal to about seventy-three per 
cent, of this requirement for the guns and fifty per cent, for 
the mortars. The amount of explosive necessary to 
load and operate the mines now provided at our vari- 
ous coast defences for one charge is complete. The 
deficiencies in the matter of fire control and search- 
lights are of the most serious character. As a matter 
of fact, proper fire control and searchlight installation 
is only maintained in a limited number of first-class 
defence areas, the remainder of the fire control systems 
and searchlight equipment being deficient or improvised. 



Unready 2^ 

Turning again to the admirable report of the 
Secretary of War it may be permitted to quote 
therefrom as follows : 

In continental United States we have a territory 
consisting of 3,026,789 square miles, with a population 
of 98,781,324. In Alaska we have 590,884 square 
miles, with a population of 64,356. Our other terri- 
torial responsibilities which must be considered are: 
The Panama Canal, where, although the population 
is small, we have an investment of $400,000,000 and 
the destruction of which waterway would be an 
international calamity; Hawaii, with 6449 square 
miles and a population of 191,909; Porto Rico, with 
3606 square miles and a population of 1,118,012; the 
Philippines, with 127,800 square miles and a popula- 
tion of 7,635,426, together with certain other islands 
not necessary to be considered in this connection. 

Scarcely any unit in the army ever has its proper 
complement of officers, and the need for an increase 
of officers is urgent and imperative. In continental 
United States we had in the mobile army on June jo, 
1 914, 1495 officers and 29,40$ men. 

We have a reserve — that is, men who have been 
trained in the army and under the terms of their 
enlistment are subject to be called back to the colours 
in time of war — consisting of sixteen men. 

Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate 
•mil find that in modern warfare a prepared enemy would 



2S West Point in our Next War 

progress so far on the way to success in six months (the 
shortest possible time allowed for the creation of a volun- 
teer army) , if his antagonist had to wait six months to 
meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well 
concede defeat without contest. 

From these vastly interesting and most impor- 
tant reports we gather the following startling facts : 

That on June 30, 1914, the mobile force of the 
army in the United States was 1495 officers and 
29,405 men, a total national defensive army of 
but 30, goo officers and men. 

That in the Panama Canal Zone we had 
a garrison of less than 2000 officers and men, 
but to be increased ultimately to about 5000 
men. 

That fifty per cent, of the men of the gun and 
mortar requirement of the coast defences are to 
be furnished by the National Guard, and that the 
total deficiencies in the coast artillery corps of 
the regular army and the organized militia are 
856 officers and 24,489 enlisted men. 

That the 15-inch guns of foreign navies outclass 
the 14-inch guns of our coast defensive works, 
with a superiority of range of between 2000 and 
3000 yards to that of the heaviest guns in our 
coast defences. 

That proper fire control and searchlight instal- 
lation is only maintained in a limited number of 
first-class defence areas, whereas in the remainder, 



Unready 29 

the fire control system and searchlight equipment 
are deficient or improvised. 

Thus it will be seen that without danger to 
themselves a hostile fleet of dreadnoughts might 
lie in safety out of range of the heaviest guns of 
our works and destroy them at pleasure. 

That theoretically our coast defences are sup- 
plied with ammunition for a battle of an hour's 
duration, but that in fact ammunition is provided 
for a bombardment of but about three quarters 
of an hour. At the end of an hour's combat the 
guns of our defensive works would be out of action 
for lack of ammunition. 

To oppose the landing of an hostile army on our 
coast the United States could put in line of battle, 
provided every man of the mobile army could be 
brought to the front, 30,900 officers and men of 
the regular army, 

I quite understand that theoretically the or- 
ganized militia is supposed to number 8323 officers 
and 119,087 men, but it is not the belief of the 
Secretary of War that all of the National Guard 
would respond to the call to the colours in the 
event of war breaking out. How large a propor- 
tion of the National Guard would come to the 
colours is matter of estimation. By some 60% is 
considered to be a fair proportion of the men of the 
National Guard who would report for duty, 
whereas by others the estimation rises to 75%. 
Assuming the latter percentage, we should have 



30 West Point in our Next War 

as a reinforcement of the 30,900 regulars about 
95,000 men from the National Guard, more or 
less dependable in battle ; or if the whole army and 
National Guard should be concentrated at a given 
point to meet an invading army, which is an un- 
thinkable contingency, we should have with the 
colours an aggregate force of about 125,900 m.en. 

But such a concentration would be a human 
impossibility. It would mean the abandonment 
of all other posts and sections of the country by 
the regular army to effect the complete concen- 
tration of its mobile strength of 30,000 men, and 
it would equally be impossible to effect such a 
complete concentration of the National Guard, 
because it would leave the rest of the country bare 
of ostensible military force to perfect the concen- 
tration. It might be possible to effect the con- 
centration of the mobile force of the regular army 
by substituting portions of the National Guard to 
take the place of the regulars on the Mexican 
border, and elsewhere in the country, but such 
substitution would require a much larger force of 
militia than of the regulars withdrawn. 

I doubt if it would be possible to concentrate 
at any given point a larger force of regulars and 
militia than 75,000 troops, with which to resist 
an invading army of a quarter of a million men. 

I have read with close attention Colonel Roose- 
velt's book, America and the World War; Major- 
General Green's book, The Present Military 



Unready 31 

Situation in the United States, and the book 
(American translation) by Freiheer von Edelsheim 
of the German General Staff, Operations upon the 
Sea — The Problems of Transporting Troops durijig 
War, without illumination of the subject of how 
we are to meet such an invasion as Freiheer von 
Edelsheim indicates as entirely possible. 

Colonel Roosevelt's book is written in a lofty 
spirit of righteousness, full of glittering generali- 
ties, but without a practical suggestion as to how 
the nation shall be prepared for war. He is like 
a great bell clanging in the night, sounding an 
alarm to the startled city. 

General Green points out the danger of for- 
eign invasion, expresses a great desire to see the 
suppressed parts of von Edelsheim's book, and 
recommends that the nation should support the 
Secretary of War, from whose admirable report I 
have quoted so liberally, in all of his suggestions 
for^ the increase of the strength of the army. 

Von Edelsheim's book was a great surprise. 
Its reading was begun with avidity, but soon it 
was discovered that beyond some calculations as 
to the transport capacity of a portion of the Ger- 
man merchant marine, there was nothing in the 
book which was not known, or nothing in it which 
at least should not be known to every soldier. 

Granted the defeat of our fleet, the question 
of the invasion of the United States under existing 
military conditions in the country is a perfectly 



32 West Point in our Next War 

simple and a perfectly practical matter. It is 
merely a question of transportation. 

With the superiority of gun-fire possessed by the 
dreadnought fleet of a possible enemy conceded 
by the chief of staff, Major-General Wotherspoon, 
and holding in memory the crushing and crumbling 
effect of the German fire upon the fortifications 
of Liege and Namur — concrete walls and steel 
turrets crumbling under this fire as if made of 
pastry — our whole coast is open to the fleet of 
such an enemy. 

Major-General Green indicates the landing- 
place of the invading enemy on the storm-swept 
southern shore of Long Island, but I cannot see 
why the enemy should risk shipwreck on such an 
open coast when it would be perfectly possible 
for him to force the eastern entrance of Long 
Island Sound, and then have his choice of half a 
dozen harbours on the mainland, on the northern 
shore of Long Island Sound, in which to land under 
cover of the guns of the fleet, within easy striking 
distance of all of the railway connections of New 
York City east of the Hudson River. 

Of course no soldier would dream of defending 
New York City except upon its sea front from an 
attack by the enemy's fleet, or at a distance of at 
least thirty or forty miles from its farthest suburb 
toward the enemy. 

The duty of the army would be to resist as far 
as possible the landing of an enemy, and when he 



Unready 33 

had effected a landing to meet him in battle out- 
side of the range of the guns of his fleet. 

Assuming a disposition on the part of the enemy 
after forcing the eastern entrance of Long Island 
Sound to seize New York City, he would be able 
to choose his point of landing, and consequently 
to dictate the line of resistance of our army, which 
should be made behind an intrenched line of 
defence. 

In looking over the tables of organization and 
the Field Service Regulations, edition of 1914, 
issued by the War Department, I find no especial 
provision for pioneers except with the cavalry, 
although there is provision for engineers. No 
army would need an efficient force of pioneers 
more than our army engaged in resisting an enemy 
in possession of Long Island Sound, and no coun- 
try possesses a larger or a better class from which 
to draw men for a body of pioneers than the 
United States, from the negro population of the 
South. A study of the pioneer corps of Sherman's 
army is recommended and, as the result of such 
study, it is thought that the difference between 
pioneers and engineers will be perceived, which 
will be suggestive and useful in future military 
operations in front of an enemy, especially in 
front of a superior enemy, landed from an ene- 
my's fleet under the circumstances indicated 
above. 

The first Hne of national defence is the fleet. 



34 West Point in our Next War 

In this book the fleet has been spoken of as the 
first Hne of defence for our harbours and our coasts. 
It must not be understood, however, that such a 
suggestion contemplates the destruction of the 
fleet organization, and the segregation of the ships 
of the fleet among the various ports and harbours 
of the country. 

Nothing could be farther from the thought. It 
is beHeved that the safety of the nation from for- 
eign invasion, unless there shall be created an 
army of sufficient size and efficiency to serve as a 
warning to any possible enemy, depends upon the 
fleet; that the safety of the Panama Canal from 
attack by invasion depends upon the creation of 
a distinct and powerful fleet of sufficient strength 
to dominate the Caribbean Sea; and that the 
continued possession of the Hawaiian Islands, of 
Alaska, and the safety of the Pacific coast, depends 
upon a powerful Pacific fleet, as strong as the full 
fleet of any one of the Pacific powers. 

The problem of national defence is a naval as 
well as a military problem. 

To insure exemption from invasion, to hold the 
Panama Canal, Hawaii, and Alaska, and to main- 
tain the Monroe Doctrine, we must increase our 
fleet to such proportions as to be as strong as 
Germany in the Atlantic and in the Caribbean 
Sea, and as strong as Japan in the Pacific. 

Nothing less than that will meet the conditions 
of the naval problem. 



Unready 35 

Nothing less than the creation of an army strong 
enough to serve as a menace even to the militaty 
empire of Germany, will be sufficient to meet the 
conditions of the military problem. 

The almost painful position of Great Britain 
as a military Power in the present war should be a 
warning to us to meet the conditions of national 
defence as they now present themselves to us. 

Great Britain was utterly unprepared for such 
a war as she has entered upon, with a small regular 
army scattered over the earth and with an ineffi- 
cient militia or territorial army, as her second line 
of defence. On the breaking out of the war she 
began the creation of a large volunteer army, 
which, according to Lord Kitchener, was to be 
ready for the field in May of this year. May came, 
but her army was not then ready for the field. 
July has passed, and nearly a year after the break- 
ing out of the war. Lord Landsowne, speaking in 
the House of Lords, says that the British army on 
the continent amounts to "approximately 420,000 
to 440,000 men," including those in France and 
those engaged in the attack on the forts defending 
the Dardanelles. 

In France the front of the Allies extends from 
the Atlantic Ocean to the Swiss frontier, and yet 
of that long front, on the maintenance of which 
depends the safety of Dunkirk and Calais, and 
the freedom from invasion of England, the British 
troops hold but forty miles. 



36 West Point in our Next War 

England has held to the volunteer system of 
recruiting her army, and manifestly the system 
has broken down. For a long while she depended 
on the ordinary out-turn of munitions of war for 
her supplies, and here also her system of produc- 
tion has broken down. A year of the great war 
has passed and England is still in the throes of 
preparation for war. She is supposed to have in 
England a million volunteers, but she does not send 
them to France where her fate is being decided. 
Presumably she does not yet consider them to 
be soldiers. She is short of guns, short of muni- 
tions of war, short of soldiers. Should Dunkirk 
and Calais fall into the hands of Germany the 
invasion of England may become a possibility. 

Should we become involved in war is it possible 
to believe that we should be able to make a better 
showing than England has made? 

Manifestly not. 

Therefore her unsuccessful undertaking in this 
war should be thoughtfully considered by us as 
not only a warning, but as pointing the way to the 
necessity of perfecting a system of national defence 
which shall put us beyond the danger of invasion 
and defeat. 

As an American by over two hundred and fifty 
years' descent, the author believes in his country 
and in his countrymen. He believes that they 
have been made, and that they can be made again, 
as good soldiers as the people of any country in the 



Unready 37 

world. He would urge upon his fellow countrymen 
to be warned by the situation of Great Britain; 
to be awake to the necessity for preparation 
against war lest they shall have to suffer the biting 
mortification, the blinding and crushing wretched- 
ness of defeat. 

Prepared we can face the world with confidence 
and with a high heart. 

It is to point the way — the only way — to safety 
and success through thorough preparation that 
this book is written. 



CHAPTER II 
WEST point: its expansion and reorganization 

FIFTY years ago, or at the close of the War of 
the Rebellion, and while I was still in the 
army, I advocated an enlargement of the corps of 
cadets, and the reorganization of the West Point 
Military Academy, so that the Academy should 
be prepared to graduate all the officers that the 
regular army should need, and in addition should 
graduate, each year, a certain number of half-term 
men, or men who should have spent two years 
at the Military Academy, and who, leaving the 
academy at their graduation, and passing into the 
great body of the people, should be ready to officer 
the volunteer army which our military system 
seemed then to demand should be created on the 
breaking out of war when war should come. My 
idea was not alone to officer the regular army ex- 
clusively with graduates of the Military Academy, 
but also each year to send out into the body of 
the people a number of young men who had had 
the advantage of two years' study and instruction 

38 



West Point 39 

at West Point, as a reserve of officers for the anny 
or the volunteers in the event of war. 

Although I discussed the subject with the 
enthusiasm of youth and with the judgment 
formed by service in the volunteer army during 
the great war, I spoke to dull ears. The country 
had had enough of war and of talk presaging war. 
The officers of the army with whom I discussed 
the subject were indifferent ; and both people and 
army, satisfied with the prowess of the volunteers, 
were content to rest the future of the country in 
their hands. 

When it is remembered that we were separated 
by three thousand miles of ocean from a European 
enemy; that Japan had not then emerged as a 
modem Power from the state of Eastern lethargy 
which had held her for centuries; that the steel 
battleship and the modem submarine had not 
then been invented, and that a three- thousand- 
ton commercial steamer was the wonder of the 
seas; that the railway was only then becoming the 
power in transportation which it has since become ; 
that electricity had not been adapted by modem 
invention as since has been done, except in respect 
to the telegraph, to the needs of man in peace and 
in war; that the telephone had not been invented; 
that 12-inch and 15-inch guns and mortars had 
not entered the realm of speculation, and that the 
motor-car was not even an affair of dreams, it 
need not excite wonder that the public and the 



40 West Point in our Next War 

army were not prepared to consider so great an 
increase in the corps of cadets at West Point, as I 
then advocated, as a preparation for war. The 
ocean was our great defence from attack, and on 
this defence the nation was prepared to rest. 

Ninety-six per cent, of the army of the United 
States in the War of the Rebellion were volunteers, 
and at Antietam and Gettysburg, in the Wilder- 
ness, in the siege of Richmond, and in the final 
campaign which ended with the surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, the troops of the 
regular army and the volunteers fought side by 
side, the one as valiantly as the other. Many 
volunteer batteries of field artillery were as fine as 
the finest batteries of the regular army. Such 
corps as the 15th, i6th, and 17th, Grant's and 
Sherman's veterans, and such an army as the 
Army of the Cumberland with Thomas at its 
head, with scarcely an exception made up of 
volunteers, were as fine bodies of troops in the 
latter part of 1862 and thenceforw^ard to the end 
of the war, as the troops of the regular army were 
during the great war or are today. The gallant 
Army of the Potomac speaks for itself in history. 

Why, with such a record made by the volunteer 
army, should the country doubt its safety under 
the protection of volunteers, steadied by the small 
and efficient body of regulars constituting the 
permanent military establishment? 

It is no wonder, as I look back over the period 



West Point 41 

of fifty years, that I spoke to dull ears; no wonder 
that I could awaken no enthusiasm in soldier or 
civilian for a large increase in the corps of cadets, 
not only large enough to supply entirely the needs 
of the regular army for officers, but also large 
enough to graduate each year a surplus of officers 
who should be ready to give their trained service 
to the volunteer troops on the breaking out of war. 

In that long ago, I advocated the increase of the 
corps of cadets at the Military Academy to a body 
of from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred men, 
and estimated that not only would the demand for 
officers of the regular army be amply supplied, 
but that there would be graduated and distributed 
throughout the people a body of men who had had 
two years of military training at the Academy, 
who would develop and maintain the military 
spirit in the people, and who would be ready to 
organize at once the volunteer army should the 
nation unhappily fall into war. 

The lesson, which, above all other lessons of the 
great war, impressed itself upon my mind was the 
length of time which it took to convert citizens, 
ever so eager, into soldiers; and as a corollary, the 
imperative necessity for a large body of officers, 
at the breaking out of war, to get the volunteers 
into shape. 

No one is readier than I am to recognize the 
value as soldiers of my fellow volunteers when they 
had become soldiers. But when in the enthusiasm 



42 West Point in our Next War 

of patriotism they volunteered they were not 
soldiers, nor were their officers, who marched at 
their head, officers except in name. 

Long months of weary work were required in the 
first place to create officers out of the volunteer 
material at hand, and longer weary months to 
change the volunteers of the ranks into soldiers. 

No one can teach another what he does not 
himself know. 

And the volunteer officers had first to be created 
before they in turn could create soldiers from their 
volunteer comrades of the army. 

In war the orders actually issued to troops are 
few and simple, and it was supposed at the out- 
break of the great war that when the soldier knew 
the manual of arms, and could march in column 
or go into line of battle with ease, that he was fit 
for battle and for the campaign. 

The troops which fought the battle of Bull Run 
knew the manual of arms and could and did march 
to the battlefield, and could and did form line of 
battle, and could and did advance to the charge, 
following bravely the lead of their officers. 

But they were not soldiers nor were they a mob 
as they were called after the battle, and as they 
have since recently been called by regular officers 
who have had no experience of battle to guide 
their judgment. 

They were simply men in the first stage of 
becoming soldiers. 



West Point 43 

In addition to drill, to readiness to obey the 
word of command, to discipline, there is needed 
the spirit of the soldier, which is morale. 

After Bull Run the troops entered upon the 
period of self -creation and of growth into soldiers. 
Boards were organized throughout the army to 
examine officers of volunteers as to their fitness 
for service. Colonels and second lieutenants 
were called before these boards and were thor- 
oughly examined as to their fitness to hold their 
commissions. Many officers left the army because 
they could not pass their examinations, and many 
others resigned rather than face the examining 
board. 

Promotions were made throughout the army 
as the result of examinations for fitness, and a 
spirit of emulation and of appreciation was de- 
veloped in the troops. Drills were held with 
regularity and pertinacity. Discipline developed 
and grew in strength and fineness. And morale, 
that intangible force, that spirit of the soldier, 
that something which develops in the soldier that 
faith in himself, in his comrade, in his commanding 
officer, which co-ordinates the effort of the com.- 
pany, of the regiment and of the army, and which 
makes the soldier and the army capable of sus- 
tained and coherent action in victory or in defeat, 
on the long march, in the encampment, in battle, 
was bom. 

It may be asked, why, during this period in 



44 West Point in our Next War 

which we were engaged in creating an army, the 
South did not advance on Washington and end 
the war in a burst of triumph? 

The answer is that they, too, were engaged in 
creating their army out of the same elements as 
ourselves — volunteers fresh from the plough, from 
the counting-room, from the college, from the 
market-place. It took the South as long to create 
the infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia — 
"as fine an infantry as ever marched" — as it took 
us to create the infantry of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, just as fine an infantry as the infantry of the 
Army of Northern Virginia. 

This schooling of the armies of the great war, 
those of the United States and those of the South, 
took about a year. And it may be taken as proven 
by the experience of war that it takes a year to 
create a soldier. That it takes a year to weld 
soldiers into the masses that make an army, and 
that unless there are officers ready at hand to take 
command of the volunteers of an army at the out- 
break of war, it takes at least a year to make a de- 
pendable officer as well as dependable soldiers, and 
dependable armies out of such officers and soldiers. 

In other words — if a possible enemy will assure 
us that we shall have a full year of time after the 
declaration of war in which to create our army 
before he will make his attack upon us, we may 
continue our dependence on volunteers for the 
national defence, otherwise not ! 



West Point 45 

But what enemy, himself prepared to strike, 
will accord us a year in which to prepare for war? 
We are not living in Utopia; 191 5 is not the year 
of a fool's paradise. 

Therefore it is necessary that we shall turn 
from the past system of raising and training armies 
to the newer, the better, and the more democratic 
system which it is the object of this book to 
advocate. 

My plan of 1866 for the enlargement and de- 
velopment of West Point is my plan of 19 15, 
modified and developed by the intervening growth 
of the country, and of the marvellous growth in the 
offensive strength of the navies and the armies of 
the great Powers of the world. 

The ocean no longer presents a barrier to in- 
vasion. The struggle for the supremacy of the 
seas now being waged introduces problems for the 
United States undreamed of fifty years ago. What 
was sound judgment in 1866 is sounder judgment 
in 191 5. What was wisdom and prevision in 1866 
is absolute necessity in 191 5 unless the nation is 
prepared to suffer defeat at the hands of the first 
great Power which may attack us. 

I can see no reason why the United States 
should be drawn into the present European War. 
It is manifestly neither to the interest of the Allies 
— Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia — nor to 
the interest of Germany and Austria to excite the 
hostility of the United States to the extent of war. 



46 West Point in our Next War 

As an ally of the Allies we could render immense 
service to their cause, and it can be easily under- 
stood why they should wish us to go to war with 
Germany. Equally we could add greatly to the 
offensive strength of Germany and Austria in the 
war by the invasion and annexation of Canada, 
should the attack of Great Britain on our com- 
merce drive us into war with her and her Allies. 

Looking at the matter purely and solely from 
the standpoint of the United States, I can see no 
conditions making for war with one or the other 
of the contending groups of nations. Diplomacy 
should be able to arrange for and to insure the 
satisfactory settlement of all outstanding ques- 
tions, or of all questions which may hereafter arise 
between the belligerents and ourselves. 

At present our relations with Germany are 
somewhat strained, but our contentions in respect 
to the freedom of neutral commerce are those for 
which Germany has stood in the past, and our 
demand in respect thereto is limited to the simple 
statement of our rights under international law, 
and the assertion that those rights shall be re- 
spected. It is impossible to think that Germany 
can see a sufficient benefit to her war plans in the 
use of submarines to risk the advent of the United 
States into the war as an ally of Great Britain, 
France, and Russia. 

And on the other hand, it cannot be thought to 
be possible that Great Britain in the effort to 



West Point 47 

limit the food supplies of Germany, supplies 
which Germany does not need for her support, or 
to limit the export of cotton to Germany and to 
the neutral nations, because it is an element in the 
production of gun-cotton, should proceed to such 
length as to compel us to declare war against 
herself and her allies in defence of neutral rights 
and the freedom of the seas. 

It is the work of diplomacy to find a living 
ground between the two contesting groups of 
nations so that our rights shall be preserved and 
peace be maintained. 

When diplomacy has the sure ground to stand 
upon that neither the Allies nor Germany and 
Austria have any reason to wish to go to war with 
us, it seems to be beyond the range of reason to 
anticipate that war with either of those groups of 
warring nations should occur. 

It is not therefore because I apprehend im- 
mediate war that I am in this book reviving the 
plans of fifty years ago. 

This book is written in the hope of introducing 
an element of common-sense into the discussion of 
the question of national defence, of marshalling 
the lessons of the past to the profit of the present 
and the advantage of the future. We have fought 
one great war with volunteers the conversion of 
whom into soldiers consumed the first year of the 
war, and frankly I think it the height of folly to 
allow the nation to remain longer in the fools* 



48 West Point in our Next War 

paradise of dependence on volunteers, when the 
conditions of modern war confirm the proposition 
that the nation which is prepared for war, when 
war breaks out, is the inevitable victor in the 
struggle. 

I believe, as I have said above, that volunteers, 
converted into soldiers, are as good soldiers as 
regulars. What the officers of the regular army- 
are not sufficiently clear-sighted to perceive, or 
frank enough to admit, is that volunteers of two 
and three years' service in time of war are as much 
regulars, so far as efficiency is concerned, as 
themselves. 

But notwithstanding this belief in the efficiency 
of volunteers as soldiers when they shall have become 
soldiers, I am opposed to the further dependence 
of the nation on the volunteer system of raising 
and maintaining armies. 

The volunteer system has become obsolete. De- 
pendence upon a volunteer army will result, and 
can only result, in the defeat of the nation in the 
first war in which she shall engage with a first- 
class Power, because such first-class Power would 
be prepared for war and we should not be prepared 
for war. 

This is demonstrated, if demonstration were 
needed, in the condition of Great Britain in the 
present great European War. The war has been 
going on for a year, and yet Lord Kitchener's great 
volunteer army is only just now coming into the 



West Point 49 

field. Much of it is still on the training-grounds 
of England. A large part of the regular army of 
England, which was sent to the continent at the 
breaking out of the war, has ceased to exist. Eng- 
land is maintaining her position in the war behind 
the guns of her allies. The French and the Rus- 
sian soldiers are doing the greater part of the fight- 
ing while Lord Kitchener in England is creating 
an army of volunteers which in time he hopes to 
have in fit shape to put into battle. 

When we fight we shall probably have to fight 
without dependable allies. We shall have no 
French army and no Russian army to battle for 
time while we are engaged behind their guns in 
creating and disciplining a volunteer army, as 
Great Britain has been doing for the past year. 

Wherefore it is necessary that we should aban- 
don the volunteer system of creating our armies, 
and rely upon the creation of a large regular army 
divided between the active army, and the reserve 
army, which shall be at the command of the Presi- 
dent to be called to the colours the moment war 
threatens the nation. 

And such a fundamental reorganization of the 
military system of the nation imperatively de- 
mands a vast increase in the number of officers 
for the command of the troops of the active and 
the reserve armies, both armies to constitute the 
regular army of the United States. 

The army of the United States must be strong 



50 West Point in our Next War 

enough, when mobilized for war, to meet at the 
coast any army of invasion sought to be landed by 
an enemy, and to defeat his army, capturing or 
driving it into the ocean. 

Not only must the United vStates be strong 
enough to put such an invincible army upon the 
Atlantic coast, but also upon the northern frontier 
and upon the Pacific coast, so that our country 
may be made impregnable to attack either from 
Europe or Asia, or from an allied attack of a 
European and an Asiatic nation, should such an 
alliance be brought into action against us. 

Also must the army of the United States be 
strong enough not only to hold Hawaii and the 
Panama Canal, but also to hold Alaska. 

To command such an army will require a large 
body of officers who should be educated officers, 
and it is to supply such a body of educated officers 
that I advocate the enlargement and reorganiza- 
tion of the Military Academy. 

The present capacity of the Military Academy 
is seven hundred cadets. The number of cadets 
should be increased at once to a force of thirty-six 
hundred young men, which would give a full brigade 
of three full regiments of twelve companies each — 
each regiment to consist of three battalions of four 
companies each. 

One of the material advantages of such an 
increase in the corps of cadets would be that the 
cadets themselves, and the officers in command, 



West Point 51 

would have the opportunity of seeing and being a 
part of a large body of troops, which would be 
subject to brigade drills. 

And by considering, for purposes of drill and 
manoeuvres, each battalion a regiment, and each 
regiment a brigade, there could be introduced di- 
visional drill and manoeuvres which would be of 
incalculable advantage to the cadets, and espe- 
cially to the officers commanding in the divisional 
manoeuvres. 

It may be said that the barracks at West Point 
are full to about their capacity of seven hundred 
men. But this suggestion presupposes that the 
cadets can only be housed in stone palaces. 
Barracks and classrooms for the increased corps 
of cadets can be constructed rapidly of wood, and 
made quite as comfortable as is necessary for the 
accommodation of the full complement of thirty-six 
hundred cadets. 

It may be said that the plain at West Point is 
too small to accommodate a brigade of thirty-six 
hundred cadets. So much the better. Let the 
parade and drill ground be over the hills and 
valleys adjacent to the present grounds of the 
Military Academy, thus introducing at the 
Academy actual war conditions for formation and 
drill. 

I have thought much as to the method of selec- 
tion of cadets for the enlarged Military Academy, 
and as to the standard of examination for admis- 



52 West Point in our Next War 

sion to the Academy, and have come to the delib- 
erate opinion that the standard of admission to 
the Academy should be maintained at its present 
high level. The country does not want a low grade 
of officer, but a high grade of officer for its army. 
Nor need this standard for admission to the Acad- 
emy be a serious hindrance to the supply of cadets 
if the method of appointment be broadened so as 
to be open to the whole country. 

But no matter how broad the competition for 
cadetships shall be made, the examinations for 
admission to the Academy should be stricter, if 
anything, than they are at present. Admission 
to the Academy on certificate from schools or 
colleges, or from any other source, should be 
abolished. 

If the examinations for admission be strict, and 
only the fit be admitted, there will be fewer found 
incompetent to continue the course of studies in 
the Academy than is the case under the present 
forms and conditions of admission, and conse- 
quently the proportion of graduates of the Acad- 
emy will be much larger than at present. 

To insure a uniform and impartial system of 
examination for admission to the Military Acad- 
emy — and much of these remarks apply to the 
Naval Academy as well — I recommend that all ex- 
aminations for cadetships shall be confided to the 
Civil Service Commission with enlarged powers. 

The Academic Board should establish the 



West Point 53 

conditions of examination, and the Civil Service 
Commission, expanded to become the Examining 
Board for the civil and military services of the 
United States, should hold the examinations 
territorially throughout the United States. The 
territorial distribution of cadetships as at present 
established, speaking broadly, should be main- 
tained, as the army of the United States represents, 
and should represent, the people of the United 
States, and consequently the cadetships, with 
certain limited reservations, should be distributed 
according to population throughout the country. 
But while thus creating the corps of cadets, and 
bringing to the Academy the representatives of all 
sections of the country, it should be understood as a 
condition of examination that each applicant for a 
cadetship, upon presenting himself for examina- 
tion, should take the oath of allegiance to the 
United States in which he shall swear fealty alone 
to the United States, abjuring any subordinate or 
foreign allegiance, jurisdiction, or citizenship, and 
pledging his life and his devotion to the defence of 
the United States against all enemies whatsoever, 
whether domestic or foreign. 

All appointments to cadetships should be by 
competitive examination, and no cadet should be 
admitted to the Academy except after success in 
such competitive examination. All young men of 
good character, whose parents are citizens of the 
United States, should be ehgible to enter the 



54 West Point in our Next War 

competition for cadetships. The sons of officers 
of the army should have the privilege of appearing 
before any examining board in the country for 
examination for admission to the Military Acad- 
emy, but they should stand the test of competition 
in such examination for cadetships. 

The Civil Service Commission should, for the 
purposes of examination for admission to the 
Military Academy, be assisted by either members 
of the Academic Board or by representatives of 
the Academic Board, and the physical examination 
of each applicant should be made by medical 
officers of the army and should precede the mental 
examination for cadetships. No one should be 
admitted to the Academy except he be the holder 
of a certificate from the Civil Service Commission 
to the effect that he had passed his examination for 
admission at a public and competitive examination. 
The Examining Board or Commission should hold 
every competitor for a cadetship to strict com- 
pliance with the conditions and requirements of 
the standard of admission established by the 
Academic Board, and no one should receive his 
certificate of admission to the Academy who had 
not fully and fairly passed the examination accord- 
ing to such standard of admission. 

The broadest and completest possible competi- 
tion coupled with the strictest examination for 
admission to the Military Academy, in which the 
applicant for admission shall not only have passed 



West Point 55 

a competitive examination, but shall also have 
passed satisfactorily the examination according to 
the standard of admission established by the 
Academic Board, should be maintained. It is 
believed that such a system, which could not be 
influenced by undue pressure of any sort, would 
result in the selection of cadets of as high a condi- 
tion of mentality as possible, higher than the 
present restricted system of selection of cadets can 
possibly secure for the Academy. Indeed it is 
believed that one of the reasons that such a large 
proportion of cadets fail to graduate into the army 
as officers is, that the system of restricted selection 
at present prevailing does not insure to the 
Academy a sufficient number of high-class ca- 
dets, competent to meet the requirements of the 
scheme of studies maintained at the Academy. 

As the object of these examinations is to insure 
a corps of cadets at its full maximum strength, 
which should be thirty-six hundred men, the ex- 
amining boards should be required to file with 
their list of accepted candidates for admission to 
the Academy a list of alternates, who shall have 
passed their examinations satisfactorily, from 
which list all vacancies in the annual allotment 
for the Academy should be filled, and if for any 
reason any cadet should fall out during the first 
two or three months of the school year a cadet to 
fill his place should be taken. 

Objection may be made by the unthinking to 



56 West Point in our Next War 

the proposed strength of the corps of cadets. It 
may be said, why concentrate in one school 
thirty-six hundred cadets? Why not create in 
different sections of the country smaller schools 
on the plan of West Point to turn out the same 
number of graduates? 

The answer is that the great need of the army is 
to accustom its officers to see and to be a part of, 
to grow into the consciousness of being a part of, 
a large body of troops. 

If some of the battles of the War of the Rebellion 
are studied it will become apparent that the 
commanding officers of divisions, on several 
notable occasions, did not properly estimate the 
extent of ground which their commands could 
occupy, such failure in apprehension resulting in 
serious losses, and this failure may be traced to the 
stunting effect upon their minds and upon their 
imaginations of their experience with small bodies 
of troops in the old army, stunting effects from 
which their later experience with larger volunteer 
commands was unable to free them. Notably this 
was the case at Antietam. 

I have long thought it would be well worth the 
expense to send to Europe each year as large a 
number of officers of the army as would be received 
by foreign Powers — each married officer to be 
required to leave his wife at home in the United 
States — to attend the usual autumn manoeuvres 
in order that they should have the opportunity of 



West Point 57 

seeing large bodies of troops in battle formation 
during the manoeuvres, so that their imaginations 
should be stimulated to a conception of the 
relationship of large bodies of troops to the terrain 
in which they are operating, and to accustom 
them to the sight of large bodies of troops in 
motion, which would reveal to them the actualities 
of their profession. 

In our small army no chance for such observa- 
tion is afforded except, to a very limited degree, 
at present upon the Mexican border; and before 
the War of the Rebellion in our then still smaller 
army, a brigade was an impossible actuality, an 
almost startling conception of the imagination. 
The result was that on the breaking out of the 
great war our regular officers had almost as 
much to learn about armies, and their constitu- 
tion and being, as the officers of the volunteers. 
Of course they had studied and thought about 
large armies, and how they looked and acted and 
fought, but as to the realization of their dreams, 
they had to wait until they were created brigadier- 
generals and major-generals, and put in com- 
mand of brigades and divisions of the volunteer 
army, when they learned, for the first time, these 
lessons of war, often at a serious cost to the troops 
under their command. 

A large brigade of cadets at West Point, a 
brigade which for tactical purposes could be 
expanded into a division, would not only be of 



58 West Point in our Next War 

advantage to the officers in command but also of 
great awakening influence upon the minds of the 
cadets themselves. They would get used to 
military numbers in the impressionable period of 
their lives, when impressions made upon the mind 
are ineradicable. 

Also it is thought that the unity of command, 
the unity of instruction and of association, would 
produce better results in a single academy among 
a large body of cadets, than if the same body of 
cadets should be broken up and divided among 
four or five different schools, under different 
commanding officers, and under different inspi- 
ration. 

The only point upon which objection to a large 
West Point — a West Point of thirty-six hundred 
cadets — could rest, is that the broken character 
of the country surrounding the Military Academy 
would not afford the necessary parade ground. 
But on the other hand, this broken country could 
be made an element of instruction of the utmost 
value to the future officers of the army. Battle- 
fields are not usually level parade grounds. The 
broken country in which West Point lies could 
serve admirably as a field of manoeuvre for the 
cadets. Of course the government would have to 
increase the territory comprehended within the 
area of the Military Reservation to accommodate 
the corps of cadets with sufficient manoeuvre 
ground. 



West Point 59 

So far as the requirements for admission to the 
Academy are concerned, while the standard of 
admission should be maintained at the present 
high level, the range of examination might be 
limited to the advantage of greater thoroughness 
in the examination. What the examination should 
be directed to produce is a candidate for cadetship 
with a clear, strong, well-disciplined mind, ac- 
quainted with the studies introductory to those 
to be pursued at the Academy, and with a general 
knowledge of the history and geography of our 
country, and of the history and geography of the 
great nations of the modern world. They should 
not be required to familiarize themselves with 
ancient history nor with controversial subjects 
of our own military history before appearing for 
examination for admission to the Academy. It is 
difficult to understand of what value a knowledge 
of the Delian League could be to a candidate for 
examination for a cadetship except to familiarize 
him with the fact of the influence of sea power on 
the development of a nation, or why a candidate 
for a cadetship should be required to form and ex- 
press an opinion as to the effect of the battle of 
Cold Harbor upon Grant's campaign against Lee. 

As to the effect of the battle of Cold Harbor on 
Grant's campaign, a true answer to the question 
would not, I fancy, satisfy the mind of the examiner 
who suggested it. The answer to this question is 
that the battle of Cold Harbor had no effect 



6o West Point in our Next War 

whatsoever on the campaign. The battle of Cold 
Harbor was fought on the 3d of June, 1864, and 
on June 5th we find Grant writing from Cold Har- 
bor to HaUeck, that he proposed to advance to 
the James and cross the river with the whole of his 
army, a continuation of his advance against Lee by 
the left flank, which began on the Rappahannock 
and which ended at Appomattox. Grant says in 
his Memoirs: " I have always regretted that the last 
assault at Cold Harbor was ever made." In view 
of this statement by General Grant it may be as- 
sumed that the assault at Cold Harbor was either 
a mistake, or was badly conducted. But after all, 
it was merely an incident of the campaign. If it 
was a mistake, it was one of those mistakes which 
might have crushed a small man, but which, in the 
case of a great man like Grant, was swallowed up 
in victory. The only mistake that Grant made at 
Cold Harbor, in my judgment, was that he did 
not concentrate his artillery, and smother Lee's in- 
trenchments with the fire of his guns in anticipa- 
tion of the advance of the infantry to the charge. 

One might as well ask what influence the battle 
of Aspem-Essling had upon the campaign of 
iVagram? Napoleon was defeated at Aspem- 
Essling by the Archduke Charles, and barely 
escaped with his army across the north arm of the 
Danube. But his intellect blazed forth in defeat, 
and he called reinforcements to his standard from 
every quarter. One may almost hear the tramp 



West Point 6i 

of the army of Italy, under the command of the 
Viceroy, marching across the Alps to the rescue of 
the Emperor. 

After his concentration had been completed, 
Napoleon threw twenty-four bridges across the 
Danube and advanced upon the Archduke Charles, 
finding him at Wagram. The battle of Wagram 
was a great triumph for French arms, and Napo- 
leon crowned himself with victory. 

Any practical plan for the reorganization of the 
army must consider first the question of officers, 
and having in mind the lesson of the great war 
that it takes a year to make a soldier, and con- 
sequently a much longer time to make a dependable 
officer, and still longer to acquaint that officer 
with the technique of the profession, it may be 
readily seen that it is not the part of wisdom to 
fill the army with officers direct from civil life 
when by increasing the capacity of West Point it 
may be possible to supply the army with trained 
officers from the National Military Academy. 

I advocate a large West Point, a West Point of 
thirty-six hundred cadets, because I believe that 
such a strong corps of cadets is needed to furnish 
officers for the enlarged regular army, and also to 
provide officers for the reserve army which should 
be constituted as a part of the regular army. 

At present the officers of the regular army who 
are graduates of the Military Academy, are but 
about forty-four per cent, of the whole number of 



62 West Point in our Next War 

officers of the army. Such a small percentage of 
graduates in a period of profound peace is not only- 
wrong in theory but wrong in practice. 

The demand for officers for the enlarged regular 
army, should the strength of the army be brought 
up to two hundred thousand men, would aggre- 
gate about four thousand officers. To admit at 
once to the army such a large body of civilians as 
officers would be a calamity, and would postpone 
the fitness of the army for action for at least a 
couple of years, if not indeed impair its efficiency 
for many years to come. How much better it 
would be to delay the increase of the army to its 
full proposed strength until there could be created, 
through graduation from the Military Academy, a 
measurably sufficient number of officers to com- 
mand the enlarged army; or to increase the army 
gradually as an enlarged West Point should be 
able to graduate officers for the anny. 

Nor do I believe that anything would be lost by 
such delay, as I do not think that there is danger 
of immediate war. 

If the curse of excessive details of officers for 
special duty should be stamped out, the Secretary 
of War would find it easy to restore immediately 
to their commands several hundred officers now 
on detached duty, without the least bad effect 
upon the service or upon the business of the 
country. Then, if the present regiments and 
batteries of the regular army should be filled to 



West Point 63 

full war strength, and be maintained at full war 
strength, the apparent demand for new officers as 
stated by the Secretary in his last annual report, 
would be greatly reduced if not entirely done 
away with. It is thought that the demand for 
officers for the active regular army and the reserve 
army, as I shall outline these organizations in the 
next chapter, will be sufficient for a number of 
years to consume all of the graduates from the 
enlarged West Point. The subject of excessive 
details will also be more fully discussed in the 
following chapter. 

The plan for the enlargement of West Point 
which I advocate, is based upon the theory that the 
general term of instruction Jor all cadets shall be two 
years, and that thereafter, those who are found 
upon examination to be especially fitted to con- 
tinue in the army as officers of the active army, 
shall enter upon a post-graduate term of two 
years' study and instruction at the Military 
Academy. This plan will give to the army a 
highly educated body of officers, and will give to 
the reserve army and to the country a body of 
officers who have had two years' instruction at the 
Academy, and who have been regularly graduated 
therefrom as qualified officers of the army. 

The corps of cadets, enlarged to the number of 
thirty-six hundred men, should receive the same 
instruction — military and academic — during their 
term of two years' service at the Academy, no 



64 West Point in our Next War 

distinction, except that of class record, being made 
between those to be graduated at the end of the 
term of two years, and those to be given the op- 
portunity of taking the post-graduate course for 
service in the active army; except that a study 
of the character of the cadets should weigh in 
the final selection of cadets for the post-graduate 
course. But upon the final examination at the end 
of the two-year term of study, and based upon such 
examination, and upon the record of the character 
of the cadets proposed to be kept by the officers of 
the Academy, the selection should be made of 
those who should be retained at the Academy to 
take the post-graduate course of two additional 
years of study for graduation as officers of the 
active army. 

The War Department should estimate the 
number of officers needed for the active army 
during each succeeding term of two years, and the 
number of cadets to be selected for the post- 
graduate course should be determined by this 
estimation of the needs of the army for officers. 

Of course the selection of the cadets to be 
continued at the Academy for the post-graduate 
term should be made as impartially as possible, 
the object of the government being to secure not 
only a sufficient number of officers to fully officer 
the active army, but also to reserve to the active 
army the cream of the cadet corps. 

This idea of reducing the general term of study 



West Point 65 

and instruction at the Military Academy to two 
years, with provision for a special post-graduate 
course of study and instruction for those cadets 
who are finally to be graduated as officers of the 
active army is the soul of my plan for the reorgani- 
zation and enlargement of West Point. Classroom 
standing must of course count for much in making 
these selections for the post-graduate course, but 
on the other hand, something more must enter into 
the determination of the problem: That something 
being an estimation oj character. 

The determination of character, until the 
supreme test of opportunity and trial in war is 
applied, is very difficult, and yet character is the 
heart and soul of the soldier. It is the one deter- 
mining feature which separates the efficient from 
the inefficient officer. 

During the first two-year term, the whole body 
of cadets will be striving for the honour of selection 
for the second or post-graduate course of study and 
instruction, and for final graduation as officers of 
the active army. 

The uncertainty whether they are to be officers 
of the active or of the reserve army will act as a 
stimulus upon the whole school: and the further 
uncertainty as to whether a large or a small 
number of cadets will be demanded by the exi- 
gencies of the service for continuance at the 
Academy to take the post-graduate course of 
study and instruction will stimulate the cadets, not 



66 West Point in our Next War 

only in their studies but in their military conduct, 
and this stimulus will develop character. 

In no profession is character so imperative an 
attribute as in the army. It is the one most 
important, the one determinative personal in- 
fluence in developing the soldier. It differentiates 
with merciless accuracy the efficient from the 
inefficient officer — and it marks the wide differ- 
ence between the efficient few and the two or three 
great soldiers who stand out in a blaze of glory 
from among the millions of men under arms. 

A man may be a profound mathematician, an 
admirable tactician; he may know in theory the 
principles of the art of war; he may understand 
the theory of strategy; he may be an excellent 
engineer and a brave man, and yet lacking char- 
acter he may be a complete failure as a soldier. 

It is the object of the Military Academy to 
train young men to become soldiers. To train 
young men so that in after military life they may 
be soldiers, not the mere semblance of soldiers. 
To equip them so that when the opportunity offers 
itself in war, they will be equal to the opportunity ; 
equal to the efficient performance of the tasks 
imposed upon them in war no matter how great 
those tasks may be. 

The success or failure of the work of the Acad- 
emy is determined by the character manifested by 
its graduates. The ultimate determination of the 
character of the soldier only comes, and can only 



West Point 67 

come in war and through the tests of war; and it 
is for this reason that the peace reputations of 
officers often count for so little when subjected to 
the rude and the severe tests of war. 

Until these supreme tests are applied we cannot 
know whether an officer is deserving of the great 
title of soldier or not. 

We may think that we know, and we may be 
able to judge to a certain extent, as to the character 
of the cadet at the Military Academy, and after- 
ward of the officer in the Hfe of the army, but it is 
after all an approximation. 

And yet such an approximation must be at- 
tempted to be made at the MiHtary Academy. 
In determining who among the corps of cadets are 
to be allowed to take the post-graduate course for 
final graduation as officers of the army, the ques- 
tion of character must be considered. Character 
develops itself in so many different ways that it is 
difficult to determine whether a student possesses 
it or not, and yet I fancy that instructors trained 
to observation, may reach an approximation of 
more or less value which should be of use in 
determining who shall be selected for the post- 
graduate course. 

A record of the character of each cadet should be 
kept, and such record should present as clear an 
estimate of the character of each cadet as can be 
formed by the officers and professors under whose 
observation he may have passed. The substance 



68 West Point in our Next War 

of this estimate of character should be considered, 
side by side, with the record of the class standing 
of the cadet in determining whether he should be 
graduated, and should leave the Academy at the 
end of the two-year term, or whether he should be 
allowed to take the post-graduate course of two 
additional years of study at the Academy. 

The history of armies bears eloquent testimony 
not only to the value of character, but as to the 
lamentable failure of officers lacking in character. 

The present Generalissimo of the French Army, 
General Joffre, made himself notable before the 
war by arbitrarily retiring a number of general 
officers who had failed to display promptness and 
efficiency, or in other words, character, on the 
peaceful fields of the autumn manoeuvres. And 
since the opening of the present war in Europe, 
upward of fifty general officers of the French army 
have been relieved from their commands and 
placed on the retired list for inefficiency. They 
may have been, or some of them may have been, 
successful graduates of St. Cyr, and yet in the 
supreme test of war they failed. 

So also was it in our great war. Many general 
officers, graduates of the Military Academy, were 
found to be, judged by the criterion of war, unfit 
for service in the field in command of troops in 
the advanced rank in the volunteer army to which 
they had been appointed. Many were continued 
in their commands longer than they should have 



West Point 69 

been because of their old army reputations, or 
because of their cadet standing at the Military 
Academy, and yet the inexorable judgment of 
war condemned them as unfit. 

If a closer estimate of character be made at 
West Point and afterward in the army, it may be 
predicted that fewer failures among our general 
officers in war will occur. 

It may be conceded that there is some sort of 
estimate of character sought to be formed under 
present conditions at West Point, but I think it 
may be stated that in no case is such estimation of 
character allowed to weigh heavily against class- 
room standing in determining graduation. 

It is recognized how difficult it is to make such 
an estimate of character, and with what watchful 
care it must be attempted. And yet it should be 
seriously attempted to be made in the interest of 
the service, because reputation in the army in time 
of peace, or until the supreme test of war is applied, 
guarantees little, and yet such reputation is neces- 
sarily the basis of the assignment of officers of the 
army to high command on the breaking out of 
war. 

Our armies, during the great war, were at times 
badly commanded by officers of high army reputa- 
tion in time of peace, and the danger is that our 
armies of the future may be badly commanded 
by the same class of officers, unless some surer 
estimation of character be formed, first at the 



70 West Point in our Next War 

Military Academy, and, after graduation, in the 
army. 

Who would have predicted at the opening of the 
great war that Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and 
Thomas would head the list of the army as great 
soldiers in war? 

We were taught to put faith at the breaking out 
of the war, and during the early part of the war, in 
McClellan, McDowell, Bumside, Buell, Hooker, 
Halleck, Pope, and many other officers of the 
regular army, only to find, in the test of war, that 
they were broken reeds, worthless for the great 
commands that they held. All of these generals 
lacked character, and lacking character they failed. 
Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas possessed 
character and succeeded, covering themselves and 
the army with glory. 

Yet as difficult as it may be to estimate character 
at the Military Academy the effort to do so should 
be made, because the country needs for its army 
the best officers that the Military Academy can 
furnish. The creation of an enlarged West Point 
will give the officers and professors of the Academy 
a wide range of selection among the cadets for the 
post-graduate course, and consequently great care 
and discrimination in selection should be exer- 
cised in order that those to take the post-graduate 
course should excel not only in the records of the 
classroom, but also in the reports of the officers of 
the Academy on character. 



West Point 71 

The increase in the corps of cadets to thirty-six 
hundred men, and the reduction of the term of 
study and instruction at the Military Academy to 
two years, with a post-graduate term of study and 
instruction of two years additional for the cadets 
designated for final graduation as officers of the 
army, will make serious modifications necessary 
in the curriculum and in the method of instruction. 
The course of study and instruction should be 
simplified and yet broadened in the two-year term, 
so that there should be concentrated into this 
period the studies directed particularly to the 
education and development of soldiers. 

The course of study during the first year should 
include the following studies, the English language, 
for the development of a direct and clear style of 
military expression, both in speech and writing, 
and all cadets should be required to write a good 
hand, so that orders and reports may be read easily 
and without mistake; mathematics, military engi- 
neering and surveying, including reconnoitring and 
field work; infantry drill, including marches and 
camp duties; machine-gun drill; hygiene, including 
that of camps and moving columns of troops, in- 
struction to be given by medical officers of the 
army; riding, and aviation. There should be at- 
tached to the Academy a complete outfit of aero- 
planes and hydroplanes, and cadets should be 
required to make two or three ascensions a year, 
and to prepare and submit reports of their obser- 



72 West Point in our Next War 

vations while in the air as a part of their study of 
reconnoitring. The instruction in military engi- 
neering should be coupled with practical illustra- 
tions in the field, including the construction of 
field works. 

Study marches of several hours' duration should 
be made at least three times a month under war 
conditions. The column should be stripped as for 
battle, the men should carry one day's cooked 
rations in their haversacks, and the column should 
be followed by several auto-ambulances and by 
two or three unloaded auto-ammunition waggons, 
to give the semblance of war to the manoeuvre. 
The march should be conducted as if in an enemy's 
country, but without cavalry and artillery, but 
with a corps of pioneers, to be organized from the 
corps of cadets. 

During the season of the year when troops can 
camp out without danger to the health of the 
cadets, the command should occasionally be 
absent from the Academy during these marches 
for a period of twenty-four hours, on which 
marches shelter tents should be carried, and the 
cadets should go under canvas during the night 
of their field manoeuvres. During these marches 
the column should consist of infantry, cavalry, and 
artillery. 

I quite understand that it may be said that such 
absence from the Academy would interfere with 
the continuity of study of the cadets, but in the 



West Point 73 

first place, I do not believe that such would be the 
result, as these marches should be considered to be 
the practical application of the theories taught in 
the classroom, and in the second place, it must be 
remembered that the object of instruction is to 
make practical soldiers in two years, good captains 
and majors; and to produce such soldiers the 
cadets should have the opportunity of learning 
what a regiment is, and how it looks in the field; 
how a brigade looks, how it moves, how it goes into 
action, how it intrenches, how it encamps. These 
instruction marches should be preceded or fol- 
lowed by lectures by the officers in command to 
their respective regiments, upon the features of the 
march and of the encampment. In two years the 
Academy, under this system of instruction, should 
be able to make an officer competent to take 
command, on his graduation, of a company or of a 
battalion of infantry, or of a battery of artillery, or 
of a squadron of cavalry, and such field instruction 
is deemed to be necessary to produce such an of- 
ficer. The present course of instruction at the 
Academy is thought to be too academic; too much 
of the nature of classroom and parade-ground in- 
struction. 

The second year's course should include in 
addition to mathematics, ordnance and gunnery; 
the art of war; military chemistry and electricity; 
military surveying, including the construction of 
light railways; military engineering, including 



74 West Point in our Next War 

bridge-building, work with the pontoons, con- 
struction of trenches and field fortifications, and 
instruction in the manufacture and laying of mines; 
and instruction in cavalry and light artillery tac- 
tics, and the use of machine guns in co-operation 
with cavalry and artillery as well as in co-operation 
with infantry. 

Instruction should also be given in military 
administration, including the service of the 
commissary and quartermaster's departments, 
now consolidated as the General Supply Service 
of the army. 

So far as machine guns are concerned, I have 
come to the deliberate judgment that they should 
be organized into separate and distinct batteries, 
under their own battery officers, and that these 
batteries, where a sufficient number of them are 
associated together, should be grouped into 
battalions under machine-gun battalion officers.* 
These machine-gun organizations should be dis- 
tinct from regimental organizations whether of 
infantry or cavalry, but that when associated with 
infantry and cavalry, batteries of machine guns 
should be under the command of the brigade 
commander with whose troops they should be 
acting. 

The only modification that I should make in this 
form of command is in respect to machine guns 
with artillery, in which case, when the artillery is 
in battalion formation, the machine-gun batteries 



West Point 75 

acting with the artillery should be under the 
command of the artillery battalion commander. 
I believe in the permanent association, not incor- 
poration but association, of machine-gun batteries 
with battalions of light artillery, so that the 
artillery should have the direct support of their 
fire in action. 

It is quite true that I have never seen machine 
guns in action, but in this respect very few of the 
officers of the regular army have the advantage of 
me. It is therefore allowable for one writing on 
military subjects to theorize upon the subject of 
the use, and the organization for use, of machine 
guns. 

Above everything, mobility should be the aim of 
army organization; mobility and the concentration of 
fire. The system of distributing the machine guns 
among infantry regiments to be handled by ma- 
chine-gun squads drawn from infantry regiments, 
is, I am convinced, a serious mistake ; wrong both in 
theory and in practice. If used in such formation 
in battle there would be produced a sputtering fire 
along a long range of front, whereas if concentrated 
in battery organization, and under the direct 
command of brigade commanders, the fire of the 
machine guns could be concentrated when neces- 
sary on a limited front, and, so concentrated, 
produce a withering and destructive fire. 

And I advocate the association of machine 
guns in battery formation with field artillery to W 



76 West Point in our Next War 

under the command of the artillery commander, 
because the artillery will then have its own support 
among its guns ; the fire of the machine guns being 
much more effective than the fire of a correspond- 
ing amount of infantry in support of the guns. 
The same argument holds with reference to the 
association of machine guns with cavalry. As 
artillery, under my scheme of army organization, 
is considered to be army corps not divisional 
troops, and under the command of the corps com- 
mander, the moment he should need machine guns 
for his firing line in battle, he could, should the 
machine guns associated with the artillery be not 
in action, order them to the front. 

The transportation of machine guns has not yet 
been worked out satisfactorily. As to whether 
machine guns should be transported on auto trucks 
made for the purpose, which should advance within 
easy range of the firing line, or whether they should 
be transported on motorcycles, each motorcycle 
having the capacity not only to carry a gun but 
also an extra man, I hold my judgment in sus- 
pense, except that I think the machine guns to be 
associated with infantry should be transported on 
auto trucks, and the machine guns to be associated 
with artillery should be transported on motor- 
cycles, the motorcycles being manned by the men 
of the battery, and, on approaching the firing line, 
the guns to be dismounted from the motorcycles 
and moved to the front, every fifth man remaining 



West Point 77 

in charge of the motorcycles, as was the practice 
during the great war when cavalry was dismounted 
for action on foot, every fifth man being left in 
charge of the horses. 

And further, I think that machine guns accom- 
panying cavalry should be transported on motor- 
cycles, because motorcycles can go wherever cav- 
alry can go, and the fire of machine guns would 
add greatly to the power of cavalry, dismounted, 
to hold advanced positions until the infantry could 
get up. In the case of artillery, the fire of the ma- 
chine gims can measurably keep down the fire of, 
and drive back, infantry advancing to attack field 
guns when in action in the open. I quite under- 
stand that in modem war it is the object to conceal 
artillery in action, and that the guns are placed 
well to the rear of the infantry, and yet it will 
happen that artillery must expose itself in beating 
back an advance of the enemy, and if it can carry 
its own supports into action, as would be the case 
should batteries of machine guns be associated 
with artillery, the danger of its occupation of 
exposed positions would be greatly reduced ; mean- 
while the machine guns associated with the artillery 
would be subject to the orders of the corps com- 
mander for use upon any part of the line of battle 
when not in action with the artillery. 

The graduation at the end of the two-year course 
of study at the Military Academy should be post- 
poned until the ist of September of each year, and 



78 West Point in our Next War 

the month of August of each year should be spent 
in the field under actual war conditions. The in- 
structional work of the command should consist of 
drills and manoeuvres with the three arms of the 
service, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and with 
machine guns; and it should also include service 
with the pontoons, the repair and construction 
of roads and bridges, and the formation of en- 
campments. 

As this month's service is to be the last work of 
the two-year men the corps of cadets should be 
handled as in war. The transportation should be 
cut to war limits, the men should make and break 
camp, should march and go into battle formation, 
should ford shallow streams and lay pontoon 
bridges across broader and deeper streams under 
cover of artillery fire, and on crossing streams their 
advance should throw up bridge heads to cover the 
crossing of the balance of the troops. 

During this month of manoeuvres the cadets 
should be in brigade and tactical divisional forma- 
tion, and they should march and manoeuvre as a 
brigade and as a division. There should be at 
least one battery of artillery and at least one 
squadron of cavalry attached to the corps, and the 
corps should have its pioneer corps, its pontoon 
train, and its auto-supply train. The service 
troops with the corps of cadets should be supplied 
by the army. 

Any assembly of the three arms of the service, 



West Point 79 

infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with pioneers and a 
pontoon train, and with service troops, forming an 
independent command under the flag of one 
commanding officer, no matter how large or how 
small the command may be, is an army. 

Consequently for all the purposes of the ma- 
noeuvres during the month of August, so long as the 
command shall be an independent command, the 
corps of cadets with cavalry and artillery may be 
regarded as an army, and the lessons of an army 
may be learned from its marches and manoeuvres. 

The command of the corps of cadets, constitut- 
ing a brigade, should be held by a brigadier-general^ 
or by an officer holding that rank during assign- 
ment, who should select all of his staff officers 
from among the cadets. Should it be possible for 
the concluding period of fifteen days of the August 
manoeuvres to associate the corps of cadets with 
large bodies of the regular army, the corps should 
at once be converted into a brigade of two regi- 
ments of cavalry and into a regiment of artillery, 
regular troops being dismounted to supply horses 
and battery mounts for the corps, and during 
these latter days of August the corps of cadets 
should manoeuvre with the body of regular troops 
with whom they should be associated as cavaliy 
and artillery. 

It is believed that if these changes be carried 
out at West Point the government will have at 
the end of the two years, roughly speaking, thirty- 



8o West Point in our Next War 

six hundred enthusiastic young men fit to officer its 
army. But assuming for sake of argument that 
half of the proposed corps of thirty-six hundred 
young men should be held at the Academy to 
take the post-graduate course of instruction, there 
would still be left eighteen hundred young officers 
for the active and the reserve army. 

But until the reorganized army should be filled 
up with officers I should suspend the post-graduate 
course, and graduate at the end of each year for 
immediate entry into the army, every cadet who 
should have taken the full two-year course and 
who should pass the final examinations. When, 
however, the active army should be full of officers, 
then the post-graduate course should be instituted, 
and the number of post-graduate students required 
for the army should be determined by the War 
Office in advance of the annual graduation, and the 
selections for the post-graduate course should be 
made to conform to the requirements of the army. 

The balance of the corps should then be 
graduated as officers of the reserve army until the 
complement of reserve officers should be full, when 
the surplus every year thereafter should be honour- 
ably mustered out of the service with a year's pay 
of a second lieutenant of infantry, passing from 
the Academy into the current of everyday life, 
but registered to serve the country as officers on a 
call to the colours at any time within ten years 
from their date of graduation. 



West Point 8i 

Fifty years ago, when I first thought out this 
plan for the reorganization of the Military Acad- 
emy, our army was a small army, and the number 
of annual vacancies among the officers of the army 
to be filled by graduates of the Military Academy 
was small. Nevertheless I then advocated a 
Military Academy of from twelve hundred to 
fifteen hundred men, because I knew that the 
military education and service of a two-year course 
at the Academy would, in time, give the country a 
vast number of men trained for the army, from 
among whom the government could draw its 
officers in time of war to command the volunteers, 
and so be saved the risk and danger of the long 
period of preparation for war, after war should 
have begun. 

And then, I confess, there was fixed in my mind 
the thought that the occupations, the struggles, 
the uncertainties, and the triumphs of civil life 
would in many instances broaden and keep in 
fine condition the minds, and develop the charac- 
ters, of many of these two-year graduates of the 
Academy, so that should war break out, the 
nation would not only have officers for its army of 
volunteers, but possible generals of high capacity 
for its commanding officers. The control of great 
resources, the conduct of great affairs, with the 
ever present weight of responsibility in civil life, 
develops character as no length of service in the 
army in time of peace can possibly do, because of 

6 



82 West Point in our Next War 

the lack of the stimulus of responsibility /or results 
demanded in civil life. 

Assuming a military education of two years at 
the Military Academy as the basis, and such a 
life as that led by many of those who during the 
past fifty years have conquered the wilderness, 
carrying our railway lines from the valley of the 
Mississippi across the Rocky Mountains to the 
Pacific Ocean, who have founded and developed 
our vast manufacturing power, and have created 
our vast system of finance, was it unreasonable to 
suppose that when called to the colours these men 
would have brought to the service of the nation in 
war all the wealth of genius and of character which 
had been developed and had been displayed by 
them in the activities of civil life? 

It would be a most interesting psychological 
study to investigate the influence of the failures of 
Grant and Sherman in civil life upon their military 
characters. Upon Grant manifestly the influence 
was a broadening one. Upon Sherman the in- 
fluence was also broadening, but unconsciously so, 
owing to the intense personal consciousness of the 
man. Sherman was far from being so great a man 
as Grant, and consequently this influence was not 
so marked in his case. The inferiority of Sherman 
to Grant is manifested in many ways, but especially 
in their battles. 

Such was my dream of fifty years ago, as to the 
enlargement and reorganization of the Military 



West Point 83 

Academy, and such is the conviction of my old age. 
Had this dream been realized in the past the utterly 
unnecessary spectacle of the introduction of so 
large a number of civilians into the regular army 
at the time of the creation of our coast artillery 
corps, and upon the breaking out of the war with 
Spain, would have been avoided. Indeed there 
was little excuse for such appointments on account 
of the Spanish War, because the government had 
it in its power arbitrarily to have graduated the 
First, Second, and Third Classes at West Point 
into the army as second lieutenants, which would 
measurably have supplied the then demand for 
officers. The bulk of these young men would have 
served at West Point at least two years before 
entering the army as second lieutenants, and 
would have made better officers on that account 
than the young men appointed to the army from 
civil life who, as a class, knew nothing of the army 
or of their duties as army officers. 

It may be noted here that I have made a dis- 
tinction between the volunteers of the great war 
and appointees from civil life to the army since 
the war. The distinction lies in the fact that the 
volunteers of the War of the Rebellion learned 
their trade of war in war; that the best school of 
instruction for war is war; that three or four years* 
service in the army in time of war furnishes a 
much better education for war than three or four 
years spent on the banks of the Hudson in time of 



84 West Point in our Next War 

peace. I have said elsewhere that the 15th, i6th, 
and 17th Army Corps, composed of volunteers, 
toward the end of 1862 and thenceforv/ard to the 
end of the war, were as good soldiers as the 
soldiers of the regular army, and yet I now ad- 
vocate the appointment only of graduates of the 
Military Academy as officers of the regular army. 
The reason for this discrimination in favour of 
graduates of the Military Academy is that we 
have, fortunately, no war in which to educate 
officers for the army, and that without such 
education in the school of experience in actual war, 
there is no school in which it is so likely that good 
officers can be trained for the army as at the Mili- 
tary Academy at West Point. The Spanish War 
was too brief a war to serve as a school for officers. 
Indeed it was only toward the end of that war that 
the regular army began "to find itself." The 
dulling influence of so many years of peace prior 
to the war with Spain had gotten the army 
entirely out of touch with the conditions of actual 
war. 

Apropos of the proposed two-year course of 
instruction at the Military Academy, I cannot 
forget that one of the best division commanders 
of the Western Army, Major-General J. M. Corse, 
whom I knew personally, had served two years at 
the Military Academy. Why he left West Point 
I never knew; I never took the trouble to inquire. 
It was sufficient to know that he was a fine soldier, 



West Point 85 

an infinitely finer soldier than many general officers 
who were graduates of the Military Academy. 
Removing to the West before the war, where he 
was subject to the developing influences of the 
demands of civil life, the war found him in Iowa. 
He volunteered, and his West Point service of two 
3'ears secured for him command rank. His own 
merit did the rest. 

The post-graduate course is intended to com- 
plete the military education of the selected cadets 
who are to receive final graduation into the army 
as officers. Although the introduction of the two- 
year course would dislocate some of the studies of 
the present curriculum, advancing, let us say, the 
study of the art of war to the second year from the 
fourth year in the present course, it is not thought 
that any unhappy effect on the students need be 
apprehended, since the cadets with one, or one 
year and a half of service and instruction at the 
Academy, are quite as ready to take up the study 
of the art of war as they would be in their fourth 
year of instruction at the Academy. 

It is not intended, however, to devote any time 
to the consideration of the course of study for the 
term of post-graduate instruction. If the plan of 
increasing the number of cadets and breaking the 
present course of instruction into two distinct 
periods be adopted. First, a two-year period of 
study, carrying graduation from the Academy, and 
Second, a post-graduate course for the further 



86 West Point in our Next War 

instruction of cadets selected for final graduation as 
officers of the army ; the arrangement of the studies 
of the post-graduate course of instruction may 
safely be left to the Academic Board. If, on the 
other hand, nothing is to be done in reference to the 
suggestions of this book, it is not worth while to 
waste time or thought in the preparation of a plan 
of post-graduate studies. 

But as to the organization of the Academy I 
deem it advisable that certain changes should be 
made whether the present system be maintained or 
not. 

Making an argument in favour of longer tours 
of duty for officer instructors at the Academy, 
Colonel Townsley, Superintendent of the Military 
Academy, says in his Annual Report datisd June 
30, 1914: 

While I do not claim that these figures are mathe- 
matically exact, they are very close to it, and give an 
honest representation of the difficulties we encounter 
in the selection of desirable officers as instructors under 
this detached service law. The result is that we are 
compelled to ask for officers as instructors who with- 
out this detached service law would not have been 
considered for such duty. These officers when de- 
tailed have done their very best, and yet the results 
have not been up to the standard heretofore attained, 
and an exhaustive amount of work in instructing these 
instructors, that is beyond all reason, has been put 
upon the heads of the Academic Departments. The 



West Point 87 

ill effect upon discipline of having Instructors not 
naturally well equipped cannot even be estimated, 
and in this lies a most serious and bad effect of the 
detached service law upon the cadets at the Academy. 
Instructors who graduated low in their classes and 
who are not temperamentally constituted to be good 
instructors are now necessarily required to instruct 
the keen cadets standing high in their studies, and 
who are ready to take every advantage of an instruc- 
tor's errors or peculiarities. The result Is unsatisfac- 
tory not only as regards instruction but in its effect 
upon discipline. 

This natural protest as Superintendent against 
the injustice of compelling the Academy to accept 
the services of instructors not qualified for the 
duty of instruction, is, in reaHty, a remarkably 
strong argument against the selection of officers 
of the army for such duties. 

The practice of drawing instructors for service 
at the Military Academy from among the officers 
of the army grew up when the army was much 
smaller than it is now, and when its responsibilities 
were much less than they have since become, and 
also when the temptations of detached service 
were not so great as they now are. 

The curse of the army today is "detached 
service." The Secretary of War at the last 
session of Congress asked for an addition of one 
thousand officers to the service, such increase in the 
corps of officers being largely rendered necessary, 



88 West Point in our Next War 

in the judgment of the Secretary, by the great 
number of ofncers on detached service. 

I think that the system of instruction at the 
Military Academy, except in purely military- 
matters, should be changed so that the instructors 
should be civilians. 

The officers of the army detailed for military 
duty at the Academy should comprehend the 
Superintendent, who should rank as brigadier- 
general during his residence, and who should be 
the superior and commanding officer at the 
Academy, a commandant of cadets who should 
rank as brigadier-general while holding that 
assignment, and three officers with the assigned 
rank of colonel to command the three regiments of 
cadets, the Adjutant of the Academy, the Quarter- 
master, the Chief Medical Officer, the instructors 
in field work, engineering, in ordnance and 
gunnery, in aviation and in signalling, and such 
other officers as shall be found to be absolutely 
necessary for purely military work and instruction. 

The commanding officers of battalions of 
infantry, batteries of artillery, and squadrons of 
cavalry should be drawn from cadets pursuing the 
post-graduate course of studies; the theory being 
that all graduates of the first, or two-year term, 
are fitted, or at least should be fitted, to command 
at once on graduation a battalion of infantry, a 
battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. If 
they are not so fitted there will then be found to 



West Point 89 

have been some error in the plan of their instruc- 
tion, because, if a good regimental commander of 
volunteers can be created in two years' service in 
the field, surely a graduate of the Military Acad- 
emy, with all the advantages of two years' study 
and instruction at the Academy, and with the 
chance of command which should be given to him 
for purposes of experience, should be competent 
to command a battalion of infantry, a battery of 
artillery, or a squadron of cavalry. All staff officers 
of the Superintendent except the Adjutant of the 
Academy, and all staff officers of the Commandant 
of Cadets should be drawn from the post-graduate 
corps of cadets, their service as staff officers being 
considered to be a material part of their military 
education. But all comipany officers should be 
selected from the whole corps of cadets according 
to merit, and I have sufficient confidence in the 
high class of the cadets produced by competitive 
examination to believe that the corps, as a whole, 
will be found able to furnish all officers below the 
grade of battalion commanders needed to officer the 
corps of cadets. 

So far as the rank of lieutenant-colonel is 
concerned, I do not think it necessary to fill that 
rank, as I regard the office as of little use in a regi- 
ment of infantry or a regiment of cavalry since the 
introduction of the three-battalion system, or its 
equivalent. It is possible that it might be well to 
retain the rank in a regiment of artillery so as to 



90 West Point in our Next War 

furnish officers of command rank to serve as 
chiefs of artillery; either the lieutenant-colonel 
commanding the regiment in absence of the colonel 
on staff duty, or vice versa. 

If a semblance of military rank and authority 
be deemed to be necessary in the classrooms, the 
instructors at the Academy could be organized 
into a corps to be designated as the Instructional 
Corps of the Army, with assimilated rank, and 
with the right to wear a uniform and to carry a 
sword. But these gentlemen should not be drawn 
from the army but from civil life. Should any 
officer of the army, however, wish to enter this 
corps he should be compelled to resign his com- 
mission in the army. It is unreasonable that 
officers educated to be soldiers should be required 
to serve, or should seek details from their com- 
mands to serve as instructors at the Military 
Academy. The craze for detached service is 
sapping the vitality of the army, and wherever it 
can be shown that detached service is unnecessary, 
steps should be taken to do away with the abuse. 
It may be said that qualified officer instructors 
make the best instructors, but this may be doubted 
when it is considered that no officer could expect 
to be detailed for a longer period than four years, 
and when it is further considered that the country 
is full of colleges and universities whose professors 
rank high as instructors. 

I think a permanent corps of instructors, drawn 



West Point 91 

from civil life, could be organized for the Military- 
Academy against whom the charge of inefficiency 
made by Colonel Townsley against some of the 
military instructors at the Academy could not lie. 

The instruction of the young men of the country 
has called into existence a special class of men who 
have devoted their lives to the cause of education. 
The bulk of these gentlemen have deliberately 
chosen their profession from a love of teaching. I 
asked recently one of the professors of the George 
Washington University, himself an authority on 
explosives, why he had chosen his profession? 
He replied with a smile which illumined his 
whole face, "Because I love teaching. I love my 
profession." 

There is not a shadow of doubt on my mind that 
both the army and the Military Academy would 
be benefited by the substitution of a corps of civil- 
ian instructors in place of the military instructors 
now assigned to duty at the Academy. The 
army would receive back its officers whom it needs 
in its ranks,' and the Academy would have a 
permanent corps of selected instructors entirely 
competent to perform the duties of the classroom. 

The detail of officers of the army as instructors 
is the most expensive system of instruction in the 
country when the pay and allowances of the offi- 
cers are taken into consideration, but this objec- 
tion would not be urged against the system were 
there no other objection to it. But the need of the 



92 West Point in our Next War 

army for officers with the colours, and the need of 
the Academy for competent instructors, speak 
eloquently against the system. The system of 
officer instructors should be superseded, as out of 
date, by a corps of civilian instructors to be chosen 
after full and thorough examination for fitness. 

The same remarks apply to the Naval Academy 
at Annapolis. Here also we find officers of the 
navy on duty, text-book in hand, working in the 
classroom while the navy is clamouring for more 
sea officers. I do not think that detached service 
is so much of an abuse in the navy as it is in the 
army, and yet it would not be matter of surprise if 
it should be found that there are officers of the 
navy on duty in the Navy Department, doing 
work which could be better done by some of the 
old clerks of the Department. 

There should be assigned to duty at the Military 
Academy a certain number of sergeants from the 
army as drill masters, whose duty it should be to 
take the cadets in hand the moment of their 
arrival at the Academy, and put them through a 
course of drill in the school of the soldier, squad 
drill, etc. These sergeants should be allowed to 
demonstrate their fitness for this work, and if 
found fit, they should be given the opportunity 
to transfer from their regiments to permanent duty 
at the Military Academy to serve there as drill 
masters, retaining their grade in the service, but 
to be dropped from the line of the army and to be 



West Point 93 

designated as drill masters at the Military Acad- 
emy, their places in their regiments to be filled by 
promotion from the ranks. 

It has been recommended that the date of 
graduation should be advanced to the first of 
September, and that the month of August be spent 
in the field in brigade and tactical divisional forma- 
tion. But it is recognized that the cadets just 
arriving at the Academy would be too green for 
such work, and therefore it is recommended that 
all cadets entering the Academy should be required 
to report June 15th of each year, and be at once 
put in camp. The drill sergeants should then 
take them in hand for fifteen days, and on the first 
of July they should be organized into companies 
and be drilled in such formation throughout the 
month of July. By the first of August they would 
be ready to be incorporated in battalions. It is 
roughly estimated that each year's quota of new 
cadets would be about one thousand men, or the 
equivalent of about three battalions of infantry. 
These new cadets should be distributed among the 
three regiments of the corps according to the 
judgment of the commandant of cadets, either in 
squads or companies. I think, however, it would 
be better for them to be incorporated directly and 
personally with the existing battalions, so as to 
become, from the outset of their career, thoroughly 
assimilated with the corps. 

Nothing is said upon the subject of discipline 



94 West Point in our Next War 

because it is believed that the discipHne of the 
Military Academy is excellent; and nothing is 
said as to the spirit of the Military Academy 
because that is believed to be admirable. 

Given two men of equal ability, equal character, 
and equal attainments one of whom is a graduate 
of the Military Academy and the other a civilian 
appointee in the army, and it should be possible to 
assume that the graduate of the Military Academy 
will be the better soldier. 

But the impossible should not be expected. The 
Academy cannot make a soldier unless the military 
quality be in the cadet. He may have capacity 
enough to graduate and yet not be a soldier. In 
the army he may prove a fairly good subaltern, 
a fairly good captain, or a fairly good major, and 
yet not be a soldier in the large sense of the term. 
He may even know what should be done, but at the 
crisis not have the character to do what should be 
done, in which case he would not be a soldier. 
^ But with all these reservations I favour an army 
officered by graduates of the Military Academy, 
I believe that the best results may be expected 
from an army so officered. I believe, generally 
speaking, that prompter action in an emergency 
may be expected from an army so officered, 

I have no illusions, however, as to West Point 
or West Pointers. I have known personally a 
number of graduates of the Military Academy, and 
have served in the army with graduates of the 



West Point 95 

Academy, and I have a high regard for the Acad- 
emy and for her graduates. That we should, 
however, accept every graduate as a good soldier 
simply because he had spent four years of his life 
at school at West Point, is an absurdity; an ab- 
surdity in which West Pointers, however, have 
too often fallen into the habit of demanding belief 
by the country. In making this demand West 
Point is injuring her cause, because the history of 
the great war is full of the blunders and failures of 
regular officers, graduates of the Military Academy. 
General Carter in his book, The American Army, 
gives a list of graduates of the Academy who 
commanded armies, army corps, and divisions, 
during the great war, concluding his list with the 
remark: "Of their non-graduates brothers-in- 
arms of the old regular army none were in com- 
mand of armies, only Sumner commanded a corps 
and Kearney and Mower commanded divisions." 

Does not the gallant General know that it would 
have been almost an impossibility for a non- 
graduate officer of the army, under the West Point 
influence which controlled the War Department 
throughout the great war, to have reached the 
command of an army corps or an army ? 

Analyse this list, given by General Carter, and it 
becomes painfully apparent that many of these 
gentlemen were given commands for which they 
were utterly unfit. Does any one doubt that Kear- 
ney and Mower were infinitely better soldiers than 



96 West Point in our Next War 

some of the army commanders and half of the 
corps commanders given in General Carter's list as 
graduates of the Academy ? 

I did not know Kearney, but it was the general 
belief of the army at the period of his untimely 
death, that on account of his ability as a soldier 
he was destined to achieve high command; 
possibly the command of the Army of the Potomac; 
so keen were his military perceptions and so firm 
his character. Mower I knew personally. He was 
the incarnation of military vigpur. He was a 
soldier who inspired his men; a leader whom his 
men followed with the devotion of admiration. 

Does not the gallant General know that but few 
of Napoleon's marshals were educated soldiers, 
except that they were graduates of that best of all 
schools for the making of soldiers, the school of 
war? 

In many instances volunteer officers, seasoned 
and developed by several years of war, were better 
soldiers, and showed a keener sense of the spirit 
of discipline, than some of their West Point 
associates in the army, even where the latter had 
had the same advantage of service in the field 
in war. 

As to the higher qualities of the soldier, those 
qualities which reach to the height of generalship, 
I say without the slightest shadow of doubt in my 
judgment that Major-General John A. Logan of 
the volunteers, as a battle commander, outranked 



West Point 97 

the whole Regular Army except Grant, Sherman, 
Sheridan, Thomas, and Meade, after whom I place 
him — sixth in the list of officers of the American 
army in the great war. 

Logan's battle of Atlanta — for it was his battle, 
fought by the Army of the Tennessee under his 
command — stamps him as a great soldier. 

Had Logan fought the battle of Atlanta under 
the eye of the great Napoleon the sun of another 
day could not have arisen before he would have 
been a Marshal of France. 

There was not an officer or a man in the Army 
of the Tennessee who did not expect that Logan 
would be retained in command of the army after 
the battle of Atlanta, which command came to 
him on the field of battle, upon the death of 
McPherson at the very opening of the engage- 
ment; but General Sherman decided otherwise. 
I think this judgment of Sherman, denying the 
command of the Army of the Tennessee to Logan 
after the battle of Atlanta, was due to the narrow- 
ing influence of the West Point training on his 
mind; and a narrowing influence undoubtedly it 
has upon a certain character of mind. He could 
not realize that a man could learn as much oj war 
from three or four years' training in war as from 
three or four years' schooling in boyhood on the 
banks of the Hudson, during a period of peace. 
And yet no one grew more rapidly than Sherman 
during the great war. The Sherman of Bull Run 



98 West Point in our Next War 

was a neophyte; the Sherman of the South Caro- 
lina campaign was a great soldier. 

It is greatly to General Howard's credit that he 
recognized the right of Logan, won on the field 
of battle, to the command of the Army of the 
Tennessee, calHng General Sherman's attention 
to the fact, and only on an impatient exclama- 
tion from Sherman, consenting himself, to accept 
the command of the army. 

I have read pretty much all that Sherman has 
written about the supersession of Logan, and 
have come to the conclusion that what he has 
written upon the subject is a painful and unsatis- 
factory excuse for an indefensible act. 

For both General Howard and General Logan, 
as gallant soldiers as ever wore swords, and with 
whom I had the honour to serve in the field, I 
have the utmost respect. I owe to General 
Howard the opportunity of my military life 
through his recommendation of me to General 
Osterhaus as Adjutant-General of the 15th Army 
Corps. I hold their memories in the tenderest 
recollection, and it is the pride of my life that they 
honoured me with their confidence. In placing 
Logan in the highest class of soldiers I disclaim 
any reflection upon the soldierly qualities of 
General Howard. I speak of Logan as I should 
speak of Grant or Sherman or Sheridan or Thomas, 
as a man apart, without any personal or professional 
reflection upon any other officer of the army, 



West Point 99 

merely assigning to him his place in history ac- 
cording to my appreciation of his merits and his 
services to the army and to the nation. 

General Logan was offered a brigadier-general- 
ship in the Regular Army at the close of the great 
war, which he wisely declined. His temperament 
was unsuited to the detail work of the army in 
time of peace. His sphere of activity was the 
army in time of war. He had the true sense of 
command. He exacted obedience and action 
from his subordinates, but was absolutely free 
from fussiness, that fault of some general officers 
which makes them meddle with the conduct of 
affairs by their subordinates. He never interfered 
in the execution of his orders, but allowing his sub- 
ordinates a free hand, demanded strict compliance 
with the orders given. He always expected and 
demanded success. He had an almost unerring 
judgment for position. He knew by instinct what 
soldiers could do. He had character, which made 
him a soldier in the fullest acceptation of the term. 
He had many of the qualities of Massena, Marshal 
of France, Duke of Rivoli, and Prince of Essling, 
one of Napoleon's greatest marshals. Logan's 
genius for war blazed forth the brightest when 
everything seemed to be going wrong and success 
depended upon him personally. Then his un- 
daunted spirit filled the whole field, and he tore 
victory from approaching defeat. 

No one has a higher appreciation of the volun- 



100 West Point in our Next War 

teer soldier, seasoned by service in war, than I 
have. No one glories more than I do in the valour, 
the unfailing readiness for duty, the steadiness in 
battle, the brilliant feats of arms of the volunteers, 
and no pride should be higher in life than the pride 
in having been an officer of volunteers in the great 
war. 

When they were well commanded these volun- 
teer troops proved themselves to be invincible 
soldiers. But it is the saddest commentary upon 
the great war that they were so often badly, 
inefficiently, ignorantly commanded, and that 
such failures in high command were too often the 
failures of regular officers, graduates of the Mili- 
tary Academy, who were utterly unfit for the 
command of armies, or divisions, or even brigades, 
to which they were assigned largely because of 
their reputation in the old army. 

This is not an indictment of the Regular Army or 
of the Military Academy, but is simply a protest 
against the inferences created by such remarks as 
those quoted above from General Carter's book, 
The American Army. The same unfitness of reg- 
ular officers for command often presents itself in 
all wars. It is today making itself felt in the 
French army, as is manifested by the arbitrary 
retirement from their commands for incapacity of 
a number of French general officers. Doubtless 
the same unfitness is making itself apparent in all 
the armies engaged in the war, although we know 



West Point loi 

little or nothing of such manifestations. We do 
know, however, that after the battle of the Mame, 
General Count von Moltke was relieved from duty 
as Chief of Staff of the German army, and that 
other general officers of that army subsided into 
obscurity. 

But notwithstanding my high appreciation of 
volunteers when they have become soldiers by train- 
ing in war, I am satisfied that the best results are 
to be obtained by the employment of educated 
soldiers, and especially do I advocate their educa- 
tion to the highest point, and as a part of that 
education, the application of all possible tests to 
determine and develop character as far as charac- 
ter can be determined in time of peace. No 
matter how patriotic, how earnest, how loyal 
volunteers may be, they have to learn their business 
after war breaks out, which handicaps them so 
seriously, that the nation should no longer incur 
the risk of dependence upon them in the first 
line of battle. 

The conditions of war have so strikingly changed 
in the past fifty years, as I have heretofore shown ; 
that, as we are unlikely to find an enemy so un- 
prepared as we were at the breaking out of the 
great war, and are today, I consider it our duty 
to change our methods of creating and maintaining 
armies to meet the changed conditions of war. 

Now war bursts upon the world as from a 
thunder-cloud which has been rolled up by the 



102 West Point in our Next War 

great south wind. It comes with the suddenness 
of lightning accompanying the thunderings of 
heaven. 

A nation unprepared Jor war must how its head 
to the storm and offer its neck Jor the yoke oj conquest. 

I would have my country fully prepared to meet 
the first burst of war when it shall come. Ready 
not only with men and munitions, but with officers 
who shall have received the fittest possible educa- 
tion and preparation for war. 

It is because I am convinced that the best 
preparation which can be made by any country 
for war is the creation of a great body of officers 
who shall have received in youth the best military 
education and instruction which can be given to 
them, that I advocate the enlargement of the 
Military Academy, and the breaking into two 
great divisions of the course of study and instruc- 
tion of the cadets at the Academy ; one term of two 
years leading to graduation and to positions as of- 
ficers of the reserve army, and the second term of 
two years given to post-graduate study and in- 
struction, with final graduation as officers of the 
active army. 

There is need for immediate action to insure the 
prompt inauguration of the system which I 
propose, and to allow it to become operative for 
some years before the graduates of the Military 
Academy, under it, shall be called upon to face 
the test of war. 



West Point 103 

I can see no reason why we should allow our- 
selves to be drawn into the present war which is 
devastating Europe. Nor do I think that there is 
any immediate danger of embroilment with Mex- 
ico; but even should we find it necessary to in- 
tervene in Mexico, I should regard it as a great 
mistake, almost rising to the magnitude of a crime, 
to increase the regular army merely to meet the 
contingency of intervention. The estimates of 
the military requirements for intervention which 
have been given to the press are dreams. To meet 
any Mexican demand upon our army I should 
advocate the filling of the regular army to full war 
strength, and the calling to the colours, as volun- 
teers, of a sufficient number of the organized 
National Guard. If the army should be filled to 
full war strength and the National Guard should 
furnish from fifty thousand to sixty thousand 
volunteers, the army would be fully strong enough 
to meet and suppress any opposition to interven- 
tion that the disaffected elements in Mexico should 
be able to offer, and to restore and to maintain 
peace in that distracted country. 

I think that we may count upon six or eight 
years of peace after the conclusion of the present 
war in Europe, in which period we shall be amply 
able to inaugurate the system of an enlarged Mili- 
tary Academy at West Point, and the creation of 
the reserve army, which will be the subject dis- 
cussed in the next chapter. 



104 West Point in our Next War 

Should my judgment be correct in this prevision, 
it will readily be perceived that by the time war 
shall come the Military Academy will have 
graduated a sufficient number of officers to officer 
not only our regular army, which should be in- 
creased to about two hundred or two hundred and 
fifty thousand men, pari passu with the gradua- 
tion of officers from the Military Academy, but 
also measurably to officer the reserve army; so 
that when war shall come the army would be sub- 
stantially officered by graduates of West Point. 

The responsibility of conducting the war would 
then rest upon the shoulders of the graduates of 
the Military Academy, and the glory of victory 
would be theirs. 

Preparation for the next war should be under- 
taken upon a well-developed plan, deliberately, 
and without flurry or emotion. We, as a people, 
should look the future calmly in the face. We 
should see clearly the reasons for preparation for 
war, and comprehend, with equal clearness and 
calmness of mind, the steps to be taken to prepare 
the country for war. 

I think that war will come from the territorial 
and commercial ambitions of one or the other of 
the combinations of warring nations of Europe and 
Asia. 

Should the war end in the defeat of Germany she 
will be stripped of her colonies, and after the 
passage of a few years of recuperation from the 



West Point 105 

effects of the war, she will look about the world 
for colonies to replace those lost in the war. 

In South America she has already a thriving 
commercial colony under the Brazilian flag. This 
colony has been fostered in ways essentially 
German, even to the sending of school-books by the 
German Government to the Germans in south- 
em Brazil for use in their schools. Uruguay and 
Paraguay adjoin southern Brazil, and should this 
region be annexed by Germany she would be amply 
compensated for the loss of her African colonies. 

There is but one nation to stand across the 
pathway of such aggression on the part of Ger- 
many: the United States. 

Are we prepared to say to Germany that she 
shall not annex southern Brazil and Uruguay and 
Paraguay.-* 

If so, we must be prepared for war with Ger- 
many, and prepared to fight Germany, without 
allies, to a finish. 

Such a war will require not only a large navy 
but a large army, because, should our navy be 
overcome, Germany would proceed at once to the 
invasion of the United States as the speediest 
method of ending the war by the triumph of her 
arms. The United States defeated in such a war, 
would mean not only that German ambitions in 
South America would be completely gratified, but 
that we should be forced to pay a war indemnity 
to Germany of many thousand million dollars. 



io6 West Point in our Next War 

Unless we are prepared to surrender, on chal- 
lenge, the Philippine Islands to Japan, we may 
find ourselves some years in the future at war with 
that Power. I have said that Japan looks upon us 
as her locum tenens in the islands, but this period 
of peaceful possession will undoubtedly come to an 
end sometime within the next ten or twelve years, 
should we then be, as we now are, a weak military 
and naval power. 

I doubt very much that Great Britain could be 
induced by Japan to join her in an attack upon the 
United States, even with the possession of the Pan- 
ama Canal held before her eyes as the prize of vic- 
tory, and consequently I disagree with those who 
think that we shall find Great Britain among our 
future enemies. We lie between three and four 
thousand miles on her flank, and England should 
know that a war between Great Britain and the 
United States can end in but one way, in the tri- 
umph of the United States and in the disintegration 
of the British Empire. 

Because, however, I do not think that we shall 
be exposed to the horrors of war for eight or ten 
years, is no reason that we should not prepare for 
war now. 

I think it very fortunate that we may look 
forward to at least eight years of peace, because 
in that time we may so well and so strongly 
prepare the country for war that war may not 
then come. 



West Point 107 

If we should be prepared, nations with ambi- 
tions to gratify will then count the cost. They 
will set down in the account the possible gains and 
the probable losses, and if they think that the 
United States is strong enough to defend herself, 
and also to defend her ideas, they will refrain from 
attacking her. If, however, when the time comes 
for the gratification of their ambitions, the United 
States is as weak a naval and a military power as 
she is today, she will be attacked, and the result 
of the war need not be in doubt. 

I would have my country fully prepared for 
war not only because I believe that fit preparation 
is an assurance against war, but also because, 
should war come, that it will be the surest way to 
victory; and victory should be the only termina- 
tion of war that the United States should allow 
herself to contemplate. 

In these eight or ten years of prospective peace 
which I see before the United States, we should 
inaugurate the changes in the organization and 
system of the Military Academy which I have 
recommended, and gradually increase the regular 
army as the Military Academy should be able to 
graduate officers for the command of the new 
troops, and after the active army shall have been 
increased to the proposed strength, the creation of 
the reserve army should be undertaken, as I point 
out in the next chapter, with the end in view that 
we should be ready to put into the field, the mo- 



io8 West Point in our Next War 

ment war breaks out, an army of one million men 
officered, as far as possible, by graduates of the 
Military Academy. 

Herein lies the significance of the title of this 
book, West Point in Our Next War. 



CHAPTER III 

THE ONLY WAY TO CREATE AND TO MAINTAIN AN 
ARMY 

THE Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, deserves 
the respect and thanks of the country for 
his earnest efforts to bring tp the attention of the 
people the necessity for "reasonable preparation 
for war" on the part of the United States. And 
in his official report to the President, to which I 
have already referred, he shows that he knows 
the situation of utter unreadiness of the country 
for war should war, unhappily, be forced upon the 
nation. 

Knowing so well as he does how utterly unready 
the United States is for war, it is to be regretted 
that he should have allowed his judgment to be 
warped to the advocacy of measures ineffective 
to produce the result which he sees so clearly 
should be produced, the preparation of the United 
States to meet war from whatever quarter it may 
come. 

In The Independent, of August i6, 1915, Mr. 
Garrison says: 

109 



no West Point in our Next War 

And at the most, a comparatively small increase in 
that permanent force (the regular army) is all that is 
necessary to enable it to perform its all-important 
function — that of training a citizen soldiery. For it 
must not be forgotten that the one great lesson of all 
our wars is that they must be carried to a conclusion 
by citizen soldiers and those citizens must be trained. 
To thrust untrained citizens into the field is nothing 
short of death by government order. 

Men who have studied this subject with care think 
that a well trained body of four or five hundred 
thousand citizen soldiers, immediately available, 
together with our permanent force in the regular and 
militia establishments, will give us reasonable guaran- 
tees against hostile invasion of our territory. In 
reaching this conclusion due weight must be given to 
the co-operation of our navy and our land coast defences. 
The latter — with the reasonable improvements neces- 
sary to keep up with the progress of invention — will 
amply protect all important harbours, all exposed 
centres of population and industry, all terminals of 
railroads giving access to the interior. The former 
will make it very difficult but not impossible to land 
on other parts of the coast. But it is fairly safe to 
say that no enemy is likely to attempt to land unless 
our fleet should be driven from the sea. Reasonable 
preparation practically consists in being ready to meet 
this latter contingency, and to meet it a force of this 
size is believed to be necessary. 

There is much to commend in this language but 
it will not do to trust to it as a program for 



Conscription iii 

national defence. There is far too much of the 
non seqicitur in the argument to warrant its confi- 
dent acceptance. 

What does the Honourable Secretary mean by 
saying, 

a well trained body of four or five hundred thousand 
citizen soldiers, immediately available, together with 
our permanent force in the regular and militia estab- 
lishments, will give us reasonable guarantee against 
hostile invasion of our territory? 

Does he mean a volunteer army enlisted and 
maintained in time of peace, and kept under arms 
in time of peace, or at least ready to answer the 
call to arms when the nation shall be forced into 
war? Or does he mean by "a well trained body 
of four or five hundred thousand citizen soldiers" 
some other kind of soldiers, a kind known possibly 
to the esoteric consciousness of the General Staff 
but utterly unknown in the history of our wars? 

Nor is it possible to agree with the Secretary 
that "at the most a comparatively small increase 
in that permanent force [the regular army] is all 
that is necessary to enable it to perform its all- 
important function — that of training a citizen 
soldier y.^^ 

Indeed, I do not think even he, upon close 
thought upon the subject, will be prepared to hold 
that it is the "all-important function" of the 
permanent force to train a citizen soldiery. 



112 West Point in our Next War 

Nor is it quite clear exactly what the Secretary 
means by the remark : 

In reaching this conclusion due weight must be given 
to the co-operation of our navy and our land coast de- 
fences. The latter — with the reasonable improve- 
ments necessary to keep up with the progress of 
invention — will amply protect all important harbours, 
all exposed centres of population and industry, all 
terminals of railroads giving access to the interior. 

So long as our navy holds command of the seas 
fronting our shores, invasion of the United States 
is impossible except across our northern or Cana- 
dian border. Great Britain then being our enemy, 
or across our southern or Mexican border. Should 
our navy, however, be driven from the sea, the 
invasion of our country is one of the simplest of 
military problems in which our land coast defences 
would count for little or nothing as a defence 
against such invasion. Conceding that our "land 
coast defences" are strong on their sea fronts, 
they are weak and open at the rear, or practically 
so, and need, in every case, a mobile army for their 
defence. There is not the slightest necessity that 
an invading army, whose fleet holds the sea, should 
attack one of our fortified harbours to effect a 
landing on our coast; and once firmly established 
on our coast, of what earthly use would our "land 
coast defences" be in protecting the "exposed 
centres of population" and in protecting "all ter- 



Conscription 113 

minals of railroads giving access to the interior" 
from attack by the army of the enemy ? As to the 
present terminals of the railroads giving access to 
the interior, they would be useless to an enemy, 
because he would make the point which he might 
hold upon any one of these railroads his terminal, 
serving as such so much of the line of railroad to- 
ward the interior of the country as he might con- 
trol. But should he need possession of one of the 
existing coast terminals of such railroad, being 
once safely ashore, he would simply seize such 
terminal by an attack in the rear unless his advance 
against such port should be defeated by our mobile 
army. 

In concluding this branch of the subject let us 
hear Major-General Carter upon the subject of 
our land coast defences. The gallant General 
says in his book, The American Army: 

In fixing upon the proportions of cavalry to infantry 
it should be remembered that in any war of magnitude, 
involving invasion, a considerable part of the infantry 
•would not he embraced in the mobile army, but assigned 
to the land defence of seacoast fortifications. 

Here we have a confutation of the Honourable 
Secretary's supposition of the part which "our 
land coast defences" would play in protecting 
*'all harbours, all exposed centres of population and 
industry, all terminals of railroads giving access 
to the interior.^* 

8 



114 West Point in our Next War 

According to General Carter these seacoast 
fortifications, or our "land coast defences" as 
the Secretary calls them, will need the protection 
of infantry to defend them from land attack by 
an invading enemy, instead of being able, as the 
Secretary says, to extend protection to "all ex- 
posed centres of population and industry and all 
terminals of railroads giving access to the interior." 

While agreeing with General Carter as to the 
vulnerability of our seacoast fortifications to land 
attack, I do not agree with him, on military grounds, 
that "a considerable part of the infantry would 
not be embraced in the mobile army, but assigned 
to the land defence of the seacoast fortifications.^* 

If war has demonstrated anything, it has de- 
monstrated the folly of shutting up troops behind 
stationary fortifications with the object of holding 
such fortified positions against attack by a superior 
mobile enemy, and the converse of this proposition 
may be taken as having been also demonstrated by 
war, that the best possible means of defence of 
strategic positions is a mobile army, and conse- 
quently, the best possible means of defending our 
"land coast defences" from land attack is a mobile 
army acting against the enemy. 

I have therefore always held that an open fron- 
tier, protected by a mobile army of sufficient size, 
is a safer frontier than one defended by great per- 
manent fortifications requiring large bodies of 
troops for their defence, and I make this statement 



Conscription 115 

notwithstanding the heavily fortified eastern fron- 
tier of France, because it is not these fortifications 
which are holding in check the German army but 
the mobile army of France about, and even beyond 
them, in close touch with the Germans. 

But not to be hypercritical, what the Honour- 
able Secretary probably means is that he advocates 
the creation, in time of peace, of a volunteer army 
of between four hundred thousand and five hun- 
dred thousand men in addition to the regular 
army and the National Guard, which army should 
be thoroughly trained so that the men might be 
considered to be soldiers; and the maintenance 
of this volunteer army of between four hundred 
thousand and five hundred thousand men through- 
out the long years of peace, ready to be called 
to the colours the moment war should break out. 

This is probably the conception of the General 
Staff; it is certainly the conception of Major- 
General Carter, and is the argument of his recent 
book The American Army, which I have read with 
interest and pleasure. But it is the idea of vision- 
aries, of those who have lived their lives in the 
side eddies of life, far from the sweeping currents 
of activity and endeavour in which civilians live 
and struggle, and in which they often go down, 
but in which they are forced, by circumstances, 
to look at things as they are, not as they would 
have them to be. 

It is singular that I, a former officer of volun- 



ii6 West Point in our Next War 

teers, should say that this idea of creating and 
maintaining, in time of peace, a volunteer army of 
between four hundred thousand and five hundred 
thousand men is impossible of realization, whereas 
General Carter, an officer of the regular army, 
maintains not only that it is possible, but presents 
the suggestion as the very heart of his plan for 
creating and maintaining a defensive force in the 
United States, in time of peace, equipped and 
ready for war whenever war shall break out. 

It would be quite as easy to establish and main- 
tain a rose garden at the North Pole as to create 
and maintain such a volunteer army in time of 
peace. 

The failure of the recruiting service of the Regular 
Army in time of peace to do much more than sup- 
ply the army with recruits to take the places of 
the men who are discharged from the service, or 
who desert, should not only be a warning to the 
officers of the regular army to refrain from dreams 
as to the creation of paper armies in peace with 
which to defend the country in war, but also 
should carry proof to so clear and trained an 
intellect as that of the Secretary of War of the 
utter impossibility, either of creating and main- 
taining in time of peace a volunteer army of 
between four hundred thousand and five hundred 
thousand men, or of instructing such a force of men 
under the conditions of organization of a volunteer 
army, so that they should become well trained 



Conscription 117 

soldiers ready for the field on the breaking out of 
war. 

The element of training must be considered in 
the discussion of volunteer armies. One of the 
chief lessons of the War of the Rebellion is that 
it takes a year to create a dependable army. I 
do not mean to say that men gathered together 
in regiments and brigades almost directly from 
their homes have not made a gallant fight when 
thrust into battle. But notwithstanding their 
gallantry and their success they were not soldiers : 
they had not developed that coherency of organi- 
zation; that calmness under relentless fire; that 
readiness to obey intelligently any order given to 
them; in a word, they had not developed morale, 
which is the soul of soldiers, and which makes them 
almost as dangerous in defeat as in victory. 

Should we be called upon to resist invasion we 
shall not meet volunteers of the same amount of 
training as our own volunteer troops, but the 
veteran troops of a great military power: soldiers, 
many of whom had been tried by battle, led by 
officers who had received their education in the 
school of actual war. Facing such an enemy, 
patriotism, no doubt, will animate our soldiers, 
but we should not forget that a foreign flag has 
once already flown over the capital of our country 
after the defeat of our army of "citizen soldiers," 
who could not stand the shock of the enemy's 
attack, and who left the field to be maintained by 



ii8 West Point in our Next War 

the meagre force of sailors and marines under the 
command of the gallant Barney. 

If our enemy, should it unhappily occur that 
we should have an enemy, will graciously give us 
a year after he declares war upon us in which to 
prepare for the conflict, and in which period of 
time to create and discipline our volunteer army, 
before he opens his attack, I should agree with the 
Honourable Secretary of War that we might rely 
upon a volunteer army for our defence. But 
outside of opera bouffe, no such gracious enemy 
could be found within the broad confines of the 
world. 

Time is the essence of opportunity in war, and 
the opportunity to strike as soon after the declara- 
tion of war as possible is seized upon by all sensible 
Powers. It should not be forgotten that even 
before the declaration of war against Russia the 
Japanese attacked and captured several Russian 
men-of-war. 

As to the value of time in war the present conflict 
in Europe is eloquent. 

The war opened August i, 19 14, by the declara- 
tion of war by Germany against Russia, Austria 
having declared war against Serbia on July 28, 
three days earlier. On August 2d Germany vio- 
lated the neutrality of Luxemburg. On August 
3d she violated the neutrality of Belgium, and on 
August 4th the German troops attempted to take 
Liege by storm. 



Conscription 119 

England declared herself at war with Germany 
from the night of August 4th. 

August 8th German troops penetrated between 
some of the encircling forts, taking possession of 
the city of Liege; and bringing up their heaviest 
artillery, they concentrated their fire upon the 
forts which still held out, crumbling their steel 
and concrete turrets and casemates into dust and 
distorted masses of iron. Then pouring vast 
masses of troops into Belgium, the Germans 
brushed aside the gallant little Belgian army of 
about 400,000 men, taking possession of Brussels 
on August 20th, and receiving the surrender of the 
army of Namur on August 22d, after destroying 
its fortifications by concentrated artillery fire; 
Huy, the third defensive fortification on the line 
of the Meuse, having previously surrendered. 
Twenty days after the Germans appeared before 
Liege the north-eastern frontier of France was 
open to them. 

Tardy England, clinging to the system of volun- 
tary enlistment in raising armies, sent her small 
regular army to the continent in August, 1914, 
and set to work to raise a great volunteer army, 
Lord Kitchener publicly stating that the war 
would not begin until May, 19 15, when he hoped 
to put his volunteers, trained and disciplined 
meanwhile, into the field. May has come and 
gone, and we are now, as I write these lines, in the 
middle of September, 191 5, over one year from 



120 West Point in our Next War 

the date of England's declaration of war, and her 
new army, apparently, is scarcely yet ready to 
join her allies on the continent; or, according to 
some accounts, is just now being sent across the 
Channel. The army which England sent to France 
in August and September, 19 14, has practically 
ceased to exist. The English army in France has 
been re-enforced by troops withdrawn from garri- 
sons and by Indian troops, and by Colonial con- 
tingents from Canada and from the Antipodes. 

On the 27th of July, 191 5, the Premier, Mr. 
Asquith, announced to Parliament that the total 
losses of the English army to date were 321,889 
killed, wounded, and missing. 

A telegram from London dated September 14, 
19 1 5, gives the losses of the British army up to 
August 21, 1915, as 381,983 men. The dispatch 
is as follows : 

London, Sept. 14. — Official announcement was 
made today in the House of Commons that the total 
of British war casualties up to August 21 was 381,983 
officers and men killed, wounded, or missing. 

Detailed figures of the casualties are announced 
as follows : 

Killed and died of wounds: Officers, 4965; other 
ranks, 70,992. 

Wounded: Officers, 9973; other ranks, 241,086. 

Missing: Officers, 1501; other ranks, 53,466. 

These figures refer to the army alone. 

The last previous statement of the total of British 



Conscription 121 

casualties was made by Premier Asquith on June 9. 
It gave a total of 258,069 up to May 31. The losses 
from that time up to August 21 are therefore shown 
to have been 123,914, a daily average of about 1500. 
In the two months before the end of May, the period 
covered in the preceding announcement, the losses 
averaged roughly about 2000 a day. 

In other words, the British army has lost in 
killed and wounded up to August 21, 191 5, almost 
the full number of officers and men deemed by 
the Honourable the Secretary of War, and presum- 
ably by the General Staff, to be a sufficient force 
to assure the United States a "reasonable guaran- 
tee" of safety from war and invasion! And this 
loss is but the beginning of the toll of death which 
the war will demand from England before it comes 
to an end. 

I have made this reference to England because 
she still holds to the antiquated system df raising 
and maintaining an army by voluntary enlistment. 
We have seen how inadequate it has proved in 
her case, and the inference is a natural one that 
had it not been for the protection of her allies and 
the supposed superiority of her fleet, she would 
have been invaded by Germany, with all that 
that implies. 

It may be considered to be one of the sources of 
delight of the War Department to draw up plans 
for paper armies. Such plans are always interest- 



122 West Point in our Next War 

ing, and are worked out in a thoroughly theoretic 
fashion, but they lack the possibility of success 
because they start with a wrong premise. 

They assume that in time of peace there are 
four, five, or six hundred thousand men ready to 
enlist at a moment's notice in a volunteer army, 
to be commanded by regular officers, for a term 
of service ranging from two to five years. These 
plans usually call for the organization of the volun- 
teer army on the battalion system, three battalions 
with the colours, and a skeleton battalion, to 
serve as the depot battalion, in which recruits 
should be continuously enlisted and prepared for 
service, and when needed, be transferred to the 
active battalions to make good the wear and tear 
of the service. 

Major-General Carter's plan is substantially 
to territorialize both the regular army and the 
suggested volunteer army, the regiments of each 
army to maintain depots within the limits of their 
territorial divisions, which depots shall become 
the regimental homes of the regiments. It is the 
theory of his plan that at these depots recruits 
shall constantly present themselves, in time of 
peace as well as in time of war, for enlistment and 
instruction, and that when so enlisted they shall 
constitute a skeleton, or recruiting company or 
battalion, from which source the troops with the 
colours shall be receiving a constant stream of 
recruits, well drilled and ready to take their places 



Conscription 123 

in the ranks of the active or field battalions of the 
regiment. Or should the depot company or bat- 
talion prove to have been very successful in secur- 
ing and drilling recruits, that it should exchange 
places with one of the service battalions, which in 
turn should become the depot battalion. 

The territorial divisions of General Carter's 
proposed volunteer army are to conform to the 
boundaries of the Congressional districts in each 
State, each Congressional district to furnish one 
regiment to the volunteer army. 

To state this plan in General Carter's own words 
the following extract is taken from his book The 
American Army. 

With the reorganization of the regular regiments 
provided for, we may then consider the greater army 
of federal volunteers. There are 435 Congressional 
districts, to each of which it is proposed to assign one 
ten-company infantry regiment of federal volunteers, 
comprising nine companies of 150 men each, which, 
with the machine-gun platoon, regimental detachment, 
and depot company, will aggregate about 1500 men. 
This would give theoretically a body of 652,500 volunteer 
infantry enlisted in peace, with an enlistment contract 
providing for two years' service in peace, and, in the 
event of war, its automatic extension for three years 
or during the war, if less than three years, and he it 
understood, this is not a standing army, for it is not con- 
templated to withdraw the federal volunteers from their 
customary vocations any more than the organized militia 



124 West Point in our Next War 

is now withdrawn but to systematize their training and 
provide officers of approved merit to lead them in active 
service. 

I object to General Carter's plan broadly on 
the ground that it is visionary in the extreme and 
utterly impracticable of successful accomplish- 
ment; and I object specifically to so much of his 
plan as proposes the territorialization of the regular 
army and of the volunteer peace army on the 
ground of public policy; and also I object to the 
name he has invented, "Federal Volunteers," for 
the volunteer peace army which he proposes shall 
be created. 

The War of the Rebellion was fought to a finish 
on one principal issue — viz., Is the United States 
a nation or a confederacy ? And the result of the 
war established the fact that the United States is a 
nation. 

Why then abandon the term "National" for 
"Federal" in reference to the proposed Peace 
Army of Volunteers? 

Nothing should be done, even by choice of 
words, to cast a shadow of doubt upon the fact 
that the United States is a nation indivisible and 
indissoluble except by a successful rebellion. 

The great war in this country between i86l- 
1865 was a rebellion undertaken for the destruc- 
tion of the nation. Had it been successful it 
would have become a revolution, and would so be 



Conscription 125 

» 
regarded in history. It failed, and it was, and is 
in history, a rebellion. This historical statement 
is necessary to the further objection to General 
Carter's plan for the territorialization of the regu- 
lar, and the proposed volunteer peace army, on 
the ground of public policy. 

I regard this plan of territorializing the army, 
regular and volunteer, as opposed to public policy 
because it proposes the sectionalization of the 
army, and the creation of a Massachusetts Army, 
a South Carolina Army, a New York Army, a 
Mississippi Army, an Ohio Army, instead of an 
Army of the United States. 

In a word, this plan proposes the creation of a 
military force with local instead of national senti- 
ments and associations. Such an army, drawing 
its forces directly and by distinct organization 
from the Congressional districts into which the 
several States are organized, would carry local 
prejudices and local ambitions into the service of 
the United States where they do not belong. Such 
local and sectional interests and sentiments might 
lead to disagreement among the constituent ele- 
ments of the army, which in turn might lead to 
disorganization under the influence of demagogues 
and evil-wishers of the United States, should any 
such plot hereafter the destruction of the nation 
by force of arms. 

Fancy the influence of such a system of terri- 
torialization upon the army in 1861. Not only 



126 West Point in our Next War 

would there have been, as there was, a secession 
of officers from the army, but the army itself 
would have been divided by regiments and batter- 
ies into loyal and disloyal sections ; whereas under 
the national system of recruitment of the army 
in 1 86 1 the disloyalty was personal and individual, 
being confined to the officers almost exclusively, 
whereas the rank and file of the army were loyal 
to the national colours. 

This objection on the ground of public policy 
to General Carter's plan of territorialization should 
be sufficient to condemn it. But there is even 
another and practical objection to it to be found 
in the habit of gerrymandering Congressional 
districts into purely political districts, which may 
be relied upon to return representatives to Con- 
gress in defiance of general public sentiment, by 
the grouping of counties or parts of counties into 
Congressional districts politically true to the 
party in power in the State. It is conceivable 
that either the territorial home or depot of regi- 
ments of the army would have to be movable, 
almost on wheels, so as " to go with their Congres- 
sional districts," or else that some districts would 
be found to be without a regiment or a regimental 
depot, whereas some other districts would be 
found to have the depots of several regiments 
within their borders. 

This plan of raising in peace a great volunteer 
army of 652,500 men, and of holding together 



Conscription 127 

such a volunteer army throughout years of peace, 
I consider to be absohitely impossible of accom- 
plishment because it is based upon a false pre- 
mise: upon the false premise that there are 652,500 
men in the country ready to enlist in the army, 
regular or volunteer, in time of peace. 

I think the history of the country demonstrates, 
and the labour and scant success in recruiting the 
present regular army especially demonstrates, 
that only in times of national crisis can citizens 
be relied upon to volunteer for service in the army 
with any degree of freedom. Their patriotism 
and love of country must be appealed to, and they 
must be made to see that their services are neces- 
sary to the protection of the life of the nation. 
And the method of raising volunteer armies is also 
opposed to the success of General Carter's plan, 
because the history of volunteer enlistment de- 
monstrates that the young men of communities 
follow the lead of those to whom they have been 
accustomed to look for advice and counsel in the 
varying phases of life. These leading men of 
communities constitute the real volunteer recruit- 
ing agents for the army, and they expect to receive 
and usually do receive the highest rank in the 
volimteer companies and regiments which they 
raise. It is no part of the argument to say that 
they are not fitted for these positions of rank which 
come to them as the result of their successful 
recruiting endeavours. Nor do I contend that 



128 West Point in our Next War 

they are fitted for the commands that are given 
to them. As a matter of argument I quite agree 
with General Carter when he says : 

It is recognized by all military men that the creation 
of any force worthy of the name of army demands 
trained officers. 

And further: 

As the Federal volunteer regiments are organized 
the number of field officers and captains and non- 
commissioned staff officers of the corresponding 
branches of the Regular Service should be increased in 
order to supply the skeleton personnel of regulars 
necessary with each volunteer regiment, 

if it be granted that the superior officers of volun- 
teers are to be drawn from the regular army. 

But as a practical proposition, however, the 
gallant General's suggestion of officering the peace 
volunteers with officers of the regular army, if 
attempted to be carried out, would entirely defeat 
the plan of raising in time of peace a large volun- 
teer army. These colonels, lieutenant-colonels, 
majors, and captains, to be drawn from the regular 
army, whom it is proposed to place at the head 
of the volunteers, will have no relationship with 
the people from among whom it is proposed that 
the volunteer regiments shall be recruited, and as 
recruiting officers they would prove dismal failures. 



Conscription 129 

The argument is often made by officers of the 
army against the maintenance of the separate 
miUtary posts of no strategic value which are still 
occupied by the army throughout the country, 
on the ground that they greatly increase the ex- 
pense of the army. Secretaries of war have 
become eloquent in denouncing the maintenance 
of such detached posts at the instance of members 
of Congress in the interest of their constituents. 
But how, after such statements, would it be pos- 
sible for a secretary of war to face Congress and 
demand the creation of 435 additional independent 
posts or regimental depots, to accommodate the 
volunteer army proposed by General Carter, 
together with the necessary number of separate 
posts or depots for the accommodation of the 
regiments of the regular army under the Carter 
plan? 

The expense of these regimental depots with 
their grounds, their quarters for the regimental 
and company officers necessarily stationed with 
the depot companies or battalions, their barracks 
for the men, etc., would puff out the army budget 
to such Falstaffian proportions that it would re- 
quire all the good nature of Prince Hal to make 
the proposition acceptable to the Congress. 

I believe that General Carter's plan, the plan 
of the War Department as indicated by the Secre- 
tary of War, or any plan from any other source 
which calls for the creation of a great volunteer 



130 West Point in our Next War 

army in peace to be illogical, impracticable, wrong 
in theory, and impossible of accomplishment. In 
time of peace utterly impossible of accomplish- 
ment, and in time of war utterly impracticable 
so far as the creation of a dependable army is con- 
cerned, for want of time in which to convert the 
volunteers into soldiers, with which to meet the 
armies of any one of the great Powers landed on 
our coasts within a month or two after the decla- 
ration of war. 

That is the condition of war which we must face : 
The landing of an enemy on our coast within one 
or two months after the declaration of war. Of 
course if our navy can hold the seas and defeat 
the navy of our enemy, and that enemy is not 
Great Britain, our country will be spared the 
danger of invasion. But with the vast stretches 
of coasts to observe and protect ; with the demand 
upon our navy that it shall hold control of not 
only the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Caribbean Sea, but also of the Pacific Ocean to 
guarantee the possession of the Hawaiian Islands, 
and of the Northern Pacific to cover Alaska ; with 
all these demands upon our fleet, how is it to be 
expected, unless our navy shall be so vastly in- 
creased in strength as to make it superior on the 
eastern and on the western oceans to the navies 
of our probable enemies, that the navy can defeat 
the fleets of our enemies? How can it be ex- 
pected that our navy anyway near its present 



Conscription 131 

strength can hold command of the Atlantic and 
the Pacific Oceans, of the Gulf of Mexico and the 
Caribbean Sea? 

If the navy loses control of those seas and oceans, 
the invasion of our country will follow as surely 
as day follows night. 

Convinced as I am upon this subject, beHeving 
with the whole strength of my mind that the plan 
which I submit is the only plan for the creation 
and the maintenance of an army which shall be 
of immediate use on the breaking out of war, I 
submit it to my countrymen with the prayer that 
they may give it due consideration. 

The proper valuation of time is the essential con- 
dition of success in modern war. The proper esti- 
mation of the value of time in warfare is one of 
the secrets of the successes of Napoleon. The 
campaign of Ulm beautifully illustrates this proper 
valuation of time in military movements. 

But the valuation of time finds expression in 
respect to modem wars, before war begins, through 
the perfection of preparation for war; and when 
war is declared, in the prompt mobilization of 
armies, and the rapid advance upon the frontier, 
or upon the selected objective of the predetermined 
plan of operations by the army first ready for 
action. 

In the war of 1870 France was taken unaware 
and consequently was unready. But Germany, 
foreseeing the war, had been preparing for its 



132 West Point in our Next War 

outbreak for years, and was ready for mobiliza- 
tion the moment war should be declared. The 
war of 1870 between France and Germany we now 
see to have been inevitable. The succession to 
the Spanish crown was merely the provocative 
of the war, as the Serbian attack upon the Austrian 
Archduke was merely the provocative of the pre- 
sent war in Europe. Had these incidents been 
lacking, some other incidents, equally unimportant, 
would have arisen, or have been created, to sus- 
tain the declaration of war. 

The war of 1870 was practically settled in the 
first six weeks of the war. 

The present war in Europe presents many of 
the same characteristics. Whether the Allies 
will be able to overcome the advantages already 
gained by Germany is something which the future 
can alone decide. But up to the present moment 
the success of the war has been with the Germans, 
owing almost entirely to their appreciation of the 
value of time in war. They prepared for the war 
thoroughly, patiently, and most intelligently. 
Russia was approximately ready, but not nearly 
so ready for war as Germany. France was par- 
tially prepared for war — but England was wholly 
unprepared for war except on the side of her diplo- 
macy. But England usually wars through her 
diplomacy, which gains her allies to do the most 
of the early fighting. 

Not only is time an essential condition of success 



Conscription 133 

in modem war, but it is the essential condition of 
success in preparation for war. It takes years of 
work and the utmost care and thought adequately 
to prepare a nation for war. 

To be prepared for war is to be ready for war 
the moment war breaks out; not two months, or 
six months, or a year after war breaks out. 

Judged by this standard the United States is 
utterly unprepared for war. Its army "is essen- 
tially a peace army." Nor will any of the plans 
of the War Department of which we have any 
knowledge, nor any of the plans submitted un- 
officially by officers of the army, put the United 
States into a condition of preparation for war. 

The chief reason that the plans of the War 
Department, and of the officers of the army who 
have outlined plans of preparation for war, will 
not put the nation into a condition of preparation 
for war is, that in all of these plans the chief 
dependence is placed on a volunteer army to be 
created either in time of peace, which is utterly 
impracticable, or after war has broken out, which 
is utterly absurd. 

As I have said before, if our enemy will gra- 
ciousl}'- grant us a year from the date of the decla- 
ration of war in which to prepare our army for 
war, we can, in that period of time, create a vol- 
unteer army which can be depended on. 

But all modern wars open with a burst of activ- 
ity by one or the other of the combatants, usually 



134 West Point in our Next War 

on the part of both of the combatants, success 
going to the army which is readiest to assume the 
offensive. 

The unreadiness of the British army, and the 
dependence by Great Britain on volunteers, should 
be a warning to us. A year has rolled round since 
the present war broke out and the British army 
is not yet ready for the field. Nor, judging from 
the reports which are allowed to reach us, has the 
British army reached the numbers deemed to be 
necessar}'- to the maintenance of her position as a 
great Power in war. 

What then should we do to prepare our country 
to meet the eventualities of war? 

Let us bravely face the truth that the time has 
passed jor the employment of volunteers i?i war. 
Let us put aside frankly all thought of raising a 
volunteer army either in peace or war, and place 
our reliance upon a standing army to be divided 
between an active army and a reserve army; 
both constituting the regular army of the United 
States. 

Let us give up the present fruitless method of- 
recruitment of the regular army, and accept the 
necessary and the inevitable policy of conscription, 
which rests upon the principle of the natural 
obligation of every citizen to serve his coun- 
try in peace or in war, for the creation and 
the maintenance of our active and our reserve 
armies. 



Conscription 135 

Conscription is the most democratic, the fairest, 
the most equal, and the only logical method of raising 
and maintaining modern armies. Our experience, 
and the experience of England, with the voluntary- 
system of recruitment of armies bears out this 
statement conclusively. 

It is not only the best way of maintaining an 
army in time of war, through a steady stream of 
recruits passing from the great central depots to 
the colours, but it is the only, absolutely the only, 
way to create and to maintain an army in time of 
peace, ready to take the field the moment war shall 
break out. 

Of course, in saying that it is the only way of 
raising and maintaining an army in time of peace, 
ready to take the field when war shall break out, 
I do not refer to our present army, because in no 
large, or true, or modem war sense have we an 
army. We have a group of highly honourable 
gentlemen at the head of a handful of troops, but 
when it is recalled that the losses of the British 
army in the present war up to August 21, 19 15, 
have been 381,983 officers and men as stated offi- 
cially in the House of Commons on September 14, 
191 5, or considerably over twelve times the strength 
of the mobile army of the United States within 
the continental area of the United States, it is 
not too much to say that not only have we not 
even an army suited to the requirements of peace, 
but judged by the standards of modern war, we 



136 West Point in our Next War 

are absolutely without an army, an offensive or 
defensive army, in the true war sense of the 
term. 

I have spoken only of the losses of the British 
army because the British Government, at this 
moment, still holds to the system of creating and 
maintaining an army by voluntary enlistment. 
Should the relationship of our army to the losses 
in this war sustained by the armies of the great 
continental Powers be considered, the absurdity 
of our army as a fighting force would be even more 
apparent. In battles of the present war which 
have scarcely commanded a larger space than a 
few headhnes and a few lines of text in the press, 
more men have been killed and wounded and 
taken prisoners than constitute our whole mobile 
army within the continental area of the United 
States. 

Comparison presupposes a condition of measur- 
able equality, or a condition at least approaching 
equality. But there is no basis of equality be- 
tween the army of the United States and the 
armies of the great continental Powers engaged 
in the present war, and consequently a comparison 
of the strength of the mobile army of the United 
States with the losses sustained by these great 
armies is an impossibility. A contrast is all that 
may be allowed us. 

Conscription is the only method of creating and 
maintaining an army at all times ready for war. 



Conscription 137 

because it is the only method which recognizes the 
element of time. 

The argument in favour of conscription rests 
upon prevision, upon the acknowledgment by the 
government of the element of uncertainty in the 
future, and upon the recognition by the govern- 
ment of the relationship of our foreign interests 
and obligations to the interests, ambitions, and 
obligations of the other great Powers. No modem 
nation can shut herself up within herself, and 
remain aloof from the activities of the world. 
The contests of ambition and of selfish interest are 
as keen among nations as among individuals. 
The activities of the world lead to conflict, some- 
times peaceful conflict, often to the conflict of 
arms. 

Conscription provides the way for the creation of 
an army in time of peace of ample proportions to 
meet the conditions of modern war. 

Conscription draws its allotment of recruits 
from the people at large without favour, and with- 
out the consideration of personal interest. Every 
man, be he rich, or be he poor, be he cultured or 
uncultured, owes the same allegiance to the nation, 
and should take his chances in reference to mili- 
tary service, those chances being determined by 
the impartial drawings of the conscription. 

Conscription draws more equally and more evenly 
upon the manhood of the nation than the system of 
voluntary enlistment. 



138 West Point in our Next War 

At the outbreak of war under voluntary enlist- 
ment, and under the stimulus of patriotism, the 
best of the youth of the nation offer themselves 
voluntarily to the service of their country. This 
puts an unequal and unjust burden upon the 
higher and the better element of the country; a 
burden which should be spread generally over 
the young manhood of the nation. 

Conscription, acting with the calmness of blind- 
ness, takes by chance those it needs for the service 
of the country. Rich and poor, the highly edu- 
cated and the most ignorant, stand upon the same 
broad plane of duty and citizenship, and under 
conscription are liable to be drawn for the service of 
their country in the army and navy of the nation. 

The preparatory training in the army for all 
recruits should be the same. Merit alone should 
differentiate between the representatives of the 
classes called by conscription to the colours. There 
should always be held open the opportunity for 
advancement to the deserving in the ranks. It 
should not be forgotten that it was said that every 
recruit who joined the army of the Great Emperor 
carried the baton of a Field Marshal of France in 
his knapsack. 

What system of creating an army could be more 
democratic? What system of supplying the losses 
occurring in the army in time of war could be more 
equal in its application to the citizenship of the 
country? 



Conscription 139 

Do we wish to see our country open to attack 
which we have no power to resist, or do we wish 
our country to be ready and prepared to resist 
attack whenever and from whatever quarter it 
may come? 

In a New York paper of August 25, 19 15, a New 
York lawyer, who is reported to have been bom in 
the United States, and who is represented to be 
an officer in one of the anti-American organiza- 
tions of German sympathizers, is reported to 
have said, that he would not volunteer for service 
in a war between Germany and the United States, 
adding: 

I think Germany's submarine policy is absolutely 
justified. I think Germany has a right to sink every 
vessel, neutral or otherwise, which carries ammunition 
to the Allies. If the vessel carries neutral non-com- 
batants, not without warning, of course, but after the 
warning, blow them to hell, every damn ship of them. 

International law, bosh! Who gives a rap about 
international law? Germany doesn't. Germany is 
making international law. 

Such utterances show unfaithfulness and poten- 
tial treason to the country of his birth. We had 
the same kind of people as this man to deal with 
during the War of the Rebellion, and we put 
them in Fort Lafayette, and sometimes we shot 
them. 

Should this man be conscripted, one of two 



140 West Point in our Next War 

things would surely happen should the nation be 
unhappily at war with Germany : he would either 
be compelled to fight Germany or else he Would be 
shot. My own impression is that he would decide 
to fight Germany rather than be shot in the back 
with his face to the wall. 

Conscription would be an excellent thing to 
discipline such people who disown their own coun- 
try in favour of a foreign and possibly hostile 
Power. 

I believe firmly in the unifying influence of con- 
scription upon the country at large, both section- 
ally considered, and in reference to the large 
immigration into the country of people antago- 
nistic to each other and to ourselves in blood, in 
customs, and in standards of belief. 

It has been said that the United States is the 
melting pot of the world. That as we receive into 
our citizenship the Slav, the Greek, the German, 
the Italian, the Englishman, the Irishman, the 
Scotchman, the Scandinavian, the man from the 
East both far and near, so must we assimilate 
the representatives of those races to ourselves, 
to our thought, and to our theory and system of 
government. We must completely change the di- 
rection of their feelings and hopes from their old- 
world relationships toan assimilation with our hopes 
and our aspirations. Without in the least dis- 
turbing their old-world memories, we must control 
the sweep and current of their present thought so 



Conscription 141 

that the new allegiance which they have assumed 
shall be a real allegiance of heart, of mind, and of 
body; an allegiance which shall displace all other 
ideas of allegiance, and which shall supplant all 
other national influences and obligations. 

If the representatives of these various races who 
have come to this country voluntarily and to 
better their condition, and with the idea of making 
it their home, and the home of their children, 
should be compelled to go before the conscription 
officers on the chance of being drawn for service 
in the army and the navy, they would be forced 
to realize the existence and the presence of the 
power of the United States, something that they 
do not now clearly comprehend ; and those of them 
who should be drawn for service in the army or the 
navy, finding alongside of them in the ranks Ameri- 
cans of the old lineage, would insensibly, as they 
learn to salute the flag of the country, endeavour 
to become as American as their comrades by their 
side. 

Instead of promoting sectionalism in the country 
as General Carter's plan of territorializing the 
regular army, and of raising an army of territori- 
alized volunteers would undoubtedly do, con- 
scription would work along the lines of association 
in destroying what is left of sectionalism in the 
country. The men of the North and of the South, 
of* the East and the West, would find themselves 
serving shoulder to shoulder under the flag of their 



142 West Point in our Next War 

country, and while learning to know and to appre- 
ciate each other, they would at last apprehend how 
utterly provincial and absurd are the vanities of 
sectionalism, how broad and grand is the idea 
of nationalism, how pure and holy is the love of 
country. 

I have refrained from discussing the Australian 
and the Swiss military systems because they propose 
the creation of something in the nature of volunteer 
armies, and I have come deliberately to the conclusion 
that volunteer armies have no longer a place in modern 
warfare. 

In reference to the Australian system, it is not 
seen how it could be inaugurated in our country 
without an amendment to the Constitution, giving 
to the national government a certain but definite 
control over the school systems of the respective 
States, because this system would come into opera- 
tion in respect to all of the school children of 
twelve years of age in the country. As to the 
Swiss system it amounts to a levy en masse within 
certain age limits, and such an extreme measure 
is utterly unnecessary in our vast countrj\ In a 
small country like Switzerland, surrounded by pos- 
sible enemies, such a system of universal military 
service is not only commendable but necessary. 
But in the United States, under conscription, the 
army and the navy could readily be supplied 
with recruits, and the reserve army be created 
as a part of the regular army, with so small a tax 



Conscription 143 

on the manhood of the nation as scarcely to be 
appreciable. 

Nor have I deemed it necessary to discuss at 
length the plan proposed by the Secretary of War 
in his report of November 15, 1914, as to the 
creation of a reserve. 

The Secretary says : 

I am firinly convinced that if we can use the stand- 
ing army as a school through which to pass men who 
come into it, with the knowledge that if they are 
proficient they can be discharged at any time after a 
year or eighteen months, we will begin at once to build 
up the necessary reserve, and will, for the first time in 
the military history of this country, have something 
approximating a balanced organization. 

I am as firmly convinced of the error of this 
plan as the Secretary appears to be convinced in 
its favour. The mistake which the Secretary 
makes is in considering the army a school. It 
is not a school, and should not be so considered, 
but is, or at least should be, a living, coherent 
force, highly drilled and disciplined, for the accom- 
plishment of definite objects and purposes, the 
defence of the country in war being the chief one 
of these objects of its organization. To attempt 
to make it a school for the graduation of reservists, 
is to divert it from its main and original purpose 
and to convert it into a dumping ground for crude 
material out of which possible soldiers may be 



144 West Point in our Next War 

made at some future time. Nothing will tend so 
readily and so completely to disorganize the army 
as to constitute it a school for reservists. 

No officer, under the Secretary's plan, would 
ever know how dependable the troops under his 
command were. His time and thought would 
be taken up with the constant and ever-recurring 
duty of licking new men into shape for service; 
then to see them, the moment they should ap- 
proach the condition of being soldiers, removed 
from his command and transferred to that, under 
the Secretary's plan, intangible body, the reserves. 

The army, under this idea that it is a school for 
the training of reserves, would never be able to 
feel itself to be the real thing. The new recruit in 
the ranks would be alongside of the one-year or 
one-year-and-a-half man, just about to be trans- 
ferred to the reserves. There would be no system 
or order in the ranks ; no solidity in the troops. A 
regiment is only so strong as its weakest part. 
Instead of the one-year men stiffening up the re- 
cruits, the recruits would tend to weaken the 
older men in the ranks. The effectiveness of the 
one-year men would be lessened by the ignorance 
of the recruits. The tone of the army would be 
lowered toward the plane of the most ignorant in 
the ranks. 

The plan of the honourable Secretary of War 
would sacrifice the army to the reserves; with the 
result that he would in the end have neither a good 



Conscription 145 

army nor a good reserve. Expediency is very 
well in its place, but in the creation of an army 
it is manifestly out of place. What the country 
needs is not an army which shall be a school for 
the graduation of reservists, but a coherent, well 
disciplined, compact,' and dependable army; an 
army ready for any military service whatsoever 
that it may be called upon to perform. 

I am entirely opposed to short enlistments for 
the army, and I am opposed to the transfer of 
men from the active army to the reserves under 
any circumstances whatsoever during the period 
of their enlistment, as subversive of the efficiency 
of the army. The men in the ranks should be 
offered every reasonable inducement to re-enlist 
on the expiration of their term of service, instead 
of being turned loose into the reserves after a year 
or two of service in the army, as the Secretary of 
War recommends. 

Nor have I allowed myself to discuss the militia, 
or the military camps which are now so fashion- 
able. Naturally I do not regard the militia as 
possessing the steadiness to be considered to be a 
part of the first line of defence, and as to the mili- 
tary camps, instead of attempting to make sol- 
diers their chief work should be to show the young 
men in training that no soldier can be made in a 
month. If the young men who shall attend these 
encampments shall come away with a knowledge 
of how little they know of military matters, and 



146 West Point in our Next War 

how much less they really know than they thought 
they knew when they reported for instruction, 
the camps will have served a useful purpose. In 
exciting a more general interest in the army than 
has previously existed the military camps will un- 
doubtedly be useful. But I foresee an end to 
them when the present war excitement subsides, 
as subside it must in the next year or two, unless 
we should be unhappily and unnecessarily drawn 
into the circle of the present European war. 

The active regular army should be considered 
to be the right arm of the nation. How strong 
that right arm should be is, perhaps, matter for 
discussion, but I think the judgment of those en- 
titled to express an opinion upon the subject may 
be narrowed down to an army of two hundred 
thousand or two hundred and fifty thousand 
men. 

If the principle of conscription be adopted, I 
do not think it matters very much whether the 
size of the active army be two hundred thousand 
men or two hundred and fifty thousand men, as 
should the former number be assumed, the extra 
fifty thousand men, not in the active army, could 
easily be taken up by the reserve army, which 
reserve army should be a constituent part of the 
regular army, and should be so organized that on 
the breaking out of war it could be mobilized 
at once, and take its place in the first line of 
defence. 



Conscription 147 

The object to he accomplished should be the creation 
of a military strength Jor the first line oj defence of 
one million men; the active army to consist of two 
hundred thousand men, and the reserve army to 
consist of eight hundred thousand men ; the active 
army and the reserve army constituting the regu- 
lar army of the United States. 

The men of the active army should be con- 
scripted for a term of five years' continuous service 
with the cofours. 

The men of the reserve army should be con- 
scripted for a term of five years, one year with the 
colours and four years at their homes, with two 
weeks' service each year with the colours for 
training. 

The conscription for the year should be required 
to supply: 

1. The demand of the navy and the marine 
corps. 

2. The demand of the active army. 

3. The demand of the reserve army. 

There should he two hundred thousand men always 
with the colours of the active army, and the regi- 
ments of the active army should ahvays be kept at full 
war strength. 

For the same reason that I do not believe in con- 
stituting the army a school for the reserves, I do 
not believe in having a stated peace strength and a 
stated war strength for the active army. The 
strength of the active army should he always full war 



148 West Point in our Next War 

strength. The army will then be always at its best. 
The proportion of full-term men will be so pre- 
ponderant that the year's recruits to take the 
place of the men to be discharged at the end of 
their five years' term of service will be sub- 
merged in the mass of full-term men. And at the 
end of the term of service of all men of the active 
army, they should be encouraged to re-enlist for 
another term of five years, reducing by so many 
re-enlistments the demand of the activfe army upon 
the drawings for conscripts for the year. I believe 
in the vieille moustache. 

Assuming the strength of the active army to be 
two hundred thousand men, and the term of 
service five years, there will be required, the- 
oretically, each year forty thousand conscripts 
to supply the places in the ranks of one fifth of 
the enlisted men of the active army whose term 
of service would then expire. But it is not 
likely that this number of conscripts will be re- 
quired, because the re-enlistment of men whose 
terms then expire will reduce the number of con- 
scripts required to keep the army at ' full war 
strength, unless the desertions during the year 
should outnumber the re-enlistments. 

But whatever the demand of the active army, 
the navy, and the marine corps for men to keep 
them at full war strength may be, it must be sup- 
plied by the conscription for the year, because, not 
only is it relatively more economical to maintain 



Conscription 149 

these services at full war strength, but it is also 
more desirable, because it affords the best oppor- 
tunity for the maintenance of the army, the navy, 
and the marine corps at their highest condition of 
efficiency : efficiency in the two services being the 
aim, or at least it should be the aim, of the mili- 
tary authorities of the nation. 

The annual demand upon the drawings of the 
conscription for men for the army, the navy, and 
the marine corps should be determined by the 
government before the drawings take place, and 
the proclamation ordering the drawings should 
state the number of men to be taken by the govern- 
ment from the year's allotment. 

The drawings should be held under the super- 
vision of the War and Navy Departments but by 
a regularly constituted staff of civilians. The 
government cannot afford to increase the propor- 
tion of absentee officers of the army and navy in 
number sufficient to administer the conscription. 

Officers educated for the army should not be 
allowed to perform duties outside of the army, or 
within the War Department, which can just as 
well be performed by civilians. This is a propo- 
sition as broad as the army itself, because it bears 
upon the efficiency of the army, and if it be ac- 
cepted as the principle regulating details, it would 
restore a number of officers, now absentees, to 
their commands. 

Assuming the requirement of the army to be 



150 West Point in our Next War 

about 110,000 men to complete its strength to 
200,000 men, and the requirement of the navy and 
the marine corps to be 25,000 men, we find that 
the two services would require to fill them to full 
war strength about 135,000 men. 

To officer the new regiments of the active army- 
will require about 4000 additional officers. The 
difficulty will be to provide all at once these new 
officers. Of course a great many officers now on 
detached duty should at once be relieved and 
ordered to their regiments, and as the organiza- 
tion of the regiments of the army for full war 
strength is complete in officers, it will only be 
necessary to return the officers now on detached 
service to their commands to make it possible to 
fill up the existing regiments with enlisted men to 
full war strength. 

According to the report of the Adjutant-General 
August 22, 1 914, 

there were 4701 commissioned officers on the active 
list of the army, of whom 1220, including 64 
chaplains, were general officers or officers of the staff 
corps and departments, 810 belonged to the cavalry, 
266 to the field artillery, 758 to the coast artillery 
corps, and 1 647 to the infantry. 

It will thus be seen that 1220 officers, or over 
25 per cent, of the officers of the army, were mem- 
bers of the staff corps, or were serving on staff 
duty, in August, 19 14, which would seem to be a 



Conscription 151 

sufficient number of "staff officers" for an active 
army of 200,000 men, as detached and unimport- 
ant posts should be abolished, and the army in 
the United States be concentrated in great train- 
ing camps like that of Aldershot, England. 

The Adjutant-General of the army further says : 
"Of the 3431 line officers, 2770 were present for 
duty, 86 on leave, 45 sick, 578 on detached duty, 
and 2 in arrest." 

In addition to 1220 staff officers, 578 line officers 
were on detached duty, or a total of 1798 officers 
of the army out of a total of 4701 officers were 
serving in various capacities other than directly 
in command of or with troops. A bewildering 
proportion having regard to the size of the army, 
and proving that the craze for detached service 
is the curse of the army. 

To correct this disproportion of officers on de- 
tached service the army war college, the army 
service schools at Fort Leavenworth, the school 
of musketry at Fort Sill, should be closed tem- 
porarily, or until West Point can graduate a suffi- 
cient number of officers for the army, and the 
officers on duty at these schools, together with all 
of the student officers, should be sent to their 
regiments. All officers on the active list of the 
army serving as instructors at civil educa- 
tional institutions, or serving with the militia, or 
as the superintendent of the State, War, and 
Navy Department building, and the officer serv- 



152 West Point in our Next War 

ing with the Red Cross, if on the active list, 
should be relieved from such duty and ordered 
to their commands. Should any of these offi- 
cers be staff officers, such as the engineer officer 
in charge of the War Department building, their 
relief from such duty would re-enforce their corps 
for the performance of its regular duty with the 
increased army. As the new system would do 
away with the recruiting service, officers on recruit- 
ing service could in time be relieved and returned 
to their regiments. 

It would seem to be the case that there are more 
officers serving in the War Department today than 
were on duty in the War Department in 1864 with 
an army of over a million of men, when, for about 
six weeks, I was on duty in the office of the Inspec- 
tor-General of the army. I do not speak confidently 
on this point, but I think I may say, that relatively 
to the size of the army, there are more officers on 
duty today in the War Department than were 
on duty in the Department in 1864, with a great 
deal less work for the officers to do now than 
then. 

As to the General Staff, I think that all of the 
officers on duty in this new staff organization, 
serving as chiefs of staff at the headquarters of 
military divisions, and with commanding generals 
in the field, should be relieved and ordered to 
their commands, and the adjutant-generals of such 
military divisions, and commands in the field, by 



Conscription 153 

orders from the War Department, should be 
assigned to duty as chiefs of staff. 

As Adjutant-General of the 15th Army Corps 
in the field during the great war, I think I may 
speak with some right to be heard upon this sub- 
ject. I had seen something of chiefs of staff, and 
consequently held the opinion, before joining the 
15th Army Corps, that the adjutant-general of 
every command should be the chief of staff of that 
command, because he, from his position at head- 
quarters, was naturally the centre of information 
and the source from which all orders should eman- 
ate; and also because it tends to promote con- 
fusion at headquarters should any officer of higher 
rank than he on the staff be intervened between 
himself and the general commanding, who, under 
all circumstances, should receive information at 
first hand from his adjutant-general, and not have 
it filtered through another officer standing be- 
tween the general commanding and the adjutant- 
general, interfering, unintentionally of course, with 
the confidential relations which should exist be- 
tween these two officers. 

My experience as Adjutant-General of the 15th 
Army Corps confirmed me in this judgment, and 
further, I became convinced that either the chief 
of staff or the adjutant-general was out of place, 
or rather, that they were in each other's way at 
headquarters. 

On reporting for duty as Adjutant-General of 



154 West Point in our Next War 

the 15th Army Corps I found that a gallant gen- 
tleman, an officer of the army, the Inspector-Gen- 
eral of the Corps, had been announced in orders 
as chief of staff of the Corps. But I also found, 
I must say with a certain measure of relief, that 
this gentleman was far too ill a man to attend to 
the duties of his office as chief of staff except in an 
entirely perfunctory manner. Therefore, treating 
him with the utmost courtesy, because I learned 
to have the fullest respect for him personally, I 
gradually assumed the duties of chief of staff of 
the Corps, and established extra-official relations 
with the chief quartermaster, chief commissary, 
medical director, chief of artillery, and the other 
heads of the staff departments, who gave me 
cheerfully all the information concerning their de- 
partments which it was necessary and desirable 
that I should have. The utmost harmony pre- 
vailed at headquarters. The General's orders 
were promptly issued and cheerfully obeyed. I 
held in my possession the orders for the campaign 
from Military Division and Army headquarters, 
and drew all the orders for the movement of the 
Corps in accordance with the command of the 
General. 

I really do not see, in looking back over fifty 
years, how it would have been possible for me to 
have conducted the affairs of the Adjutant-Gen- 
eral's department had the chief of staff of the Corps 
been well enough to attend properly to his duties. 



Conscription 155 

I feel confident that there would have been 
friction, had he been able to attend to the duties 
of his office, and that the public service would 
have suffered in consequence. There is not 
enough work at headquarters for a chief of staff 
and an adjutant-general, assuming both to be 
intelligent, active, energetic officers. One must 
twirl his thumbs to the north in the morning and 
to the south in the afternoon to keep himself oc- 
cupied, if the other be earnest in the performance 
of his duties. Wherefore, I am convinced as 
there is not enough work or occupation for these 
two officers if both attempt to do the work that is 
to be done, that the two offices should be centred 
in the one person at headquarters who, by pre- 
scription, is best fitted to perform the functions 
of the two offices, the adjutant-general of the 
command. If the rush of detail work should at 
any time become too pressing on the adjutant- 
general he can always order an officer of junior 
rank to his assistance. When I became Adjutant- 
General of the Army of the Tennessee I had three 
officers, on duty in my office, whose work I super- 
vised and directed, but who were my subordinates. 
Nothing will illustrate more thoroughly what I 
mean by saying that there is not room enough nor 
work enough at headquarters for an adjutant-gen- 
eral and a chief of staff, than a copy of an order 
given by Major- General Carter in his book The 
American Army, on the sanitation of the camps of 



156 West Point in our Next War 

his Manoeuvre Division, under date, San Antonio, 
Texas, March 11, 191 1. This order is signed by 
the chief of staff by command of Major-General 
Carter. 

It is an important, well-drawn, and interesting- 
order, but it belongs exclusively to that class of orders 
which should be issued by the adjutant- general, by 
the order of the general commanding, and this 
order should not have been issued by the chief of 
staif . To find something to do, the chief of staff 
had to invade the field of work which by prescrip- 
tion belonged, and belongs, to the adjutant-general. 

Therefore, I think that a certain number of 
gentlemen on duty with the General Staff could 
be relieved from such duty, and ordered to their 
commands, without detriment to the efficient con- 
duct of the affairs of the army. 

It is quite as unfortunate to over-officer as it is 
to under-officer a command. The over-officering 
of a command leads inevitably to laziness and 
slothfulness in the performance of duty. 

I do not propose to discuss the question whether 
the command of the army should be held by an 
officer designated as the commanding general of 
the army or as the chief of staff of the army. 
It is sufficient to call attention to the fact that the 
chief of staff of the army actually exercises more 
of the powers of command than the former com- 
manding generals of the army ever dreamt of ask- 
ing for, although he issues his orders by command 



Conscription 157 

of the Secretary of War, a civilian. This is the 
European system put in practice, with the Secre- 
tary of War in titular command of the army in the 
place of the sovereign. The system probably 
works well in practice because the chief of staff is 
practically, as he was intended to be by those 
officers who designed the new system, the com- 
manding general of the army, with all the powers 
of a general-in- chief, cloak the same as he may 
by apparent deference to the orders of his civilian 
chief. 

By recalling to the active list all officers who were 
allowed to retire voluntarily after a certain length 
of service, provided they be physically fit for 
active service and have not reached the retiring 
age, the law under which such retirements take 
place to be repealed; and by assigning surplus 
staff officers to duties now performed by line 
officers, such as those with the Isthmian Commis- 
sion, if there be such now on duty with the Com- 
mission; and by recalling all military attaches 
except those serving with the v/arring armies in 
Europe, together with compliance with the above 
recommendations, it is believed that nearly ail of 
the officers from the line now on detached service 
may be restored to their commands. 

West Point can be called upon for about 450 
young officers by the arbitrary graduation of the 
first, second, and third classes at the Academy. 
This would at once add to the army a. group of 



158 West Point in our Next War 

young officers, all of whom had received at least 
one year's instruction at the Military Academy, 
and many of whom had served two and three years 
at the Academy. 

Under my theory of appointment of officers of 
the army, I say without hesitation, that the young 
man who has had one year's instruction at the 
Military Academy is better fitted for appointment 
to a second lieutenancy in the army than a young 
man from civil life, or from one of the so-called 
military schools of the country. Therefore I 
think that every cadet who has had the advantage 
of one year's instruction at the Military Academy 
should be graduated for service as an officer of 
the enlarged army, until the quota of officers of 
the line shall be filled. But such arbitrary gradu- 
ation of cadets into the army should not excuse 
them from study. A course in study and reading 
should be prescribed by the Academic Board to 
be followed by the cadets who may be arbitrarily 
graduated into the army, which they should 
agree upon honour to pursue, and a species of 
examinations through correspondence should be 
instituted by the Academic Board to keep the 
young men, so advanced to be officers of the army, 
up to their work. 

Since the adoption of the three battalion system 
of organization for the army lieutenant-colonelcies 
of the line have become obsolete. Therefore the 
rank of lieutenant-colonel should be abolished 



Conscription 159 

throughout the Hne of the army except in the 
case of the artillery, and the present lieutenant- 
colonels should be promoted to be the colonels 
of the new regiments required to be organized to 
bring the active army up to the proposed standard 
of two hundred thousand men, and also of the 
regiments of the proposed reserve army. 

From all of these sources I think it will be pos- 
sible for the War Department to reclaim or secure 
at least six or seven hundred officers already in the 
army or serving as cadets at West Point, to officer 
the recruits and the new troops to be added to 
the active army. 

My book is written at the present time in the 
hope of assisting in awakening the mind of the 
country to the danger of unreadiness on the part 
of the United States in respect to the present war 
in Europe, and to the not improbable war which 
may be forced upon us within a few years after 
the conclusion of this war, as a result of the rest- 
less ambition and the pressing demand for com- 
pensation, by one or more of the nations at present 
at war, on account of the vast losses incurred by 
them in the war. 

But frankly, I do not apprehend immediate 
war, and I am wnting toward the end of the month 
of September, 1915. 

All of our apparent disagreements with Germany 
in respect to the operations of her submarine fleet 
are susceptible of settlement by diplomacy, and 



i6o West Point in our Next War 

should be so settled. Neither Germany nor the 
United States wants to go to war with the other 
at the present time. Neither nation has anything 
to gain by war and everything to lose. A calm, 
strong, and honourable diplomacy can find a way 
for the preservation of peace through the main- 
tenance of the principle of the freedom of the seas 
for neutral commerce, a principle which Great 
Britain has offended against through her Orders 
in Council in quite as marked a manner, although 
not in so spectacular a manner, as Germany with 
her submarines, and the necessity for the recog- 
nition of this principle of the freedom of the seas 
for neutral commerce should be urged upon Great 
Britain quite as firmly as upon Germany. 

Believing in the maintenance of peace, I should 
be glad to have the country move slowly in carry- 
ing out this plan for the reorganization of the 
army and its increase to 200,000 men, with the 
additional provision for the creation of a reserve 
army of 800,000 men, by first increasing West 
Point to the proposed strength of 3600 cadets, so 
as to enable the Military Academy to graduate 
officers for both the active and the reserve army. 
Nor do I think the country would lose anything 
by such thoughtful delay, because the necessary 
laws could be carefully drawn covering the whole 
field of reorganization, the various steps in pro- 
gress being duly provided for in the enactment. 

But I realize that such a methodical progress in 



Conscription i6i 

the reorganization of the army is almost beyond 
the hope of reahzation. When Congress shall 
come together in session the clamour will be for 
immediate action, and I confess frankly that I 
fear that the army will be deluged with new officers 
fresh from civil life. 

Therefore, while earnestly recommending legis- 
lation covering the whole scope of the plan for 
the expansion of the Military Academy at West 
Point to accommodate 3600 cadets, and for the 
gradual reorganization of the active army to the 
strength of 200,000 men, I feel that steps should 
be taken to guard, as far as possible, against the 
bad effect of hurried legislation in respect to reorg- 
anization, and the consequent lowering effect, pro- 
fessionally, upon the officer class of the army by 
the appointment of a vast number of civilians to 
command the new levies. 

To meet this danger, of a hurried reorganization 
of the army, especially as I can see no reason why we 
should be drawn into the present European war, I 
should suggest the gradual increase of the active 
army by ten regiments of infantry a year, for the 
period of five years, thus increasing the army in 
the period of five years by fifty new regiments of 
infantry, and by the immediate filling up of the 
coast artillery to its full war strength. 

Beheving as I do that the supply of machine 
guns for the army is absurdly inadequate, and 
that the method of drawing the machine-gim squads 



i62 West Point in our Next War 

from regiments already in service, while retaining 
these squads as a part of such regiments, is wrong 
in theory and utterly inefficient in practice, I re- 
commend the immediate organization of seventy 
machine-gun batteries, each battery to consist of 
sixteen machine guns, and to be commanded by 
a captain and two lieutenants and to be manned 
by 1 60 men. The organization of seventy bat- 
teries of machine guns will allow a battery to each 
regiment of infantry and cavalry, and two bat- 
teries to each regiment of artillery. This assign- 
ment of batteries of machine guns is purely 
arbitrary, and in actual war the number of machine 
guns would have to be materially increased. The 
system of machine-gun batteries, with sixteen guns 
to each battery, is so much better than the present 
army system that it may be considered to be 
almost revolutionary in effect. 

By divorcing the machine guns entirely from 
the regiments to which they are now attached, 
the mobility of the regiments will be greatly 
increased. By grouping the machine guns into 
batteries, and by organizing the batteries into 
demi-brigades consisting of two or three batteries 
for service with an infantry brigade, as such brigade 
shall consist of two or three regiments of infantry, 
and of two batteries for service with a cavalry 
brigade, and their association with the infantry 
and cavalry brigades of the army under the com- 
mand of the brigade commanders, the best organ- 



Conscription 163 

ization of machine-gun fire will be obtained, and 
the greatest mobility of the machine guns will be 
secured. The batteries of machine guns to serve 
with the field artillery should be organized into 
demi-brigades of two batteries to each regiment 
of field artillery, each battery of machine guns 
to be associated with a battalion of field artillery, 
and to be under the command of the artillery 
battalion commander. 

It is believed, as has been heretofore stated in 
this book, that the association of a demi-brigade 
of two batteries of machine guns with each regi- 
ment of field artillery will furnish greater support 
to the guns when in action, so far as fire support is 
concerned, than infantry can give, because of the 
concentration, the rapidity, and the scope of fire 
of the machine guns; and this remark is made in 
the full consciousness that modern tactics provide 
for the concealment of artillery in action wherever 
possible. 

In addition to the above conservative recom- 
mendations for the reorganization of West Point 
and of the army, the establishment of the reserve 
army should be begun by the conscription of 
200,000 men the first year, to be followed each 
year thereafter by a similar call for conscripts of 
200,000 men until there should be created a re- 
serve army of 800,000 men, and then to be fol- 
lowed each year thereafter by the conscription of 
160,000 men, or of such number of men as may 



i64 West Point in our Next War 

be required to meet the discharge from the army 
of one fifth of the reserve army at the end of its 
five-year term of service, and to fill the places in 
the army left vacant by desertion, death, and other 
casualties of the service. Full allowance should 
be made for these casualties of the service such as 
desertion, death, etc., and for this purpose it is 
recommended that 10,000 men be specifically 
drafted to fill vacancies in the ranks so created; 
and that each year in preparing the proclamation 
for the conscription allowance should be made for 
such casualties. In war the reserves will be called 
to the colours, and will themselves furnish the 
recruits to take the place in the ranks of the active 
army of the killed, wounded, and captured, which 
should, however, be estimated for in the call or- 
dering the conscription. The number of men 
needed for the army in time of war should be de- 
termined by the government, on the breaking out 
of war, and the call should be based upon such 
demand so determined, whether that demand 
shall seem to be for the full reserve of 800,000 
men or for a much larger number of men than the 
reserve army can at once furnish. The object of 
conscription being to supply the army with the 
necessary number of men, the call for troops to be 
raised by conscription shoyld be for the number of 
men believed to be necessary to fill the army, both 
active and reserve, to the needed strength for 
war. 



Conscription 165 

These requirements will probably call for a con- 
scription the first year under the new system of 
310,000 men as follows: 

A. To bring the regiments of the 

army now in service to war 

strength 31 ,500 men 

B. To provide the ten new regiments 

of infantry, the year's allotment 18,360 men 

C. To fill the corps of coast artillery 

to full strength 13,108 men 

D. To man 70 batteries of machine 

guns, 16 machine guns to a bat- 
tery and 10 men to a gun, 160 
men and 3 officers to a battery. . 1 1,200 men 

E. To make allowance for casualties 

in the army 10,000 men 

The year's demand for the active 

army 84, 1 68 men 

F. To furnish recruits for the navy 

and the marine corps 25,000 men 

109,168 men 

G. To effect the organization of the 

reserve army 200,000 men 

309,168 men 

Or a proposed draft the first year of conscrip- 
tion of 310,000 merk 

These estimates are submitted for the purpose 
of showing the operation of the plan of conscrip- 
tion. Should conscription be adopted by the 



1 66 West Point in our Next War 

government as the means of recruiting and main- 
taining the army and navy, it will be the duty of 
the General Staff to work out detailed estimates 
for the conscription. This remark applies to all 
of the estimates submitted in this book. 

The demand for officers for the ten new regi- 
ments of infantry should be supplied as follows : 

Ten lieutenant-colonels of the present army to 
be promoted to be colonels of the ten new regi- 
ments, and the rank of lieutenant-colonel to be 
abolished throughout the line of the army as ob- 
solete, except in the case of the field artillerj'-, 
after provision shall have been made for the present 
incumbents. 

The other officers of the ten new regiments to 
the number of 390 to be drawn, 30 majors and 
120 captains, from the line of the present army, 
and the 240 lieutenants to be furnished by the im- 
mediate and arbitrary graduation of a sufficient 
number of cadets from the first, second, and third 
classes at the Military Academiy. 

The 566 officers required to bring the coast artil- 
lery corps to full war strength should be drawn from 
the officers of the army, those now on detached 
service supplying the place of those drawn from 
the line of the army for the coast artillery, and 
from the surplus cadets of the Military Acad- 
emy, to be arbitrarily graduated from the first, 
second, and third classes; and from the non- 
commissioned officers of the army. These sources 



Conscription 167 

of supply will, it is believed, be found to be 
sufficient to officer this branch of the army. 
But should it occur that these sources of sup- 
ply of officers should be insufficient, then re- 
course must be had to the graduates of the various 
military schools of the country, to the colleges 
maintaining military instruction, and to the offi- 
cers of the National Guard, selections to be made 
by competitive examination; full consideration to 
be given, however, in making appointments to 
the records of the officers of the National Guard. 

Notification of such appointments, by com- 
petitive examination to be given broadly to the 
country. 

It may be safely estimated that the three classes 
which it is proposed shall be arbitrarily graduated 
from the Military Academy under its present orga- 
nization, will aggregate 450 young men, which will 
provide for the 240 lieutenants required by the 
ten new regiments of infantry, and will furnish 
210 young officers to take the place numerically 
of a similar number of officers drawn from the 
army to supply officers for the ten new regiments 
of infantry above the rank of lieutenant, and 
certain of the officers of the machine-gun bat- 
teries to be mobilized for service with the active 
army. 

This arrangement of officers will tend to carry 
out the conditions of this plan, as far as possible, 
for supplying the active army with officers who 



1 68 West Point in our Next War 

shall have been graduated at theMilitary Academy, 
and will result in all of the officers of the ten new 
regiments of infantry being drawn from the army 
and the Military Academy. 

The non-commissioned officers for the ten new 
regiments of infantry should be drawn from the 
present army, a corresponding number of con- 
scripts drawn for those new regiments being turned 
over to the old regiments to fill the vacancies so 
made in the ranks. 

If the small and unnecessary posts throughout 
the country be abandoned, and so much of the 
army as may not be required for frontier duty, 
together with the reserve army, be distributed in 
camps of instruction like that of Aldershot, it is 
believed that the present allotment of staff officers 
will be entirely able to take care of the needs of the 
increased army, active and reserve, although it 
is quite probable that they will have to work 
much harder than they find it necessary to do at 
present. 

The colonels of regiments and the adjutants of 
regiments of the reserve army should be drawn 
from the officers of the regular or active army or 
from the Military Academy. 

The balance of the officers of the reserve army, 
in the neighbourhood of four thousand, should be 
drawn as far as possible from the non-commissioned 
officers of the army, and from the country at large, 
until the Military Academy shall be able to supply 



Conscription 169 

the reserve army with officers from the two-year 
graduates. Competitive examinations, and re- 
course to the army, the military schools, the col- 
leges maintaining military instruction, the National 
Guard, and to the bright young men of the country 
should bring to the colours a class next best to 
that produced by the Military Academy. From 
these young men the officers of the reserve army 
should be selected. 

As the reserve army should be primarily an army 
under instruction, but notwithstanding this fact in- 
tended to be an integral part of the regular army, 
there is no need of cumbering the army with a large 
number of general officers and their staffs. The 
colonels of the reserve army can act as brigade 
commanders. When the brigades are grouped in 
divisions for tactical instruction, colonels can also 
act as division commanders if necessary, although 
in respect to the command of the divisions of the 
reserve army, it may be well to have them com- 
manded by brigadier-generals of the army. 

As instruction is primarily the duty of the offi- 
cers of the reserve army, when the troops are 
sufficiently advanced for brigade and division 
manoeuvres, these should be held under the orders 
of the commanding officer of each of the large 
camps of instruction in connection with so much 
of the active army as may be camped with the 
reserve army. These combined manoeuvres will 
afford such an excellent opportunity for the study 



170 West Point in our Next War 

of numbers by officers of the active army, that it is 
thought that they should be held under the com- 
mand of a major-general of the army, and that all 
officers of the army who can be spared from other 
duties should be invited to be present at the man- 
oeuvres and be attached to the staff of the Com- 
manding General. As the work of creating the 
reserve army progresses, the autumn manoeuvres 
should expand to comprehend the operations of the 
troops belonging to several of the camps of in- 
struction, in time reaching the proportions of an 
active army on a war basis, as proposed in the 
following chapter. In these monoeuvres, as stated 
above, the corps of cadets of the Military Academy 
should participate, the corps being organized as a 
Brigade of Cavalry, and a Regiment of Artiller5% 

The second year's conscripts, taking the place 
of those released after one year's course of instruc- 
tion in the instruction camps, will be under the 
command and instruction of substantially the same 
officers who gave instruction to the men of the first 
year's service. The officers of the troops in the in- 
struction camps will be regarded as officers of the 
reserve army, except that they should be subject to 
transfer at any time to the active army by order 
of the Secretary of War. 

As to the method of selection of the permanent 
officers of the reserve army, permanent at least 
until discharged at the end of their five-year term 
of service; that is to say of the officers of that 



Conscription 171 

section of the reserve army discharged from the 
camps of instruction after one year's service and 
training, but with four years of service yet to ren- 
der on call to the colours by the President in time 
of war; they should be chosen by competitive 
examination from among, first, a class of soldiers 
to be known and designated as the one-year volun- 
teers, and second, generally from the men them- 
selves, until such time as the Military Academy 
shall be able to graduate enough two-year men 
to fill the demand for officers of the reserve army. 

The class of one-year volunteers in the reserve 
army should be composed of young men who 
volunteer for service in the reserve army, but who 
may not have been drawn for service at the con- 
scription, on the condition that they should stand 
first in the competition for officers of the reserve 
army after their service of one year in the ranks 
of the reserves had been had. 

This process of officering the reserve army would 
be put in practice each year to officer the troops 
of the reserve army who have completed their 
first year's service in the camps of instruction. 
It is believed that in time the Military Academy 
at West Point will be able to graduate not only a 
sufficient number of officers for the active army, 
but also for a part at least of the officers for the 
reserve army, and until such time arrives the ap- 
pointment of officers for the reserve army should 
be made as above. 



172 West Point in our Next War 

To encourage the entrance into the reserve army 
of a superior class of young men, a system of one- 
year volunteer service, somewhat similar to the 
one-year volunteer service of the German army, 
should be introduced, such service leading to com- 
missions in the reserve army. And for the same 
purpose of raising the character of the officers of 
the reserve army, selected men from the active 
army should be transferred to the reserve army, 
there to be considered to rank with the one-year 
volunteers as candidates for commissions in the 
reserve army, after passing, of course, the neces- 
sary examinations for promotion as officers in the 
reserve army. 

The active army should yield up to the reserve 
army a certain number of non-commissioned 
officers for duty as drill sergeants, whose place in 
the ranks of the active army should be filled by 
transfers from the reserve army, it being the condi- 
tion of the conscription, that all drawn for service 
in the army should serve for the period of five 
years with the colours, the differentiation into 
troops of the reserve army only to take place when 
and after the ranks of the active army shall have 
been filled to war strength. 

I favour the creation of an active army of two 
hundred thousand men, the rank and file to be 
called to the colours by conscription. I have only 
modified the plan of creating an active army 
of two hundred thousand men at once, because of 



Conscription 173 

the impossibility of getting a sufficient number of 
trained and educated officers at the beginning 
of the execution of the plan to carry it into effect 
in its entirety. 

But upon one point there should not be the 
slightest doubt, viz., that the reserve army, being 
the support of the active army, should always be 
ready to yield up men to re-enforce the active army 
depleted in battle, or by the exigencies of service. 
The regiments of the active army should always 
be kept at full war strength. The conscription 
should be for the term of five years, and should be 
based upon the principle of maintaining an army of 
one million men, two hundred thousand of whom 
should constitute the active army, and eight hun- 
dred thousand of whom should constitute the 
reserve army. The conscription of each year 
should be based upon the maintenance of an army 
of one million men, with sufficient allowance for 
all losses from whatsoever cause they may occur. 
The instruction camps of the reserve army should 
be the depots for the replenishing of the strength 
of the active army. Whether the reserve army 
should be classified into an active or passive re- 
serve, that is to say, whether, when the year's 
allotment under conscription reports for duty at 
the instruction camp it should be divided into a 
depot reserve for the active army, and an organized 
reserve army, I scarcely think worth considering 
at the present moment, because it will require 



174 West Point in our Next War 

several years in which to fully develop the system, 
and experience will teach the best method of co- 
ordinating the troops of the reserve army. I think 
the proper method of arranging for the ready flow 
of recruits to the regiments of the active army from 
the camps of instruction is, that in the proclama- 
tion calling out the contingent for the year the 
number of men to be assigned to the active army 
should be stated, and the number of probable re- 
cruits needed by the active army in that year to 
fill losses and vacancies should also be st ted, 
and the aggregate of these two lists of recruits 
should be called for service in the active army for 
the period of five years; the balance of the call 
being for the reserve army. 

The camps of instruction should be the general 
army depots for recruits, not regimental depots 
be it understood, but the general army depots 
whence recruits for the different commands of 
the service should be drawn. 

The camps of instruction should be located 
throughout the country. One large camp should 
be established in New England ; one in New York ; 
one in Pennsylvania ; one at the Chickamauga Mili- 
tary Park, in Georgia; one in either Ohio, Indiana, 
or Illinois ; one at Fort Leavenworth, if the reserva- 
tion be yet intact; one at Fort Riley; one at Fort 
Sill, and one or two camps on the Pacific Coast. 
This plan of distribution would locate the instruc- 
tion camps throughout the country in regard to 



Conscription 175 

population, provisions, railway communication, 
manufacturing resources, etc. The government 
should be expected to buy sufficiently large areas 
to accommodate these instruction camps with 
camp sites, parade grounds, and manoeuvre 
grounds for the troops. 

The President and his military advisers, should 
necessity seem to demand the immediate crea- 
tion of an active army of two hundred thousand 
men, or of one million men, could, after suitable 
legislation has been had, order a draft for two 
hundred thousand men or for one million men 
as the case might be, for the active army and for 
the reserve army, the reserve army in case of war 
to be mobilized for its place in the first line of 
defence. The President would have to face the 
objection to such a mobilization that the War 
Department could not provide efficient officers for 
such a large army, active and reserve. But that 
is our present misfortune, and will be our trouble 
until the Military Academy shall be enlarged as I 
suggest. 

After the first year of the enlargement of the 
Military Academy and the estabhshment of the 
two-year course, the Academy will be able to 
furnish a considerable number of graduates, ap- 
proaching in number the demand of the active 
army for officers, and by the end of the second or 
third year, the Military Academy will not only 
be able to supply the demand for officers from the 



176 West Point in our Next War 

active army with two-year graduates, but also will 
be ready to begin the graduation of officers for the 
reserve army. 

The above estimates of the military require- 
ments of this plan are given as illustrations. In 
the matter of the batteries of machine guns I may 
have overestimated or underestimated the num- 
ber of men to be assigned to each gun. It has 
seemed to me, however, that an allowance of ten 
men to each machine gun is ample, and that an 
ample allowance for casualties in action has also 
been made. 

I have used the tables of organization, edition of 
1 91 4, of the United States army as the basis of my 
calculations for the new regiments of infantry 
proposed to be organized. I do not say, however, 
that these estimates cannot be improved upon. 

What I contend for is the enlargement of the 
Military Academy to accommodate a cadet corps of at 
least thirty -six hundred men, and the adoption of the 
principle of conscription as the means of filling up the 
active army and creating the reserve army. 

I contend that the first need of the army is an 
ample supply of well educated and instructed 
officers. 

/ contend that the day of volunteer armies has 
passed. As an officer of volunteers of the great 
war I state this belief with sincere sadness, but 
with unalterable confidence in the soundness of my 
judgment. BeHeving in the soundness of this 



Conscription 177 

opinion I should be false in my duty to my country 
if I failed to utter it. 

The conditions of modem war have so changed 
that what did very well fifty years ago will not do 
today. 

The slow process of creating volunteer armies 
renders volunteers impossible as a force for modern 
war. 

Remember that Germany declared war against 
Russia on August ist. That she violated the 
neutrality of Luxemburg on August 2d, that she 
invaded Belgium August 3d, that she opened her 
assault on Liege on August 4th, that by August 
20th Brussels, the capital of Belgium, was in her 
hands, and that by August 22d, Huy and Namur, 
whose fortifications had been destroyed by her 
high-power guns, were in her possession, and that 
within twenty days from her first assault upon 
Liege, the north-eastern frontier of France was 
open to her, the gallant little army of Belgium 
having been brushed from her path. 

How with such a record before us can we cling 
to the system of raising armies by voluntary 
enlistment? 

England has relied upon a volunteer army, and 
yet today, one year and over from the declaration 
of war by Germany, she is not ready. Even now, 
while I write, she is discussing the question of 
conscription. She must have more troops than 
the voluntary system of enlistment will give her, 



178 West Point in our Next War 

and she is slowly but surely turning to conscription 
as her only relief. 

Shall we not profit by her sad plight? 

Shall we not take warning from the rapid ad- 
vance of ready Germany into and through Belgium? 

/ hold that conscription is the only way that a 
modern army can be created and maintained. 

I ask with my whole heart that my countrymen 
will be warned, and that they will firmly and with 
calmness adopt the modem method of creating 
and maintaining armies — conscription. 

Through conscription we may hope to be ready 
when the sad day shall come, as surely it will come, 
that our country will be attacked by a foreign 
enemy. Without conscription we shall then be 
as unready as we are now unready to resist attack. 
Vast resources unmobilized are a source of weak- 
ness rather than a source of strength. 

If ready, as we should be, when the sad day 
of war shall come, we can face our enemy with 
resolution, and await the outcome of war with 
calmness in the confidence of victory. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY FOR WAR 

THERE is no natural or invariable unit of 
organization and administration for an army. 
The attempt to establish such a unit is an arbi- 
trary act: quite as arbitrary as the determination 
of the strength of a company of infantry. Opin- 
ions differ upon the latter point, Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Bates holding ' ' that the enlisted strength of a 
company of infantry should not be greater than 
104," and adds, "I believe this is as large a body 
as a captain, not mounted, can control, and I 
think the commander of a company of infantry 
should not be mounted. " That is to say. General 
Bates thinks that the strength of a company of 
infantry should be about the strength of a com- 
pany of infantry at the breaking out of the great 
war, whereas the strength of a company of in- 
fantry of the German army is 225 men, the captain 
being a mounted officer. The war strength of a 
company of infantry of the United States army 
is at present three officers and 142 enlisted men. 

179 



i8o West Point in our Next War 

Here we have three separate authorities, all 
supposed to be excellent, each differing from the 
other as to the very corner-stone of military organ- 
ization and administration, the strength of a 
company of infantry. 

I prefer the basis of strength of a company of 
infantry given by General Bates to either that of 
the German system or to that of the tables 
of organization issued by the General Staff of the 
army, not only because I agree with General Bates 
as to "104 men being as large a body as a captain, 
not mounted, can control," but also because the 
expansion of a company of infantry to 145 officers 
and men throws out of line all of our hitherto 
accepted estimates for the organization of regi- 
ments, brigades, divisions, army corps, and armies. 
A company of 104 men will develop throughout 
these organisms in a most harmonious manner, 
whereas a company of 145 offfcers and men under 
the plan of the General Staff, which combines the 
three arms of the service in a divisional organiza- 
tion, if carried along the line of progression, will 
develop such large bodies of troops by the time the 
organization of an army corps or an army is 
reached as to produce immobility. 

The Division, as now established in the army of 
the United States, is evidently intended to supplant 
the army corps in the military system, where- 
as the army corps, born of the great war, super- 
seded the all-inclusive division because experience 



A War Army i8i 

demonstrated its usefulness. This change was made 
as the result of observation and experience in the 
field during the war, which observation and experi- 
ence had a broadening influence upon the minds of 
the officers then at the head of the army. These 
officers, and I am speaking of the officers of the 
regular army, grew in intelligence and in broad- 
mindedness as the war progressed; and, as they 
realized the necessity of the utmost mobility in 
armies, they modified the organization of armies 
to correspond with their enlarged perception. 

Fifty years have passed, and we find some of the 
officers of the army wandering back to the twilight 
days just before the breaking out of the great war, 
when armies were things of dreams and military 
organization a matter of theory. 

There was little time for, and less patience with, 
theory ajter the war began. Experiience, daily 
experience, guided judgment, and the division, 
as it was constituted at the breaking out of the 
war, was gradually modified, and the organization 
of the army corps was introduced between the 
division and the army, becoming a component 
part of the army organization, because it was 
found that the army corps lent itself to a more 
harmonious association of the three arms of the 
service in an army, produced greater mobility, and 
consequently greater efficiency, than could be se- 
cured from the divisional system of organization. 

That the officers of the army of the present day 



1 82 West Point in our Next War 

should be led away from the military system de- 
vised and adopted by Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, 
Thomas, and Meade, and by such staff officers 
as Townsend, Seth Williams, Fry, Vincent, and 
Breck, would be unaccountable, but for the fact 
that new times make men restive of the instruction 
of experience, and dissatisfied with whatsoever has 
been demonstrated, a temper of mind which finds 
relief in change merely because it is change, for- 
getful of the fact that change, mere change, does 
not necessarily mean improvement. 

My object in presenting these views as to the 
organization of an army is to lend practical aid to 
the work of preparing the army of the United 
States for war. I find myself somewhat hampered 
in presenting my views by the increase in the 
strength of a company of infantry from about 
100 to 145 officers and men, and by the consequent 
increase in strength of the regiment, the brigade, 
and the division, as given in the tables of organiza- 
tion of the army. 

I do not favour a company of infantry of 145 
officers and men, but agree with Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Bates in preferring a company of 104 officers 
and men. Nevertheless, I have decided to use the 
standard war strength of a regiment of infantry 
as given in the 1914 tables of organization of the 
General Staff for the calculations of this chapter, 
not because it is the best, but simply because it 
is my wish to render a practical service in aid of 



A War Army 183 

army reorganization, without, however, sacrificing 
too much of the principle of army organization in 
which I believe, and which I advocate. 

I have always believed in a brigade of three 
regiments of infantry of from 3000 to 3500 officers 
and men. But for the purposes of this proposition, 
I have decided to use a brigade of infantry con- 
sisting of two regiments of standard strength, each 
regiment to consist of (51) officers and 1836 enlisted 
men, total war strength 1887 officers and men, or 
an infantry brigade of 3774 officers and men. To 
this strength of a brigade of infantry I propose 
should be added a demi-brigade of two machine- 
gun companies, aggregating thirty-two machine 
guns, and a company of pioneers, all to be under 
the command of the brigade commander. Whether 
a brigade shall consist of three moderate-sized 
regiments or of two large regiments, should be 
determined by the convenience of the system, and 
not by the ipse dixit of any officer or of any group 
of officers. 

By reference to the Table " A, " infantry division, 
of the tables of organization of the General Staff, 
it will be found that the General Staff has at- 
tached "one pioneer battalion of engineers" to 
the division, making them divisional troops. 

I cannot agree with the proposition that "pi" 
oncers, " as a distinct entity, are divisional troops. 
Experience in war teaches that they are essentially 
brigade troops. 



1 84 West Point in our Next War 

Nor do I regard pioneers as forming, other than 
technically, a part of an engineer regiment. They 
are the axe-men and the shovel-men of an army. 
They can build and do build crib bridges, lay 
corduroy roads, throw up field works, but they 
should not be expected to lay pontoon bridges, to 
construct permanent works, or to head an assaulting 
column in a breach which engineers might, under 
certain circumstances, be required to do, nor are 
they expected to have the technical training of 
engineers. Indeed I should regard it as a waste 
of technical education to put engineers to do much 
of the work which pioneers should be required to 
do as their regular duty; and it was because of 
the supposed technical education and superiority 
of the engineer troops that, during the great war, 
we came to use pioneers, negro pioneers, instead of 
engineers, for all the rude work of a campaign 
such as corduroying, crib bridge-building, the 
throwing up of field works, etc.; although it is 
only proper to say that our volunteer infantry 
fully and freely joined with the pioneers in this 
crude engineering work of crib bridge-building, 
corduroying, and field works construction, so that 
I think I am quite within bounds in saying that 
every colonel of a volunteer regiment was, to this 
extent, an efficient practical engineer, often more 
practical than the engineers, graduates of the 
Academy, who were serving with troops. 

In our negroes of the South we have the material 



A War Army 185 

for the best pioneer troops in the world. Under 
white officers they work cheerfully, efficiently, 
and unstintingly, and seem to possess a natural 
aptitude for such work as they may be required 
to perform. I should, in the light of the experience 
furnished by the great war, unhesitatingly recom- 
mend the employment of the negroes of the South 
as pioneers for the army, the officers of pioneers to 
be white men. I may surprise some officers of the 
army by suggesting that the officers for these 
negro pioneer troops should be drawn from among 
the young civil engineers of the country, men 
regularly engaged in the work of railway construc- 
tion, earth digging, drainage, roadbuilding, etc., 
because they get closer to their work than the 
officers of engineers of the army, and in this rough 
work would be much more efficient than they. 

One of the greatest, and judged by its result 
the most successful piece of engineering work done 
during the great war was that of the rescue of 
Admiral Porter's fleet in the Red River. This 
work was conceived and carried through by Colonel 
Joseph Bailey of the Wisconsin Volunteer In- 
fantry, the men of whose regiment were chiefly 
lumbennen of the Wisconsin woods, where also 
Colonel Bailey had learned to become a practical 
engineer. Admiral Chadwick in his book, The 
American Navy, speaking of Porter's fleet and the 
Red River Expedition, says: "The building of the 
famous dam by Colonel Bailey of the volunteers, 



1 86 West Point in our Next War 

and the successful passage thereby of the fleet 
into deeper water, is one of the great dramatic 
events of the war. " 

It is well known that Admiral Porter contem- 
plated blowing up his ships when Colonel Bailey 
offered to extricate the fleet from its perilous posi- 
tion if the commanding General would order 
a sufficient number of soldiers to his assistance to 
enable him to work out his conception. 

Bailey and the volunteer soldiers from the army, 
for the nonce converted into pioneers, did their 
work thoroughly and well, and Porter's fleet floated 
to safety in the deep water below the obstructions 
at the shoals of the Red River 

The pioneers should be mobilized only when war 
breaks out or is imminent. In peace they would 
be a useless expense to the government. 

As I do not believe in attaching machine guns to 
a regiment of infantry'-, because the mobility of the 
regiment is lessened, and its freedom of action 
hampered thereby, I have proposed elsewhere in 
this book, the organization of machine guns into 
batteries of sixteen machine guns to each battery, 
and the association of batteries of machine guns 
with brigades of infantry and cavalry, and with 
battalions of artillery. 

I think the proportion of machine guns to the 
other troops should be a battery of machine guns 
to each regiment of infantry and cavalry and to 
each battalion of artillery. 



A War Army 187 

Therefore, as the proposed brigade of infantry 
of this system is to consist of two regiments of 
infantr}'' of the war strength of the tables of 
organization, — and here I may say with emphasis 
that the organization of a brigade is as arbitrary 
a matter as the constitution of a company of 
infantry, — I have attached to the brigade in this 
scheme of organization two batteries of machine 
guns of sixteen machine guns to each battery, or a 
demi-brigade strength of thirty-two machine guns, 
the batteries of machine guns to be under the 
direct command of the brigade commander, and to 
be manoeuvred as a part of his brigade. This 
system of putting together machine guns in battery 
organization I commend to the consideration of 
those interested in army reorganization. The 
fire of a brigade of two regiments of infantry and 
of thirty-two machine guns, directed by the bri- 
gade commander, will be much more effective 
than the fire of the same number of troops and 
machine guns under any other conditions of or- 
ganization. 

A division of troops should consist of three in- 
fantry brigades constituted as above; and here I 
find myself fixed in my opposition to the plan of 
organization of a division of troops as provided for 
by the General Staff in the 191 4 tables of organiza- 
tion. 

To associate infantry, cavalry, and artillery 
with engineer troops in a divisional organization 



i88 West Point in our Next War 

is, in my judgment, offensive to the fundamental 
condition of military efficiency, mobility. 

A division is too small a unit for the association 
of the three arms of the service. The cavalry 
would be hampered in its freedom of movement, 
which is its very being. Tied so closely to infantry 
it would become almost useless. The war in 1861 
was begun with substantially such divisions as the 
General Staff now propose as the basis of organiza- 
tion of the army; but experience demonstrated 
beyond the possibility of doubt or question that 
such an organization was impossible of success- 
ful operation in war. 

An army corps, consisting of three divisions of 
infantry, was also found to be too small a military 
unit of organization for the inclusion of cavalry, un- 
less the army corps should be acting independently, 
when, of course, cavalry would be associated with 
the corps, and be placed under the command of 
the corps commander, but not as a part of the 
corps. 

It seems almost like going back into the graves 
of the past to discuss this question: a question 
settled in war for war. And yet here we have it 
again in full force as though it was an original 
proposition, and not a proposition settled definitely 
for all time as wrong by the experience of war. 

Speaking of the German cavalry in the Franco- 
German war of 1870, General Sheridan says, in his 
most interesting Memoirs : 



A War Army 189 

Such of it as was not attached to the infantry was 
organized in divisions, and operated in accordance 
with the old idea of covering the front and flanks of the 
army, a duty which it thoroughly performed. But 
thus directed it was in no sense an independent corps 
and hence cannot be said to have accomplished any- 
thing in the campaign, or have had a weight or influ- 
ence at all proportionate to its strength. The method 
of its employment seemed to me a mistake; for, numer- 
ically superior to the French cavalry, had it been 
massed and manoeuvred independently of the infan- 
try, it could easily have broken up the French com- 
munications, and done much other work of weighty 
influence in the prosecution of the war. 

And General Sheridan concludes his remarks 
upon the Franco-German War with the following 
pertinent and important words : 

Of course I found a great deal to interest and in- 
struct me, yet nowadays war is pretty much the same 
everywhere, and this one offered no marked excep- 
tions to my previous experiences. 

The cavalry of an army should be concentrated 
in one command, a division or an army corps, as 
its strength should determine, and be under the 
command of a division or corps commander, and 
should manoeuvre and fight independently of, but 
in co-ordination with the infantry of the army, in 
accordance with the orders of the commanding 
general of the army. 



190 West Point in our Next War 

It is needless waste of energy for the officers of 
the General Staff to work out schemes of organiza- 
tion and of use for the cavalry of the army. The 
whole range of thought as to the best use of cavalry 
was covered in the great war, and the officers of the 
army of the present day have only to study the 
lessons of the great war as to the use of cavalry to 
understand the whole subject. The history of the 
cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, from the time 
of its being tied to infantry in 1861, as the General 
Staff now proposes to tie cavalry to infantry, to 
the closing campaign of the war which ended in the 
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, will 
teach not only what should be done, but also what 
should be avoided, and should not be done with 
cavalry. 

Take General Grant's last, and the most bril- 
liant campaign of the war, for illustration, the 
brief campaign from March 29 to April 9, 1865, 
when Grant opened the campaign by attacking 
and destroying Lee's right at Five Forks, through 
the use of his cavalry and infantry in co-ordinated 
attack upon the enemy; when he successfully as- 
saulted Lee's works in front of Petersburg with 
Wright's and Park's Corps, compelling the evacu- 
ation of Richmond and Petersburg ; and then when 
through the pursuit of the retreating Army of 
Northern Virginia, attacking by the left flank, 
with his cavalry always in the advance, always 
ready to engage the enemy and to hold him in 



A War Army 191 

check until the infantry could get up; through 
the battle and victory of Sailors' Creek, and the 
numerous engagements which preceded and fol- 
lowed that battle ; and finally in halting the Army 
of Northern Virginia at Appomattox, the best and 
most scientific use of cavalry can be found so fully 
and completely illustrated as to conclude the dis- 
cussion of the organization and employment of 
cavalry, because, unless organized as the cavalry 
of the Army of the Potomac was then organized, 
it could not have been used so efficiently and suc- 
cessfully as Sheridan, under Grant's orders, then 
used it. 

Let us suppose for a moment that there had 
been assigned to each division of infantry of the 
army such a proportion of the cavalry of the army 
as the General Staff now proposes, in their tables 
of organization and in the field service regulations, 
shall be so assigned, and then let us ask of what 
earthly use such cavalry, so tied to infantry, would 
have been in the series of actions in this campaign, 
and in the pursuit of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia? 

Is it not clear to any soldier who allows himself 
to think with a free mind upon the subject, that 
not only would the cavalry so associated with the 
infantry in battle have been of no use, but that it 
would have been absolutely out of place and in the 
way? And especially in the pursuit of the Army 
of Northern Virginia after Lee had evacuated 



192 West Point in our Next War 

Richmond, is it not clear to any soldier that, had 
there been divisional cavalry as now provided for 
by the tables of organization of the General Staff, 
such cavalry would have been in the way of the 
marching infantry, and not only of no use, but 
absolutely a clog upon the army, cumbering the 
roads, occupying roads needed by the infantry, 
and interfering with, and interrupting the rapid 
pursuit of the enemy, a pursuit which, being by the 
flank, had to be, by its very nature, more rapid 
in movement than the retreat of the enemy? 

So far as this brief campaign is concerned, not 
only is it a school for the use of cavalry, but it is 
one of the finest campaigns in history, and one 
which every officer of the army who has a higher 
ambition than a place upon the retired list, should 
study faithfully and critically. He will find here 
in active use every principle of the art of war — 
strategy going hand in hand with sound tactics. 

The strategy of the campaign will be illustrated 
by this incident which I quote from General 
Grant's Memoirs. General Grant and General 
Meade met in Petersburg immediately after the 
evacuation of that place had begun, and had before 
them an engineer officer of the enemy who had 
surrendered, and who reported that General Lee 
had prepared an intrenched camp into which he 
proposed to withdraw from Richmond, and where 
he intended to fight the last battle of the war. 
Meade believed this man, whereas Grant believed 



A War Army 193 

him to have been sent into his lines to deceive him 
as to Lee's proposed movements. The following 
conversation took place. General Grant says: 

My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to 
evacuate Richmond, and that the only course for him 
to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road. 
Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that 
road south of Lee, and I told Meade this. He sug- 
gested that if Lee was going that way we would follow 
him. My reply was that we did not want to follow 
him : we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, 
and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade) 
believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing 
better ; that when we got in possession of the Danville 
railroad at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if 
we still found him between the two rivers, all we had 
to do was to move eastward and close him up. That 
we would then have all the advantage we could pos- 
sibly have by moving directly against him from Peters- 
burg (Meade's plan), even if he remained in the 
position assigned him by the engineer officer. 

Here we have in this brief incident, clearly 
marked, good and bad strategy. If Meade had 
been in supreme command Lee would undoubt- 
edly have made good his retreat, have effected 
a junction with Johnston in the Carolinas, and 
have attacked Sherman advancing north toward 
the James, with every prospect of success. For- 
tunately Meade was not in command. Grant's 
13 



194 West Point in our Next War 

strategy was sound, was in accordance with his 
orders of March 29, 1865, and ended in supreme 
victory. 

The handling of the cavalry of the Army of 
the Potomac in this campaign was superb. But 
the organization of the cavalry of the Army of the 
Potomac was equally good. Fortunately divi- 
sional cavalry had disappeared from the Army 
of the Potomac over two years before this cam- 
paign took place, otherwise it might not have 
ended in victory. 

Time was the essence of success in this campaign, 
and useless divisional cavalry would have clogged 
and impeded the march of the infantry of the army 
to such an extent that Lee would have outmarched 
Grant, instead of having been outmarched by him, 
and would have escaped instead of surrendering 
his army at Appomattox. 

Change is not always improvement; and in the 
creation of divisional cavalry not only has no 
improvement been made, but the army has been 
thrown into the dismal swamp of abandoned and 
disused methods of organization condemned by 
the experience of war. 

The question of the organization and distribu- 
tion of the artillery of an army is not quite so 
simple a matter as that of the cavalry of an army. 
There is something, not much it is true, to be 
said in favour of the assignment of the artillery of 
an army to the divisions of an army, as divisional 



A War Army 195 

troops, and yet I must be permitted to say that I 
do not approve of such a plan of army organiza- 
tion. 

I beheve firmly in the wisdom of the creation of 
army corps. I am satisfied that an army corps 
should consist of three divisions of infantry, with 
machine guns and pioneers, and that there should 
be in addition, as corps troops, a brigade or a divi- 
sion of artillery to each army corps, which, with 
the three infantry divisions, should constitute the 
army corps. I believe in the concentration of the 
artillery of an army corps into one artillery com- 
mand, call it brigade or division of artillery, as 
you please, said brigade or division of artillery to 
occupy in the army corps the same individual posi- 
tion that an infantry division occupies; and be 
subject alone to the orders of the commanding 
general of the army corps. 

This independent position of the artillery has 
the distinct advantage of increasing the mobility of 
the army corps and of the army. It restores at 
once to the infantry its freedom of action, and it 
enables the corps commander to concentrate and 
to direct the fire of his artillery as the exigencies of 
battle shall demand. Whereas, if the artillery be 
distributed among the divisions of the army, it 
will be found to be impossible to move the infantry 
of the division with the same celerity as would be 
the case should it be free altogether of artillery; 
and as to concentration and direction of fire, the 



196 West Point in our Next War 

power to accomplish such results will be lessened 
should the artillery be distributed throughout the 
divisions of the army, if for no other reason, be- 
cause of the distances to be overcome in bringing 
about the concentration of the guns, and also be- 
cause division commanders are fond of their ar- 
tillery, and are loath to give it up for the purpose 
of effecting a general concentration of fire. 

The difficulty of protecting the artillery of the 
corps, if it be held separate from the infantry 
divisions of the corps, is apparent, but on the other 
hand, the army is always required to protect its 
reserve artillery, and if this can be done success- 
ftilly, the corps artillery can equally well be pro- 
tected. It is conceded, however, that artillery 
attached to a division is more easily protected, 
because it is in the midst of its infantry supports, 
and because the general commanding the division 
feels a more personal responsibility for its protec- 
tion than he would feel if the artillery was in a 
separate and distinct command. 

On the march, for instance, for the purpose of 
occupying as many parallel roads as possible, the 
corps moving under such a supposition on at least 
two roads, and as affording the opportunity of 
keeping the army closed up for rapid development 
on any required front of operations, the batteries 
of the brigade or division of artillery might be 
distributed among the divisions of the corps for 
the purposes of the march, provided the corps be 



A War Army 197 

not moving into battle, or in such close touch with 
the enemy as to indicate the immediate approach 
of battle. Such a movement of the artillery would 
tend to reduce the risk of clogging the roads; and 
to increase the rapidity of the movement of the 
column, the infantry should surrender the roads 
as far as possible to the artillery, themselves march- 
ing in the fields adjoining the roads, which was the 
common practice adopted in Sherman's army in 
the Georgia and Carolina campaigns, to reduce 
congestion on the roads, which were wretched in 
the extreme. 

Such distribution of artillery among the divisions 
of the corps should only be for protection on the 
march and to facilitate the rapidity of movement 
of the corps. On coming into presence of the 
enemy the corps commander should issue his 
orders for the concentration of his artillery, and 
for the employment of his guns upon any part of 
his line of battle, where, in his judgment, their fire 
would be most destructive, and also where their 
fire would cover the movements of the infantry to 
the best advantage. Although I have covered the 
point in the discussion of machine guns, it may not 
be amiss to say that when the artillery is firing 
from concealed positions in rear of the infantry and 
its machine guns are not in action, it is within the 
power of the corps commander to order forward 
to his firing line the machine guns associated with 
the artillery. Should the artillery however be 



198 West Point in our Next War 

pushed forward into the open, its complement of 
machine guns should at once be restored in order 
that it should have the support of their fire 
in action. 

The chief lesson of the present war in Europe, 
aside from that of rapid mobilization and what it 
accomplishes, is the marvellous development of 
artillery fire. I attribute this marvellous develop- 
ment of artillery fire to the introduction of the 
motor truck or automobile as a means of transport 
for ammunition. In no previous war could it 
have been possible to have concentrated the am- 
munition which has been expended in this war. 
Such a concentration of guns as the telegrams from 
Europe have reported as having been effected on 
the German front in battles preceding the success- 
ful advance on Warsaw, is not only unprecedented, 
but undreamt of heretofore. In one of these 
battles it is reported that the Germans concen- 
trated the fire of 4000 guns upon a front of com- 
paratively a few miles in extent along a particular 
portion of the Russian lines. I do not wish to be 
understood as expressing either belief or disbelief 
in the statement that the Germans concentrated 
4000 guns in battery against the Russians on one 
narrow front. I merely repeat the statement as 
telegraphed to the press. The strength of their 
artillery must be marvellous, however, because it is 
believed that the Austro-German armies operating 
against the Russians number 2,500,000 men, and 



A War Army 199 

at the very moderate rate of two guns to each 
1000 men, they should have 5000 guns with the 
combined armies, which is entirely too small a 
proportion of guns to men. Of course we have no 
way of knowing how many guns the Austro- 
German army has in this field of operations, but a 
low estimate would give 7500 guns with the com- 
bined armies now operating against the Russians. 

The crushing, smothering, blasting fire of 4000 
guns on one comparatively narrow front is almost 
unthinkable, and if true, such a concentration of 
guns could only have been effected under a flexible yet 
centralized organization; and of course to have 
produced such a concentrated fire, army corps and 
armies must have yielded their guns for concentra- 
tion under the order of the field marshal com- 
manding, to be served under the direct supervision 
of the general of artillery on his staff. 

In face of such demonstration, I think it would 
be unwise to continue the association of the artil- 
lery with divisions of infantry as a component 
part of the division, as proposed for our army in the 
tables of organization issued by the General Staff. 
MobiHty is the demand of war, and the need of the 
extremest possible mobility is one of the lessons 
of the present war in Europe, as it was the lesson 
of our great war of fifty years ago. 

When I reported to Major-General Oliver 0. 
Howard of the army for duty, in addition to being 
assigned as aide-de-camp on his staff, I was also 



200 West Point in our Next War 

assigned to duty with the chief of artillery of the 
Army of the Tennessee as Assistant Adjutant-Gen- 
eral. The artillery of the army was brigaded by 
army corps, but the batteries were distributed 
among the divisions. The system worked fairly 
well, as often unphilosophical systems will work 
well under intelligent management. But the 
theory of the organization was correct — and had 
there been necessity for putting it into practical 
operation, an order from headquarters would alone 
have been necessary to effectuate it. After the cap- 
ture of Savannah I was promoted to be the Assist- 
ant Adjutant-General of the Fifteenth Army Corps 
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and was conse- 
quently brought near to the artillery of the corps. 
The chief of artillery of the corps, Major Stolbrand, 
was an efficient officer, and we became friends. He 
used to call me the "boy Adjutant, " as I had just 
passed my twenty-first birthday by about four 
months. We had many talks on the subject of the 
artillery of the corps, and I think I may say that 
we both agreed that the corps artillery should be 
actually concentrated in brigade formation, dis- 
tinct from divisional control, and under the direct 
command of the corps commander through his 
chief of artillery, as the commander of the brigade. 
I think the lesson of the present war in Europe 
in reference to artillery confirms the theory of the 
independent organization of artillery in brigades 
or divisions, free from infantry divisional control, 



A War Army 201 

and under the direct control of the corps com- 
mander through his chief of artillery. 

It has been reported in the press that the Secre- 
tary of War has created a commission from the 
officers of the General Staff, to report to him the 
amount of artillery which should be provided for 
the army. Should this commission care to main- 
tain its credit it will report to the Secretary that 
his inquiry cannot at present be answered. The 
influence of the war in Europe is having an almost 
startling effect upon the calibre of field artillery, 
and upon the number of guns to be assembled 
with an army; and the method of transportation 
of ammunition by auto truck or automobile has 
so completely changed the relationship of the two 
arms of the service, infantry and artillery, that 
it would be well, before determining the supply 
of artillery for our army, to await the full reports 
of the strength of the artillery of the various 
armies in the present European war, especially of 
the German army. 

My own opinion is that a considerable propor- 
tion of the ammunition now being consumed in 
Europe is absolutely wasted. But on the other 
hand, it will not do to rest upon such a supposition, 
because, should any possible enemy attack us with 
a well-equipped, well-supplied, and numerous ar- 
tillery, we must be ready to meet him, at least 
with gun for gun. 

I think the government should proceed at once 



202 West Point in our Next War 

to manufacture, or to cause to be manufactured, 
covering a period of delivery of three years, at 
least five or six thousand field guns of various 
calibres, from the heaviest guns, heretofore con- 
sidered to be siege guns, but which the present war 
has included in field artillery, to the regulation 
field gun of the light artillery of the army. 

Also I think the government should manufac- 
ture, or cause to be manufactured at least ten thou- 
sand machine guns, deliveries to extend over three 
years. The machine gun is in its infancy, not so 
much in respect to its design as to its handling and 
use in battle. Should we find that we had pro- 
vided ourselves with too many machine guns, 
nothing would be lost but a little money. But 
should we find at any time that we have too few 
machine guns, the loss might be incalculable. 

I believe that the artillery arm of the service, 
the field artillery, should be greatly increased. 
Indeed I think both the cavalry and the artillery 
should be increased to the proportional strength 
of those arms of the service in an army of one 
million men. That is to say, the artillery and the 
cavalry should be so organized that on the break- 
ing out of war the President could order the mobili- 
zation of an army of one million men, the army to 
have its full proportion of cavalry and artillery 
ready to take the field the moment the mobiliza- 
tion is completed. 

I do not mean that new cavalry and artillery 



A War Army 203 

regiments should at once be created in the strength 
required to supply these two arms of the service 
for an army of one million men. But I think that 
the result can be secured in the following manner. 

The regular or active army, to consist ultimately 
of two hundred thousand men, to he organized as 
cavalry and artillery ^ and to be so borne on the 
records of the army. 

A certain number of regiments always to serve 
as infantry in time of peace, but each regiment in 
the army to take in turn its tour of service and 
training as cavalry or as artillery. 

The length of the tour of duty of regiments under 
instruction as cavalry and as artillery to cover a 
year, or a year and a half of training in each case, 
until all of the regiments of the army, in turn, shall 
have received instruction as cavalry or artillery: 
then the tour of instruction as cavalry or artillery 
to be extended to two years, and the round of 
training in these special services to be resumed on 
this basis, and to continue in respect to all the 
regiments of the active army. 

The proportion of the troops under instruction 
as cavalry and artillery to be increased consider- 
ably beyond the present proportion of these arms 
of the service, while the balance of the troops should 
serve as infantry. In a surprisingly short period 
of time we should have the whole regular or active 
army converted into good infantry and cavalry, 
or good infantry and artillery, as the case should be, 



204 West Point in our Next War 

ready on the breaking out of war to go into the 
field either as cavalry or artillery, or as cavalry, 
artillery, and infantry as the exigencies of the 
service should demand. 

In no other way will it be possible for the army 
of the United States to be ready with sufficient 
cavalry and artillery at the breaking out of war. 
Under this plan the army will be fully supplied 
with both cavalry and artillery in the proper pro- 
portion of these arms of the service to the balance 
of the army, the reserves, which will constitute the 
infantry of the army. The whole active army of 
two hundred thousand men will be prepared to 
take the field as cavalry and artillery, if necessary, 
at the outbreak of war. 

The reserve army, under the above plan, will 
consist entirely of infantry, which may be called 
to the colours at any moment deemed to be neces- 
sary by the President. Under the conscript 
system, as above outHned, the army would consist 
of one million men — all well-trained soldiers. 

I cannot repeat too often that I do not think 
that thoroughness of organization should be sacri- 
ficed to haste incident to the possibility of our 
being drawn into the present European war, be- 
cause I can see no reasonable prospect of our being 
drawn into this war. But that feeling of confidence 
in the maintenance of present peace, which has been 
expressed, should not close our eyes to the neces- 
sity of being prepared for war in the future. We 



A War Army 205 

are surrounded by conditions and ambitions which 
may lead us into war at almost any time after the 
conclusion of the present war in Europe. No one 
who takes a broad view of public affairs can but be 
convinced of the truth of this statement. Now 
that the possibility of war is making itself apparent 
to the public mind, and now that the people are 
gradually becoming awakened to the wisdom of 
making preparation to meet the eventualities of 
the future, let the nation, calmly and with clear- 
ness of thought and purpose, prepare its army and 
navy to meet whatever contingencies may arise. 

As affording an opportunity of contrasting the 
relative advantage of six-gun and four-gun bat- 
teries, the regiments of infantry of the present 
service when converted into artillery regiments, 
under the above suggested plan for the conversion 
of the whole regular army into cavalry and artil- 
lery, should be transformed, that is to say, their 
companies should be transformed, into six-gun 
batteries, which would allow them to maintain their 
present company and regimental organizations. 
This, however, is a matter of detail easy of solution. 
If the artillery officers should be so wedded to four- 
gun batteries as to make the struggle for six-gun 
batteries revolutionary in its effect upon the army, 
then the infantry regiments could be converted 
into artillery regiments of the war strength of the 
tables of organization, the surplus men of the 
infantry to constitute new provisional regiments 



2o6 West Point in our Next War 

of artillery. But I must say that the only effect 
in my judgment of such conversion of the infantry 
into four-gun batteries would be the unnecessary 
increase in the number of officers of the army. 
On the basis of six-gun batteries the conversion 
could be effected without this unnecessary increase 
in the number of officers. 

The same remarks apply substantially to the 
provisional conversion of infantry into cavalry. 

There need be no fear that the army would suffer 
in any respect from the carrying out of this plan 
of converting the whole regular or active army into 
cavalry and artillery. The present regiments of 
cavalry and artillery would at once take their tour 
of duty as infantry, while a corresponding number 
of infantry regiments would take their tour of duty 
as cavalry and artillery regiments respectively, 
until the whole army had served in turn by regi- 
ments as infantry, cavalry, and artillery. 

I think the effect upon the officers of the army 
would be broadening and uplifting. They would 
see the army from different points of view, and 
they would be the better prepared for the day to 
which they all look forward, when, as general 
officers, they would have the responsibility of high 
command imposed upon them. 

Promotions to the rank of general are now made 
from among officers whose whole lives have been 
spent in one arm of the service, varied by special 
service in Washington, so that when they reach 



A War Army 207 

the higher rank they look upon the army from the 
standpoint of their past regimental association. 
Passing from infantry to artillery and cavalry, 
and vice versa, they would have the opportunity 
of co-ordinating in their minds the influence and 
effect of the various arms of the service, and so 
become the better fitted for the higher command. 

As to the men of the cavalry, I have long held 
that they should be drilled, armed, and manoeu- 
vered as infantry as well as cavalry, because much 
of their fighting will be on foot. Over thirty-five 
years ago I wrote that the last great charge of 
cavalry in battle against unbroken infantry had 
been made. That General, the Marquis de Galli- 
fTet, when he so gallantly led the French cavalry 
against the unbroken German infantry at Sedan, 
closed most brilliantly the history of the cavalry 
charge. This is not saying that the usefulness of 
cavalry has come to an end, nor that cavalry may 
not charge broken infantry with success; but only 
that the new career created for cavalry in our great 
war should be accepted as having opened a new 
field of usefulness for the cavalry of armies. 

Modem cavalry was developed by us in the 
great war fifty years ago ; although from the insti- 
tution of divisional cavalry as given in the tables of 
organization issued by the General Staff, it would 
appear that much that had been accompHshed in 
the development of cavalry in the great war had 
been forgotten by the officers of the army. As 



2o8 West Point in our Next War 

taught by that war, cavalry should be elite infantry 
as well as elite cavalry. I do not mean mounted 
infantry, but cavalry which may fight on foot as 
infantry fights, and also fight when mounted, and 
otherwise perform all the functions of the best 
cavalry when mounted and employed exclusively 
as cavalry. If we stand upon the teachings of the 
great war we have nothing to learn from Europe 
as to cavalry, and the Europeans have still much to 
learn from us. I say this with full recognition of 
the brilliant handling of the German cavalry cover- 
ing the advance of the German army through 
Belgium and into northern France, in the present 
war. 

I have already discussed the association of 
machine guns in battery organization with cavalry. 
This association will greatly expand the usefulness 
of cavalry, especially when it is used as Sheridan 
used his cavalry in the closing weeks of the great 
war. 

Grouping these reflections together, the follow- 
ing statement of organization of a fighting army 
of the fighting strength of 147,598 officers and 
men, say generally of the aggregate fighting 
strength of 150,000 men, is given as presenting 
the best form of organization for an army of that 
strength in the field in time of war. No account 
in this statement is taken of the service troops with 
such an army. Any one wishing to go fnto this 
branch of the subject is respectfully referred to the 



A War Army 209 

1914 tables of organization issued by the General 
Staff. 

As already stated, I prefer a brigade organization 
consisting of three regiments of infantry of about 
1200 men each, or of the brigade strength of 3600 
officers and men. I believe that a brigade of three 
regiments each consisting of 1836 officers and 
men, or of the aggregate brigade strength of 5508 
officers and men, too cumbersome, and as throwing 
out of just proportion the relationships of the other 
commands of an army. I also believe that a bri- 
gade of 5508 officers and men is too large a com- 
mand for one officer, because, up to and including 
the brigade commander, each commanding officer 
has so much detail work in his command to attend 
to, of a personal nature to the troops of his com- 
mand, that his whole time is occupied, and he 
cannot command well so large a brigade. Con- 
sequently I have adopted for the purpose of this 
statement a brigade consisting of two regiments 
of infantry, each of the regulation war strength 
of 1836 officers and men, giving a total infantry 
strength for the brigade of 3672 officers and men. 
Although preferring an artillery organization of 
six-gun batteries, I have used the regulation bat- 
tery of four guns as the basis of estimation in the 
following statement. 

I have purposely abstained from including in 
the following estimate of a fighting army of 150,000 
officers and men the constitution of the medical 
14 



210 West Point in our Next War 

corps, the quartermaster's corps, or the ammuni- 
tion train of the army, as my purpose is to give 
the organization of an army of the fighting strength 
of about 150,000 men. The tables of organization 
of the General Staff have been prepared with care, 
and can be used in connection with the following 
statement, should it be desired to fill out the scheme 
of a war army of the fighting strength of about 
150,000 officers and men with the service troops 
appertinent thereto. 

Whether these carefully prepared tables of 
transportation of the General Staff would stand the 
test of war, I do not wish to discuss. It will be 
sufficient for me to say that in my opinion no 
general commanding an army of 150,000 men in war 
would allow himself to be hampered in respect to 
his supply trains by regulations made in the far- 
away War Department. He would see that his 
trains were organized on the basis of the war rule 
for transportation, viz., as small a number of 
wagons with the troops as possible, and as large 
an ammunition train as possible, and as large 
supply and medical trains as necessary, having 
regard to the distance of the front of the army 
from its field base. An army can live and 
fight in rags and without shoes, but it must 
have ammunition and commissary supplies. 
When its ammunition and commissary supplies 
run too near the point of exhaustion, there are 
but two courses open to the army, to fall back 



A War Army 211 

as rapidly as possible on its field base, or to 
surrender. 

Apropos of cutting down transportation with the 
troops, I may say that I have seen a wagon wheeled 
out of the column, its contents — officers' baggage 
and supplies — piled up by the side of the road 
and burned, the wagon being turned over to 
the quartermaster for the general train, because 
of violation of the order of the general command- 
ing as to the allowance of transportation with the 
troops. 

Just what the transportation of the future may 
be is as difficult to say as it is difficult to estimate 
its amount. Apparently the "army wagon" is 
to be altogether superseded by the auto truck or a 
modified form of the automobile, to be invented 
for army transportation, and the ammunition 
train of the future will be so much larger than any 
ammunition train that our army has ever had 
knowledge of that it would be idle to pretend, at 
this moment, to prefigure it. This suggestion is 
made under the reservation that I think a great 
deal of ammunition now being expended in Europe 
is being wasted, but, nevertheless, should we be 
forced into war with a nation so well supplied with 
guns and ammunition as Germany, without our- 
selves being ready to meet the enemy equally well 
supplied, we should be in a similar plight to the 
distressing plight of England, but without Eng- 
land's advantage of having allies to fight for us. 



212 West Point in our Next War 

STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY OF THE 

FIGHTING STRENGTH OF 147,598 OFFICERS 

AND MEN, SAY 150,000 OFFICERS AND MEN 

Assuming the war strength of an infantry 
regiment to be 1836 officers and men, and the 
fire strength of each battery of artillery to be four 
guns, the table of organization of an army of 
147,598 officers and men will be as follows: 

Officers 

and men 

350 1st. General Officers and Staff Officers for the 
Army. The army to he commanded by 
a Major-General. Additional Staff 
Officers, if needed, to be detailed from 
the line. 

2d. A Brigade of Infantry: 
3,672 A. Two Regiments of Infantry. 
326 B. Two Batteries of Machine Guns — 16 Guns 

to a Battery — 32 Machine Guns. 
153 C. A Company of Pioneers. 



4.I5I 




3d. 


A Division of Infantry: 




Three Infantry Brigades as given above 




aggregating: 


11,016 A, 


6 Regiments of Infantry. 


978 B. 


6 Batteries of Machine Guns — 96 Machine 




Guns. 


459 C. 


3 Companies of Pioneers. 


50 D. 


A Detachment of the Signal Corps — for 




signalling. 


12,503 





A War Army 213 

4th. An Army Corps: 

A . J Divisions of Infantry as given above. 

B. A Division of 4 Regiments, 24 Batteries, 

of Light Artillery, g6 Field Guns. 

33,048 A. 18 Regiments of Infantry. 
2,934 18 Batteries of Machine Guns — 288 Ma- 
chine Guns. 
I '377 9 Companies of Pioneers. 

200 A Detachment of the Signal Corps, for 

signalling, and telegraphing with 
telegraph lines. 
4,680 B. A Division of Light Artillery, 4 Regiments, 

24 Batteries — 96 Field Guns. 
1,304 8 Batteries of Machine Guns, 128 Ma- 
chine Guns, with the Artillery. 
612 4 Companies of Pioneers with the Artillery, 
moimted, or on motorcycles. 



44,155 



^th. An Army: 

A. Three Army Corps as given above. 

B. A Division of Cavalry. 

C. A Reserve Park of Artillery if the char- 

acter of the campaign, and the char- 
acter of the country in which the 
army is to operate, should admit of 
the use of more artillery than that 
provided for above. 



214 West Point in our Next War 

A. Three Army Corps, consisting of: 

Three Divisions of Infantry as given 
above. 

99,144 54 Regiments of Infantry. 
8,802 54 Batteries of Machine Guns — 864 

Machine Guns with the Infantry. 
4,131 27 Companies of Pioneers. 
700 Detachment of the Signal Corps — for 

signalling, telegraphing, and with an 
Aero Battalion. 

Three Divisions of Light Artillery — consist- 
ing of two Brigades each — 12 Regiments, 
72 Batteries, 288 Field Guns. 

14,040 a. 72 Batteries — 288 Field Guns. 
3,912 b. 24 Batteries of Machine Guns, 384 Ma- 
chine Guns with the Artillery. 
1,836 c. 12 Companies Mounted Pioneers or on 
motorcycles, with the Artillery. 
250 d. Detachment of Signal Corps for signal- 
ling and telegraphing. 

B. A Division of Cavalry consisting of three 
Brigades of three Regiments each — p 
Regiments of Cavalry. 

11,646 a. 9 Regiments of Cavalry. 
1,170 h. I Regiment of Horse Artillery under the 
orders of the general commanding the 
Division of Cavalry — 24 Guns. 
1,467 c. 9 Batteries of Machine Guns — 3 Bat- 
teries with each Cavalry Brigade and 



A War Army 215 

under command of the brigade com- 
mander — 144 Machine Guns. 
150 d. Detachment of Signal Corps — signal- 
ling and telegraphing. 

No pioneers are provided for the 
Cavalry because pioneers are be- 
lieved to be useless with Cavalry, 
but each private should carry, 
slung from his saddle, either an axe, 
a shovel, or a pick. 



147,248 




350 General Officers and Staff Officers for the 


army, other than those detailed 


from the 


line of the army. 




147,598 




The army to be commanded by a Major-General. 


Recapitulation : 




General Officers and Staff OflScers 


350 


Infantry 


99,144 


312 guns- Artillery 


15,210 


Cavalry 


11,646 


1392 Machine Guns 


14,181 


Pioneers 


5,967 


Signal Corps 


1,100 



Fighting strength of the army 147,598 

As stated above, reference is made to the 1914 
tables of organization issued by the General Staff, 
for data as to the ammunition train, the supply 



2i6 West Point in our Next War 

train, and the medical train and field hospital 
service, for an army of 147,598 officers and men in 
the field in time of war. 

So far as the aero battalion, under command of 
the chief signal officer of the army, is concerned, 
I do not think that we have yet sufficient data to 
give its constitution authoritatively either as to 
officers and men, or as to aeroplanes. It is an 
organism in process of growth and development, 
and should be watched most attentively by the 
officers of the army. 

The army, so constituted, should be maintained 
at war strength by drafts of conscripts from the 
reserve camps, each conscript being drawn for the 
full term of service in the army, and only assigned 
to the reserve army when the active army has 
been filled to war strength, such assignment to the 
reserve army being determined by the needs and 
requirements of the service, and to be voidable in 
time of war, so that the whole reserve shall be 
ready for active service wherever and howsoever 
the government shall require their service. 

This statement gives the constitution of an army 
as a unit of organization. Other similar armies will 
have to be created in war, and when so created, 
they may be associated in combined action under 
the command of a superior general or general-in- 
chief. The unit of army organization being ac- 
cepted, the development of the greater army, made 



A War Army 217 

up of several such armies, follows as a natural 
consequence upon the demands of the war. 

It will be observed that I lay stress upon the 
proposition that the army should be commanded 
by a major-general. I believe in the wisdom of the 
military policy that major-general should be the 
highest permanent rank in our army ; the only ex- 
ception which should be made being, that in 
war, when a great victory, determinative in 
character, shall have been won, the Congress, 
upon the recommendation of the President, should, 
as an expression of national gratitude for the vic- 
tory, create the office of lieutenant-general, upon 
the understanding that the President should nomi- 
nate the victorious general for confirmation as 
lieutenant-general . 

The same remark applies to the still greater 
rank of General, which should only be conferred 
at the close of a great war, and as the reward for 
transcendent service and victor3^ 

Should these two great ranks, lieutenant-general 
and general, be held as rewards for victory in war, 
they would be superb rewards. But if the rank 
of lieutenant-general should be conferred freely 
upon officers in peace without special war service, 
or upon the commanding general of an army of 
150,000 men at the opening of war, where is the 
nation to turn for rank with which to commemorate 
victory ? 

The same remark applies to the corresponding 



21 8 West Point in our Next War 

ranks of vice-admiral and admiral in the navy. 
In a thoughtless moment the last Congress created 
the rank of admiral, and provided for the tempo- 
rary appointment, or while holding certain com- 
mands, of three admirals. As I write, I find it 
impossible to recall the name of but one of these 
"Admirals," although I am fairly well informed 
upon current affairs. 

Is there a schoolboy in the land who does not 
know the names of Farragut, Porter, Dewey? 
Or the names of those earlier officers of the navy, 
with Decatur at their head, who carried the flag 
of the country to victory on almost every sea? 

I quite understand that the argument has been 
made that we need higher rank in the navy than 
that of rear-admiral, so that when our ships join 
those of other navies in joint operations, the com- 
mand of the international fleet may be with our 
flag. This is straining at an argument for in- 
creased rank which should be brushed away by an 
enactment authorizing the President, on the hap- 
pening of such a contingency, to confer upon the 
commanding officer of our ships such temporary 
rank as will give him due status in the allied or 
international fleet. Such legislation would still 
preserve the lustre of great rank in the navy, some- 
what dimmed by the profuse creation of rear- 
admirals, because there is little likelihood of the 
President's having occasion to use this power. 
The other argument that a fleet should be com- 



A War Army 219 

manded by an admiral or by a vice-admiral be- 
cause of its strength in ships and guns, may be 
dismissed with scant ceremony as unworthy of 
serious consideration. 

If a thing be made common its value is lowered 
in the general estimation. If rank be cheapened 
it becomes an unsatisfactory reward for great 
services and great victories in war. 

The effect of the promotions in the army follow- 
ing the Spanish War is manifested by bills intro- 
duced into Congress at its last session, in one of 
which provision is made for practically the pro- 
motion of one thousand officers, already in the 
army, without their having rendered especial 
service to merit promotion ; and in the other, pro- 
vision is made for conferring upon generals com- 
manding territorial departments, upon the chief 
of staff of the army, and upon generals command- 
ing armies corresponding to the command of a 
territorial department, the rank of lieutenant- 
general while holding such commands, and for the 
promotion of all bureau chiefs and all brigadier- 
generals of the line to the rank of major-general, 
in order, as the bill states^ that the officers of the 
army may enjoy corresponding rank with their 
brother officers of the navy. If there be any- 
thing in this argument as to the advisability of 
establishing corresponding rank between the two 
services, it would be far better to reduce the rank 
in the navy to correspond with the present ccr- 



220 West Point in our Next War 

relative rank in the army than to advance rank 
in the army to correspond with present rank in 
the navy. 

Such promotions in time of peace destroy re- 
spect for rank, and also destroy the significance of 
promotions in time of war for distinguished. service 
in the field. 

Are not the ranks of major-general and brigadier- 
general high enough and honourable enough to 
satisfy the ambition of any officer? Does the 
army remember that Grant was created lieutenant- 
general only after a series of victories memorable 
in the history of our country, and that it was as 
lieutenant-general he received Lee's surrender? 

Do they remember that the war closed with 
Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, still major- 
generals, and that it was only after the war that a 
greatful country conferred upon Grant the great 
rank of General? 

Is there any intimation anywhere in the history 
of the war that Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, 
Meade, would have been better soldiers had higher 
rank been conferred upon them? 

Is there the slightest intimation in the history of 
the war that any officer disobeyed the orders of 
Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, be- 
cause they were only major-generals? 

Is it not singular that with a mobile army of but 
thirty thousand men in the United States, it 
should be proposed that chiefs of bureaus in the 



A War Army 221 

Wax Department should be created major-generals, 
whereas during the great war, with a million of men 
in arms, the chiefs of those same bureaus were 
brigadier-generals and colonels? 

In this discussion of rank my mind goes back to 
the days of my youth when the highest rank in the 
navy was that of flag officer while at sea, and in the 
command of a squadron, and commodore when 
the flag officer had returned to his home; and when 
the army was commanded by Brevet Lieutenant- 
General Scott, breveted lieutenant-general for his 
conquest of Mexico. 

Those were days when rank was respected in the 
army and the navy. Rank was valued then be- 
cause it was not made common by too free promo- 
tions or too high promotions, and because it stood 
for faithful and efficient service. It exercised an 
inspiring influence upon the officers of the two 
services because its lustre shone brilliantly before 
their eyes. 

I do not forget that the ranks of general and of 
lieutenant-general were freely used in the Southern 
army during the great war, but then it should be 
remembered that these were war ranks, in many 
instances conferred for gallant and distinguished 
service in the field, and further, that great rank was 
all that the South had to give as rewards to her 
soldiers who had won her confidence and her grati- 
tude by faithful service in her cause. It is im- 
possible to institute a comparison in the matter 



^222 West Point in our Next War 

of rank between the army of the United States 
and the gallant army of the South in the great 
war, because there is no common ground of esti- 
mation of rank upon which it may be instituted. 

I could not wish a kinder or a better wish for the 
army and the navy, with both of which services 
I have most sympathetic associations, than that 
the gallant gentlemen of the two services should 
hold rank in as high respect as it was held by their 
predecessors in the late fifties and during the great 
war. 



CHAPTER V 

THE DIPLOMACY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 

THE construction of the Panama Canal has 
imposed upon the United States the duty of 
developing a diplomatic policy of national de- 
fence: a policy which should be incorporated in 
our diplomacy as a rule of action for the govern- 
ment under all circumstances and under every 
administration. 

The Panama Canal has materially changed our 
international relationships, because the canal may, 
at any moment, become a cause of war between the 
United States and one of the great Powers, or 
between the United States and a combination of 
two or more of the great Powers, anxious for the 
possession of this important waterway between 
the two great oceans, for military and commerical 
purposes. 

We have seen the Suez Canal pass from the 
control of French capital and influence into the 
possession of Great Britain, through her purchase 
of the shares in the canal company which had 
previously belonged to the Khedive of Egypt, 

223 



224 West Point in our Next War 

and the consequent gradual expansion of the 
influence of Great Britain throughout Egypt. 
England's entrance into Egypt some thirty-five 
or forty years ago was in coalition with France, 
and upon the diplomatic assurance, which assur- 
ance was confirmed by Mr. Gladstone in the House 
of Commons, that she would withdraw from Egypt 
so soon as her mission of restoring order and good 
government in that country had been accomplished. 
There were those who, at the time, smiled incred- 
ulously at the solemn assurance given by Mr. 
Gladstone of England's intention to retire from 
Egypt upon the re-establishment of order, and we 
find her still in Egypt, her authority more firmly 
established than ever. 

England has recently dethroned the former 
Khedive and enthroned a successor, through whom 
she now governs Egypt as suzerain, and through 
the government of Egypt absolutely controls the 
Suez Canal, which has practically become a part 
of England's coast-line. 

Should the commercial ambition of England to 
possess the Panama Canal, as she now possesses 
the Suez Canal, become an active political force, 
in order that she may control the two great trade 
routes of the world, she might, to carry out this 
ambition, decide to go to war for the possession of 
the canal. Of one thing, however, we may be 
assured, England will never go to war with the 
United States, or with any other first-class Power, 



Diplomacy of Defence 225 

without a powerful ally or allies, and it is natural 
to look to the East for the most likely ally whom 
she will draw within the circle of fire. The com- 
bined fleets of England and Japan would command 
the ocean as against the fleet of the United States, 
as it would be impossible for our fleet, unless aug- 
mented beyond all possible conception, to hold the 
sea against such a naval combination. 

Nor is this the only source of danger to be appre- 
hended as to our possession of the Panama Canal. 
Should Germany seek to compensate herself for the 
losses and costs of the present war in Europe, it 
might occur to her ambition to attempt the seizure 
of the canal as giving her a vantage ground for 
attack upon one or more of the republics of 
Central or South America, with the design of 
annexing their territory to her empire. 

The danger of war for the possession of the 
Panama Canal may be restricted to Great Britain 
and Japan on the one hand, or to Germany and her 
allies on the other hand. No danger of conflict 
over the possession of the canal need be appre- 
hended from any other nation or nations. Russian 
ambition does not lie within the region of the canal, 
and no other nation has either the ambition, or 
possesses the material or financial strength to 
enter into conflict with the United States for the 
possession of the canal. 

In the position which confronts us we might 
study with advantage English diplomacy, for 
15 



226 West Point in our Next War 

which I venture to express the highest intellectual 
appreciation, drawing therefrom lessons for our 
guidance in the diplomatic defence of the Panama 
Canal. We might ask ourselves with profit, what 
would Great Britain do if she was in our place? 
No better field of study in diplomacy can be found 
than that of England. There is, or rather there 
has been, no diplomacy so fine, so thorough, and so 
successful as that of England. Sometimes mistakes 
have been made, and it looks as though some serious 
mistakes had been made by England in the diplo- 
macy of the present war in Europe, but such mis- 
takes have been rare in the past. It is a diplomacy 
which counts the cost, but which also takes the 
chances, what might be called the business chances, 
in all of its undertakings. It is the diplomacy of a 
proud aristocracy, and as such is bold, far-seeing, 
consistent, spirited, continuous, domineering, and 
crafty, in these qualities exceeding the diplomacy 
of a republic or of an empire. It is animated by 
clear cold intellect without human sympathy or 
generous emotion. It is friend or enemy of every 
nation of the world as English interests, for the time 
being, seem to warrant and demand. It is a ten- 
acious diplomacy which counts on tiring out the 
diplomacy of every other nation, and often is a 
well-planned bluff, boldly put forth on the chance 
that the other Power may retire before its calm 
front. The successes of British diplomacy in the 
past have doubtless often surprised the Foreign 



Diplomacy of Defence 227 

Office quite as much as they have disappointed 
those who have yielded before its encroachments. 
Conscious of her weakness as a mihtary Power, 
there is one thing written deep in EngHsh diplo- 
macy, never to go to war with a first-class Power 
except with efficient allies; with allies who can 
bear the full brunt of the war; and the strength of 
her diplomacy, which marks the fact that it is the 
diplomacy of an aristocracy, lies in the calm and 
clear look into the future which she takes, and the 
wisdom with which she prepares in peace, through 
alliances, for the possibilities of war in the future. 

England's diplomacy for the past hundred and 
fifty 3^ears has been the strong right arm of the 
nation, through which she has built up and de- 
fended her vast world empire. 

England has possessed herself of the Suez Canal 
that she might control that great waterway of 
commerce and of military convenience and power, 
on the route to India and the East, and it may be 
within the range of anticipation if not of actual 
belief, that when England sufficiently recovers 
from the effect of the present war, if her alliances 
shall then seem to her to be strong enough to risk 
another war, she may reach out her hand in an 
attempt to seize the Panama Canal. Should 
England come into possession of the Panama Canal 
while still holding the Suez Canal, she would pos- 
sess the two great commercial and military routes 
between the East and the West, and so establish 



228 West Point in our Next War 

her control of the commerce of the world on even 
more solid foundations than heretofore. 

There is, however, one check upon the gratifica- 
tion of this ambition of Great Britain, assuming 
it to be an ambition, in the fact that the United 
States lies for over three thousand miles upon her 
flank; and this fact will, I think, always compel 
Great Britain to restrain her ambition whenever it 
may lead her to the contemplation of hostile action 
against the United States. 

As a further counterbalance to such an effort on 
the part of Great Britain to expand her commercial 
relationships and her power, and also as contribu- 
ting to the estabHshment of something in the nature 
of a balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, I advo- 
cate the sale of the Philippines to Germany on the 
condition that Germany shall guarantee, in the 
treaty of cession, the possession of the Panama 
Canal in perpetuity, by the United States. Ger- 
many, in possession of the Philippines, would re- 
quire free access to them through the Panama 
Canal, and her interests in the islands would de- 
mand that either she or the United States should 
be in possession of the canal. England's domina- 
tion of the canal she would regard as a direct attack 
upon her sovereignty. 

The danger of a possible offensive move on the 
part of Germany against the Panama Canal is 
apparent, but on the other hand, Germany should 
know that Great Britain, unless in possession of the 



Diplomacy of Defence 229 

canal herself, would much prefer that the owner- 
ship of the canal should remain with the United 
States than that it should pass to Germany. 
Should Germany put forth her mailed hand to seize 
the Panama Canal, England might deem it to be 
to her interest and advantage to use her fleet in 
support of the United States, to defeat any possible 
attack of Germany on the canal, and to insure its 
continued ownership by the United States. 

On the other hand, German interests would be 
safer from attack, with the Panama Canal in the 
possession of the United States, than they would be 
with the canal in the possession of Great Britain or 
any other Power. 

There are risks and dangers whichever way the 
subject may be contemplated, but nations like 
individuals must be ready to face risks and dangers, 
and by being prepared to meet them avoid or de- 
feat them. 

The creation of a balance of power in the Pacific, 
and in the Caribbean Sea the creation of such a 
preponderance of power in the United States as 
would insure the permanent possession of the 
Panama Canal by ourselves, should be the leading 
policy of our diplomacy. But such a policy de- 
mands that the United States should maintain her 
freedom from entangling alliances. And it may 
even demand that the United States should free 
herself from the obligation to support doctrines, 
which, in the nature of things, can serve no useful 



230 West Point in our Next War 

purpose so far as the United States herself is con- 
cerned, and which are in themselves a constant 
source of danger to her peace and prosperity. 

The United States should also free herself as 
soon and as completely as possible from the various 
arbitration treaties which are the monument of 
Mr. Bryan's diplomacy. I believe, generally 
speaking, in the principle of arbitration, but I 
think it is unsound diplomacy to bind ourselves 
by treaty obligations, whether it may suit our 
policy or not, in every case to go to arbitration. 
If arbitration be a desirable way to settle a dispute 
between the United States and any foreign Power, 
there will always be time enough in which to 
negotiate a treaty for the settlement of such ques- 
tion by arbitration. If, however, time should be 
lacking, that fact will be proof that the question is 
of such a nature that it cannot be settled by arbi- 
tration, and that any existing treaty providing 
for such arbitration would be brushed aside, as of 
no avail, by our possible enemy. 

I am among the very few who look with any- 
thing but satisfaction upon the settlement of the 
Alabama Claims with Great Britain through arbi- 
tration. I think Mr. Sumner, with his fanciful 
"indirect claims," was much the better statesman 
of that period. His plan was to hold the Alabama 
Claims an open question until such time as Great 
Britain should be willing to surrender Canada to 
the United States in complete satisfaction and 



Diplomacy of Defence 231 

settlement of all the claims, of whatsoever nature, 
held by the United States against Great Britain. 
This policy, if firmly held by the United States, 
would, I believe, have ended in the unification of 
the continent under our flag. 

The possession of the Panama Canal by the 
United States presents what may be called a diplo- 
matic-military problem. It is military in that we 
may at any moment be compelled to defend the 
canal by force of arms, and it is diplomatic in 
respect to the provision of a way by which we may 
reinforce our garrison on the Isthmus of Panama, 
and also in respect to the unification of our power 
and influence throughout the whole of the so-called 
Republic of Panama. 

I have already discussed the military side of the 
problem. The diplomatic aspect of the case 
divides itself, naturally, between the unification 
of our power and control on the Isthmus, and the 
establishment and maintenance of means of com- 
munication and transportation for our troops and 
munitions of war, from our southern border, 
through Mexico and Central America, to Panama. 

Our diplomacy in respect to the construction of 
an interoceanic canal has been ill-judged and 
unfortunate in the extreme. Beginning with the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and extending through the 
diplomatic history of the creation of the so-called 
Republic of Panama, the Canal treaty with 
that so-called republic, and the Hay-Pauncefote 



232 West Point in our Next War 

Treaty, we have steadily advanced from mistake 
to mistake, yielding when we should have been 
stern, and compromising when we should have been 
firm. 

The creation of the so-called Republic of Panama, 
which had its birth and lives today under the pro- 
tection of our guns, was an unutterable mistake. 
There was no necessity for a Republic of Panama. 
It is a political anachronism. It has no inherent 
right to live, and yet it lives under our protection, 
and is a source of continuing uncertainty and anxi- 
ety to the United States. One of its latest pro- 
jects is a new treaty with the United States, drawn, 
among other things, to provide for the arbitration 
of issues between the United States and the sover- 
eign power of Panama, by a court of arbitration 
to be " composed of one member each from the two 
countries interested and one each from the repub- 
lics of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, " a proposition 
so sublimely absurd as almost to warrant the 
belief that its very absurdity would make it 
attractive to the Department of State, but for the 
fact of the recent change in the head of that 
department. 

Small and weak Powers, living under the pro- 
tection of strong Powers, in their own interest and 
in the interest of the peace of the world, should 
cease to exist through their annexation by the 
strong protecting Powers. 

In accordance with this principle, the so-called 



Diplomacy of Defence 233 

Republic of Panama should be annexed by the 
United States; but to compensate its inhabitants 
for the loss of their pseudo-independence, Panama 
should be at once admitted into the Union as one 
of the States of the United States. We should 
then enter upon negotiations with Colombia for the 
extension of the territory of Panama, that is to say, 
the extension of the territory and the power of the 
United States, over the valley of the Atrato and 
the valleys of the interlocking streams making 
into the Pacific Ocean. Of course we should 
be expected, and it would be simple justice to 
do so, to grant to Colombia some certain mil- 
lions of dollars, say $20,000,000 as proposed in a 
treaty recently negotiated with that republic, but 
without according to her any especial rights of 
transport over or through the canal, in compensa- 
tion for such cession of territory, and in general 
oblivion of the past. But, of course, no such pay- 
ment should be made to Colombia except in con- 
sideration for the cession of territory including the 
Atrato route to the Pacific. 

In consideration of the admission of Panama 
as a State into the Union, reservation should be 
made, in perpetuity, not only in the act of admis- 
sion but also in the treaty of annexation, of the 
right of the government of the United States to 
land her troops anywhere within the territory of 
Panama, and to take possession of whatever land 
or other property she should need for military or 



234 West Point in our Next War 

naval purposes within the state of Panama, com- 
pensation being made, of course, therefor, and 
generally to exercise complete sovereignty through- 
out Panama, without the necessity of asking and 
receiving permission from the State government 
to do so. 

A treaty with Great Britain in reference to the 
construction of the Panama Canal, or of any canal 
across any part of America, was a serious mis- 
take. It bound the hands of the United States 
when, in carrying out the great work of con- 
structing the interoceanic canal, our hands should 
have been unbound and free. 

If it was thought that the Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty stood in the way of the freedom of action 
of the United States in respect to the construction 
of the Panama Canal, all that was necessary for 
the United States to have done was to have pointed 
out to Great Britain that the Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty, which was designed to assist in the con- 
struction of the Nicaragua Canal, but which had 
always been a drag upon the United States, had 
become obsolete, and that instead of aiding it 
only hampered the United States in the construction 
of an interoceanic canal ; and that as a consequence 
of such statement, the United States would be 
glad to have Great Britain join her in the abroga- 
tion of the treaty. 

Had Great Britain refused to join in the abroga- 
tion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as obsolete 



Diplomacy of Defence 235 

and ineffective, — and her action in respect to such 
a proposition would have been determined entirely 
by the firmness with which we should have made 
the suggestion, — we should then ourselves have 
denounced the treaty as obsolete and ineffective, 
and as no longer of use or benefit to the United 
States, to Great Britain, or to the world, and as 
standing in the way of the construction of the 
great interoceanic waterway by the United States, 
which was demanded by the commerce of the world. 
The United States should have accompanied such 
a declaration with the statement that we proposed 
to construct the canal across the Isthmus of 
Panama free from all foreign influence, and that 
when so constructed it would be held to be a part 
of the coast line of the United States, but open to 
the commerce of the world under such regulations 
as we should deem it proper to make, except only 
to the commerce of enemies of the United States. 
Then, in the natural course of procedure, we should 
have opened negotiations with Colombia for the 
acquisition of the state of Panama. It may be said 
that Colombia might not have cared to cede the 
state of Panama to the United States, but it is 
quite within the range of diplomacy to reconcile the 
views of two Powers dealing with so practical a 
question. We could have pointed out to Colombia 
the fact that it was necessary that the United 
States should own and possess the territory 
through which the canal should be constructed, 



236 West Point in our Next War 

and that while we were entirely willing to pay 
Colombia liberally, even to the verge of absurd 
generosity, for the cession, it rested entirely with 
her to decide whether she preferred to receive 
such compensation for the cession of the state 
of Panama to the United States, or to have the 
United States take possession of Panama without 
granting compensation to her. This seems bald as 
read, and yet it would have been a much higher and 
a much more moral procedure than that which actu- 
ally took place. Colombia lost Panama without 
compensation of any description. United States 
marines, it is believed, were concentrated in antici- 
pation of the outbreak of the so-called revolution 
upon the Isthmus of Panama. Ships of the Ameri- 
can navy were in the ports of Colon and Panama, or 
were approaching those ports, ready to land sailors 
or marines the moment American interests should 
be jeopardized on the Isthmus. An officer of the 
American army put on his uniform, and seemed to 
be ready to direct the course of events at Colon, 
the moment the so-called revolution had broken 
out, and it is believed that we assisted in negotiating 
the Colombian troops off the Isthmus of Panama. 
In a document sent to Congress in respect to the 
affair of Panama, a cable message is given from the 
State Department, asking one of our consuls on 
the Isthmus whether the revolution had broken out, 
and his reply is also given, to the effect that no 
revolution had then broken out at Panama. 



Diplomacy of Defence 237 

A frank, straightforward diplomacy is always 
the best diplomacy, and always produces the best 
results, while yet maintaining a good understand- 
ing with the other Power or Powers. Such a 
diplomacy would have been a successful diplomacy 
in this case, and Colombia would have rejoiced in 
possessing many millions of American dollars, 
and also she would have had occasion to rejoice 
in getting rid of a troublesome state, which from 
its territorial position, was always a source of 
danger to herself. 

While we should be perfectly willing to give 
Colombia, as is proposed to be given to her by 
the treaty now before the Senate for ratification, 
twenty million dollars for the cession of the Atrato 
route to the Pacific Ocean, and for oblivion of the 
past, we should oppose the ratification of the 
treaty as it stands today, because it is paying too 
high a price in money, and in the concession of 
rights of use in the Panama Canal proposed to be 
granted to Colombia, for oblivion alone. 

The loss of Panama to Colombia is a fait ac- 
compli. Unless it should be made to the advan- 
tage of the United States to do so, I can see no 
reason why we should rake among the embers of 
the past. Our diplomacy and the diplomacy of 
Colombia in respect to the construction of the 
Panama Canal was so ludicrous and yet so tragic, 
that the disposition to smile at it is frozen by the 
amazing wrong and blunder of it. 



238 West Point in our Next War 

A great nation should state openly before the 
world what it deems to be necessary to its growth 
and prosperity; and especially so should it speak 
when it is about to undertake a great world work 
of construction by which the commerce of the 
world can only be benefited. 

As we should have spoken openly to England, 
to Colombia, and to the world of our rights and 
purposes in respect to the construction of the 
Panama Canal, so now should we speak openly 
to Panama and to the world, proclaiming the fact 
that the further continuance of the existence of the 
so-called Republic of Panama is no longer desir- 
able, and that the time had come for the United 
States to annex the so-called Republic of Panama, 
granting to the citizens of Panama, for the loss of 
their shadowy independence, admission into the 
citizenship of the United States. 
, The Panama Canal, lying in territory which 
should thus have become a part of the territory 
of the United States, the United States being freed 
from treaty obligations to any Power in respect to 
its construction, would, in its very nature, have 
become a neutral highway for the commerce of the 
world, except, and only except, to the commerce 
of nations at war with the United States. 

So far as the military aspect of the question of 
Panama is concerned, the United States should 
enter at once into negotiations with Mexico and 
the Central American republics for the con- 



Diplomacy of Defence 239 

struction and maintenance of a line of railway 
from some point on the southern frontier of our 
country, through Mexico and the Central American 
republics, to Panama, Colon, and to the line of the 
canal, which railway should be under the pro- 
tection and supervision of the United States, 
and over which the United States should have the 
right to transport, at all times and under all con- 
ditions, her troops, guns, provisions, and munitions 
of war from the United States to Panama; the 
recognition of any government as the permanent 
government of Mexico, being conditioned upon the 
agreement to such a treaty by Mexico. 

So far as any part of this route shall have been 
constructed, the United States should assume 
administrative protection and supervision over it, 
and for such part or parts of the route as may not 
yet have been built, the United States should at 
once be authorized to construct the same, and 
when constructed to associate these sections with 
those already built, making a through line of rail- 
way from the United States to Panama. 

The financial needs and responsibilities of 
Mexico incident to the civil war which has been 
raging in that republic for years, will impose such 
obligations upon her as will render the assist- 
ance of the United States necessary to aid her in 
arranging the burden of her responsibilities. 
Mexico cannot possibly establish and maintain 
a stable government within her boundaries without 



240 West Point in our Next War 

the countenance and assistance of the United 
States, and one of the chief instrumentalities in 
the re-estabHshment of peace, order, and good 
government in Mexico would be the construc- 
tion and maintenance, under the protection of the 
United States, of the proposed international rail- 
way of defence from our southern border to Panama 
and Colon. Under such circumstances it should 
not be difficult for our diplomacy to conclude a 
treaty with Mexico especially providing for the 
construction and maintenance.under the protection 
of the United States, of such an international rail- 
way, since the interests of the two nations move so 
harmoniously together in respect to such a project. 

It might become necessary for the United States 
to assume considerable financial obligations in 
carrying out this plan, but it is believed that 
Mexico, with the aid and support of the credit of 
the United States, would be able to effect a com- 
plete rehabilitation of her finances; but in granting 
such credit to Mexico, the United States should be 
given certain privileges and rights of supervision, 
which, relying upon the rapid development of her 
resources should peace and order in the republic be 
maintained, would secure the United States against 
loss on account of the extension of such credit, 
while assuring to Mexico a peaceful and rapid 
growth and development. 

In time of revolution or of domestic disturbance 
in any part of the territory crossed by the inter- 



Diplomacy of Defence 241 

national railway, the United States should, by- 
treaty, have the right to protect traffic over such 
international railway in the interest of the United 
States and of the countries through which it shall 
pass. 

Such a policy would not only result in accom- 
plishing its avowed purpose, of furnishing a line of 
railway over which reinforcements could be trans- 
ported to our troops in Panama, but it would be 
also of value in promoting the commerce of the 
nations through which the railway line should pass. 
Such an international railway, owned in part or in 
whole by the United States, with the right in the 
United States of policing its line at all times and 
under all conditions, would be a substantial guaran- 
tee of peace and order in Mexico and throughout 
Central America, and the prosperity of the several 
republics traversed by such an American-owned- 
and-managed line of railway would be assured. 

If this broadly national and American policy 
in respect to Panama and to the international 
railway should be adopted, we should be measur- 
ably assured of the safety of the Panama Canal 
through the facility of reinforcing our garrison 
covering and holding the canal and the territory 
of Panama, provided we should have the troops, 
the guns, and the munitions of war to send to the 
Isthmus. 

Wherever the line of the international railway 
should approach the coast so as to bring it within 
16 



242 West Point in our Next War 

the range of the guns of a hostile fleet, a new 
location should be established far enough inland 
to remove it from the chance of hostile interrup- 
tion. It is recalled that some years ago the United 
States caused certain railway surveys to be made 
in Central America, but whether these surveys 
would be available for purposes of construction 
is not known. They could be used, however, as 
the basis for further and fuller surveys for the 
location of the international railway. 

Indeed a beginning has already been made in 
establishing our proper relations with the Central 
American republics as sponsors of peace and 
prosperity within their territory. We have had 
a handful of marines at the capital of Nicaragua 
for some time past, with the result that that nation 
has enjoyed peace and contentment since the 
arrival of the troops of the United States. The 
worst enemies that Mexico and the Central 
American republics have ever had have been, and 
still are, the ambitious citizens of those countries, 
who, for personal profit and advancement, have 
striven for power through revolution. 

There is pending in the Senate a treaty with the 
Republic of Nicaragua, which should be promptly 
ratified, as it is in line with the establishment of 
closer relations between the two countries, and 
because it secures to the United States the posses- 
sion of a defensible harbour on the gulf of Fonseca, 
and also insures to us the exclusive right to con- 



Diplomacy of Defence 243 

struct an interoceanic canal across the territory of 
Nicaragua. The compensation for these conces- 
sions which is to be given to Nicaragua by the 
United States is a money compensation in the 
sum of three million dollars, which should be paid 
without a moment's hesitation. The negotiation 
of this treaty manifests the existence of the spirit 
of friendship which should prevail throughout 
Central America for the United States, and may be 
taken as an indication of the favourable reception 
which Nicaragua and the other countries of Central 
America would give to a proposal from the United 
States for the construction of an international 
railway from the United States to Panama. 

The United States wants substantially no ad- 
dition of territory except that already under its 
protection, the territory of Panama, and the small 
and scarcely valuable extent of territory required 
for the rectification of our southern frontier. The 
annexation of Panama would simply mean the 
natural and proper assumption by the United 
States of the sovereignty which now theoretically 
exists under the meaningless form of a so-called 
independent republic. I do not fail to recall the 
fact that several of our Presidents have made 
injudicious and entirely unnecessary remarks in 
respect to the sovereignty of Panama. But facts 
are facts, and it is one of the facts of history, ac- 
knowledged in every chancery in Europe, that the 
so-called Republic of Panama exists imder, through. 



244 West Point in our Next War 

and by the protection of the United States, and 
for the purposes of the United States. That we 
should longer maintain this so-called republic^ 
in semi-independence, as a possible centre of in- 
trigue against ourselves, is the surprise of the 
nations. It may flatter our amour propre to be 
considered altruistic, but it is not altruism so much 
as national thoughtlessness that induces us to 
maintain the pseudo Republic of Panama in exist- 
ence. 

In time of war, an independent government on 
the Isthmus of Panama might be of inexpressible 
annoyance, if indeed not of serious danger, to the 
United States and to the canal. ConjElicts, at 
present of little or no consequence, have already 
taken place between the police of Panama and the 
soldiers and sailors of the United States. Such 
occurrences indicate a spirit which, under the 
touch of the demagogue, or under the hostile hand 
of an enemy, might at any moment develop into 
revolutionary activity, which might seriously 
complicate our position on the Isthmus. 

In offering the people of Panama citizenship in 
the United States we should amply compensate 
them for surrendering the flimsy tinsel of so-called 
independence, and also since the possibility of the 
sanitation of the tropics has been demonstrated, 
the annexation of Panama by the United States 
would inevitably lead to the development of the 
country, which will be impossible so Ion? as the 



Diplomacy of Defence 245 

semblance of sovereignty remains in the people of 
Panama. Indeed, the work of development should 
be undertaken immediately after the annexation 
of Panama through the establishment, by the 
United States, of military colonies in the territory of 
Panama as a measure for the defence of the canal. 
The construction and maintenance of the inter- 
national railway through Mexico and Central 
America by the United States would tend to 
restore and to maintain the peace of those coun- 
tries, whereas Mr. Bryan's diplomacy in respect to 
Mexico has been most disastrous to that country, 
most destructive of American interests, and re- 
morseless as to the lives of American citizens. 
The American Ambassador in Mexico reported to 
Mr. Bryan, upon his coming into office, the condi- 
tion of affairs in Mexico, ending his report with the 
suggestion that the United States had two courses 
open for action: either to recognize Huerta or to 
intervene for the re-establishment of peace in that 
distracted country. This advice was as sound 
advice as was ever given by a diplomat to his 
government. The United States neither recog- 
nized Huerta nor intervened. The result of Mr. 
Bryan's failure to appreciate the value of the advice 
of our Ambassador is before the world ; a number of 
American citizens have lost their lives, hundreds of 
millions of American capital have been lost or 
destroyed, and the end is not yet. The United 
States by action or inaction is largely responsible 



246 West Point in our Next War 

for lawlessness in Mexico. Her failure to realize 
conditions as they exist, and her withdrawal from 
the performance of her duties as the leading nation 
of the American continent, has measurably brought 
about the disorganization which prevails in Mexico. 
Instead of dealing firmly with the Mexican sit- 
uation ourselves we have associated with us the 
diplomatic representatives of several of the South 
and Central American republics, to consider and 
decide what the United States shall do in Mexico. 
These meetings, beginning with the conference 
assembled at Niagara Falls, which was called in 
the name of Pan-Americanism, may establish a 
precedent which in the future will plague us, and 
may even hamper our free diplomacy in dealing 
with American questions from the standpoint of 
the interests of the United States. 

I do not believe in Pan-Americanism. I see in 
the principle of Pan-American action on all 
American questions a danger to our future welfare, 
with the possible result in the future of the imposi- 
tion of burdens and responsibilities on the United 
States in respect to issues in which the United 
States has no direct interest. I believe the time 
has come to narrow the action of the United States 
in respect to American questions to those questions 
and interests which concern herself, or which 
concern those nations lying within the sphere of 
her influence. And I believe that we should leave 
to the nations of South America, south of the 



Diplomacy of Defence 247 

Orinoco, the consideration of all questions affecting 
themselves without the exercise of influence or 
constraint by the United States; the only excep- 
tion to this proposition of dealing with the affairs 
of South America being that the United States 
should maintain a sympathetic attitude towards 
Colombia and Venezuela, as facing the Caribbean 
Sea, which necessarily includes them within the 
sphere of influence of the United States. 

Such a policy, if adopted by the United States, 
would relieve us from the further enforcement of 
the Monroe Doctrine, and would allow to the 
nations south of the Orinoco complete and abso- 
lute freedom in reference to the ordering of their 
own affairs. 

The abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine by 
the United States would, in my judgment, induce 
those far-away nations of South America to draw 
closer to the United States than is likely to be the 
case so long as the Monroe Doctrine shall remain 
in force. Under the protection of the Monroe 
Doctrine those countries feel themselves free from 
the danger of European aggression, and conse- 
quently they are restive under the measure of 
obligation for their safety which they owe to the 
United States. Relieved from the fancied restraint 
upon their freedom of action by this obligation 
to the United States, they would at once realize 
their danger of attack by some one or other of 
the great Powers of Europe, and they would begin 



248 West Point in our Next War 

to consider whether, after all, the United States 
is not, as she has always been, their best friend. 

The narrowing of our international obligations, 
as often happens, would intensify those which 
remain in force, and we should at once announce 
to the world the policy of the sphere of influence 
of the United States, as covering and protecting, 
as with a shield, Mexico, Central America, Colom- 
bia, and Venezuela. An attack, with the sugges- 
tion of conquest, upon any one of the countries 
within our sphere of influence as thus outlined, 
should be regarded by the United States as an 
attack upon herself, and should be resisted and 
repelled with her whole force. 

To equip ourselves fully for the discharge of this 
duty to the nations to the south of us we should 
be granted by Mexico, through the rectification 
of our southern frontier, a port upon the Gulf 
of California either at Guaymas, or at some de- 
fensible point to the north of Guaymas on the 
Gulf, and the cession of Lower California includ- 
ing Magdalena Bay. This cession of territory 
would give us the debouche of the Colorado into 
the Gulf of California, and put us in the position 
to realize that vast project of usefulness, the ad- 
mission of the waters of the Gulf of California 
into the basin of the Mohave Desert. Of course 
the United States should amply compensate Mexico 
for such a cession of territory, which, by the way, 
would prove no serious loss to Mexico, as the 



Diplomacy of Defence 249 

cession would cover the lands of the rebellious 
Yaqui Indians, who have ever been a source of 
trouble to that country. 

This policy of the sphere of influence should 
cover and protect the islands of the Gulf of Mexico 
and of the Caribbean Sea. It would not neces- 
sarily lead to the acquisition by war of any of 
these islands owned or at present controlled by 
any European Power, but notice should be given 
to all the nations holding possession of any of 
these islands within our sphere of influence, that 
the United States could not look with favour upon 
their sale or alienation to any Power other than 
to the United States, and consequently we should 
be ready to buy any island, or group of islands, in 
the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean Sea which any 
European Power should wish to dispose of. 

As to the negro republics of Haiti and Santo 
Domingo we should assume responsibility for their 
good government as we have assumed responsi- 
bility for the good government of Cuba. We have 
in both countries taken wisely the first step in this 
direction. The time is fast approaching when we 
should proclaim a protectorate over these two re- 
publics, with the consequent right of intervention 
to maintain peace and order within their borders. 

The world would gladly welcome the creation 
of such a sphere of influence by the United States 
over Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and 
Venezuela, and over the islands of the Caribbean 



250 West Point in our Next War 

Sea and of the Gulf of Mexico, as promising peace 
and stable government throughout its extent. 
So long as these several countries maintained 
peace and order within their borders the United 
States would look on with approbation. But upon 
the breaking out of revolution within the borders 
of any one of them, the United States should at 
once intervene in support of the constituted 
authorities of the nation, and restore peace and 
order within its borders. As in the case of our 
intervention in Cuba, but one such intervention 
would be necessary to establish the belief in all 
of these countries in the friendly interest of the 
United States in their well-being. 

The United States, under such a policy, would in 
due course of time surely succeed in welding these 
nations into a firm and substantial alliance with 
herself; and peace and order established within 
their boundaries through the exercise of the 
friendly influence by the United States, would 
insure the development of the commerce and 
industry of these various peoples, and secure to 
them a condition of national happiness and con- 
tentment which they have never known. 

The diplomatic policy of the United States 
bearing on the subject of National Defence is, 
after all, simple and direct. Its cardinal principles 
have been stated. Intelligence and judgment 
alone are needed to carry such a diplomacy to a 
successful conclusion. But both intelligence and 



Diplomacy of Defence 251 

judgment are needed not only in the State Depart- 
ment, but in the various countries themselves in the 
maintenance of our relations with these Powers. 
A revival of interest in the diplomacy of the nations 
within the sphere of influence of the United States 
is of first importance. In every one of these 
neighbouring countries we should be represented 
by wise, tactful, and most cgurteous statesmen, 
as it should be their duty to win the confidence 
of these peoples by showing them that our only 
interest, beyond the maintenance of the interna- 
tional railway always open and in operation, which 
should be their interest as well as our own, is in 
their welfare and happiness. 

These American countries need capital and 
enterprise for their development. If American 
capital and enterprise could feel assured of safety, 
and that a friendly influence would be exerted by 
our government for their protection, the marvellous 
resources of these countries would be developed 
almost with the rapidity of the development of our 
Western States. 

It should be the purpose of our diplomacy to 
convince these neighboiuing nations that we want 
nothing that is theirs, and that we stand ready to 
defend them from attack and subjugation from 
whatever quarter such attack should come; and 
that we offer them our loyal friendship and ask for 
their friendship in return. 

The maintenance of this policy in the face of the 



252 West Point in our Next War 

world, with calmness but with firmness and con- 
tinuity, will insure the blessings of peace to our own 
dear country, and the development of friendly re- 
lations with the nations to the south of us, which in 
time will grow strong and vigorous under the pro- 
tection of our shield, and be ready, should the 
need arise, to stand by our side in war, in the 
general defence of the interests and the rights of 
America, should war ever unhappily be forced 
upon the United States by the ambition of any of 
the great Powers of the world. 



POSTSCRIPT 

THE PLAN OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR FOR THE 
NATIONAL DEFENCE 

November 20, IQIS- 

THE newspapers of the 6th of November, 191 5, 
gave to the country the plan of the Secre- 
tary of War for the national defence, which pro- 
vides for the increase of the regular army to 
141,707 officers and men, and the creation of a 
volunteer army of 400,000 men, which, with the 
organized National Guard of 129,000, will consti- 
tute a paper army of 670,707 officers and men. 

It is proposed by the Secretary of War that the 
400,000 volunteers shall enlist for six years, three 
years to be passed in what may be called the active 
volunteer army, and three years in the passive vol- 
unteer army. The 400,000 volunteers, under the 
Secretary's plan, are to be subject to two months' 
training each year for the period of three years. 

That the Secretary can be under no illusions as 
to the kind of army this plan will give the country 
will appear from the following extract from his 

253 



254 West Point in our Next War 

statement, published November 6th, in all the 
papers of the country. 

The Secretary of War says : 

When this system is devised and made operative 
the nation would militarily be in this situation: It 
would have, as the Constitution provides, an army 
raised and maintained by it, composed of a certain 
number constantly under arms, and a very much 
larger number definitely identified in personnel, 
provided with equipment and organization, possessed 
of some training, and subject to instant call. 

The Secretary modestly states his ambition as 
to the character of the proposed volunteer army of 
400,000 men by saying that this army will be 
''possessed of some training.** That he knows the 
exact value of such a limited amount of training, 
or rather how almost valueless it is in the making 
of soldiers, is shown by his interesting report of 
November 15, 1914, from which I have already 
quoted so extensively, and from which I make the 
following extracts. After speaking of the regular 
army and the National Guard, the Secretary says: 

"And this is absolutely all. The only other 
recourse would then be volunteers, and to equip, 
organize, train, and make them ready would take, 
at the smallest possible estimate, six months. " That 
is to say, six months of continuous and intensive 
training. 

The Secretary further says : 



Plan for National Defence 255 

Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investi- 
gate will find that in modern warfare a prepared enemy 
would progress so far on the way to success in six 
months, if his antagonist had to wait six months to 
meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as 
well concede defeat without contest. 

Again in his report of November 15, 1 914, the 
Secretary says: 

"Efficient officers, above all things, cannot be 
improvised. " 

Again the Secretary says : 

It is furthermore true that by intensive military 
training any young man of good health and average 
mentality can be made a serviceable soldier in twelve 
months, and, in fact, has been so made. This has 
been tried abroad, and I have caused it to be tried 
under my own administration and inspection. 

Again the Secretary says in his report of No- 
vember 15, 1 914: 

Those who are thoughtful and have courage face 
the facts of life, take lessons from experience, and 
strive by wise conduct to attain the desirable things, 
and by prevision and precaution to protect and defend 
them when obtained. It may truthfully be said that 
eternal vigilance is the price which must be paid in 
order to obtain the desirable things of life and to 
defend them. 



256 West Point in our Next War 

And in his article published in the Independent 
of August 16, 1 91 5, the Secretary says: 

For it must not be forgotten that the one great 
lesson of all of our wars is that they must be carried to 
a conclusion by citizen soldiers and these citizens must 
be trained. To thrust untrained citizens into the field 
is nothing short of death by governmental order. 

Here I might rest the argument against the 
sufEciency of the plan of the War Department for 
the defence of the nation, relying upon the views 
of the Secretary of War, as given above, to sustain 
my contention. 

But I ask the reader to note especially what the 
Secretary says as to the time required to make a 
soldier: "That by intensive military training any 
young man of good health and average mentality 
can he made a serviceable soldier in twelve months. " 

And in his article in the Independent above 
quoted the Secretary says: "To thrust untrained 
citizens into the field is nothing short of death by 
governmental order." 

Yet the Secretary calmly proposes in his state- 
ment published to the country on November 6, 
191 5, the creation of a defensive army which 
shall consist of 400,000 volunteers to be enlisted, 
one- third each year for three years, so that at 
the end of three years, we should have 133,333 
soldiers who will have had three annual terms of 
two months* training under arms; 133,333 who 



Plan for National Defence 257 

will have had two annual terms of two months' 
training under arms; and 133,334 who will have had 
but two months* training under arms. That is to 
say, one-third of the proposed volunteer army 
would have had but one-half the training in service, 
distributed through three years, required by the 
dictum of the Secretary of War to make "a, ser- 
viceable soldier" ; one-third of the volunteer army, 
but one-third of the training in service, distributed 
through two years, required to make a serviceable 
soldier; and the remaining third of the volunteer 
army would have received but one-sixth of the 
training in service acknowledged to be required 
by the Secretary of War to make a serviceable 
soldier. 

Would not this army come within the limitations 
of the proposition of the Honourable Secretary that 
it should "concede defeat without contest," when 
attacked by a prepared enemy, since, under the 
War Department's plan for national defence, we 
should not have an army even with the limited 
training of six months under arms to put into the 
field to meet the enemy? 

But the Secretary knows, as is shown by his 
official report of November 15, 19 14, that it takes 
twelve months, or one year, to make dependable 
soldiers. How can he then recommend to Con- 
gress such a measure as that advocated in his 
Memorandum given to the country on November 
6, 19 1 5, proposing the creation of a volunteer army 
17 



258 West Point in our Next War 

of 400,000 men who may be "possessed of some 
training," but manifestly, from his previous 
statements, not enough training to make them 
soldiers? 

The Secretary of War should be congratulated 
on the fact that he has himself confirmed the ex- 
perience of the nation, fifty years ago, during the 
great war, to the effect that it takes a year to make 
soldiers, dependable soldiers, soldiers in fact as 
well as in name, by his experiment with "a Battery 
of Artillery, a Troop of Cavalry, and a Com^panyof 
Infantry," but for the fact that he turns from his 
own "lessons of experience" to the dreams of those 
who do not understand the subject, and presents 
a scheme of organization for the army based upon 
a denial of the principle which he has so forcefully 
and convincingly established in his official report 
of November 15, 1914. 

In his last official report the Secretary of War 
states the strength of the army as of date "June 
30, 1914," to be "4701 officers and 87,781 men," 
or a grand total of g2,4.82 officers and men, or less 
by y^iS officers and men than the statutory strength 
of the army. 

The adjutant-general of the army reports as of 
date June 30, 1914, that during the previous year 
the desertions from the regular army had been i 
officer and 3882 enlisted men, and that the army 
lost by the discharge of enlisted men from the 
army for various reasons outside of the expiration 



Plan for National Defence 259 

of enlistments, by order of the War Department, 
during the year 1044 men, thus making a total loss 
from these two causes by the regular army of 4Q2y 
officers and men in one year. 

The plan of the War Department published 
November 6, 191 5, for the enlargement of the 
army will call for the enlistment of approximately 
50,000 men to bring the regular army up to the 
proposed standard of 141,707, and the enlistment 
of 133,333 men for the volunteer army the first 
year after the enactment of the law by Congress 
for the increase of the army. 

Is there any reason to believe, from the experi- 
ence of the army in its recruiting service, that such 
large numbers of men will voluntarily offer their 
services to the country in time of peace for enlist- 
ment in the regular and volunteer armies? What 
encouragement has the country, from the ex- 
perience of the past, to anticipate any such rate of 
enlistment? And even should such enlistments 
be secured, is there not reason to believe that the 
same proportion of desertions and discharges 
reported by the adjutant-general, as given above, 
would cause the reduction of the army below the 
statutory allowance of men for service? 

We have the authority of the Secretary of 
Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury for 
.the statement that the country is enjoying great 
prosperity, and that we are approaching a period 
of unprecedented prosperity. 



26o West Point in our Next War 

Periods of prosperity are periods of full work for 
the labouring men, and consequently of slack 
enlistments in the army, and of increased deser- 
tions from the army. 

Possibly the War Department counts upon the 
offer of two months' experience of the pleasures of 
country life to attract the labouring men to the 
colours of the volunteer army, throwing upon the 
manufacturers and upon the other employers of 
labour, the expense and loss through the disor- 
ganization of their business, of a large part of the 
ultimate cost to the country of the proposed 
volunteer army. 

I do not believe that a volunteer army of 400,- 

000 men can be organized and maintained in 
peace. The stimulus of war and of danger to the 
nation is needed to inspire men with the ardour to 
enlist. Patriotism can be appealed to when dan- 
ger threatens, but in cold, dry times of peace it 
will be impossible to awaken the enthusiasm of 
the people to enlist freely in the army. 

I believe that the plan of the War Department 
as advocated by the Secretary of War in his state- 
ment of the 6th of November, 1 91 5, will fail of 
creating the armies he advocates. 

I have so fully discussed in this book the strength 
of the army required for the national defence, that 

1 shall only refer to this branch of the subject in 
this postscript by saying that I regard 200,000 men 
for the regular or active army as the irreducible 



Plan for National Defence 261 

minimum which should be provided by Congress, 
and that 800,000 men for the reserve aimy, every 
man of whom shall have served continuously with 
the colours at least one year in "intensive train- 
ing/* is the irreducible minimum which should 
be provided by Congress for the reserve army. 
This plan would create an army of one million 
trained soldiers to meet an enemy bold enough to 
challenge the sovereignty of the nation. 

I believe that the day of the volunteer soldier has 
passed. 

I believe it to be the duty of the nation to accept 
the lesson of demonstrated fact, and to adopt the 
only logical and the only democratic method of 
raising and maintaining armies, by and through 
conscription. 

Through conscription the nation can fill and 
maintain at statutory strength the ranks of its 
regular or active army, and it can create and 
maintain a reserve army of any strength deemed 
to be necessary for the public defence. Under 
voluntary enHstment I do not believe that in time 
of peace either the regular army, or the volunteer 
army proposed by the Secretary of War, can be 
brought up to the strength deemed to be necessary 
by his statement of November 6, 191 5, or be 
maintained at that strength. 

But assuming, for sake of argument, that the 
plan proposed by the Secretary of War in his 
statement of the 6th of November could be put in 



262 West Point in our Next War 

practice, such an army as it would produce 
would prove to be a disastrous failure at the 
crisis. The Secretary's plan will neither pro- 
duce a dependable army, nor an army of suffi- 
cient strength to make the defence of the nation 
a possibility. 

Can it be possible that the Honourable Secretary 
supposes that his volunteer army could hold the 
field against the trained soldiers of Germany 
imder the command of a merciless soldier like 
von Hindenburg? 

I have sufficient faith in my countrymen to 
believe if they are trained so that they shall be- 
come soldiers, and are organized into armies of 
sufficient strength, that they can not only hold the 
field against the best German army which should 
invade our country, however so well commanded, 
but also that they could drive the invaders into 
the ocean. 

But such an army as the Secretary proposes for 
the defence of the country would be neither large 
enough nor well trained enough to hold the field 
against a veteran German army, commanded as 
such an army would surely be commanded, and 
fought as it would stu-ely be fought, with the one 
single end in view, victory. 

What of the Panama Canal? Of the Hawaiian 
Islands? Of Alaska? Do these possessions of the 
United States come within the purview of the 
defence plan of the Secretary of War? Scarcely, 



Plan for National Defence 263 

one would fancy, from the narrowness of the 
plan. 

Where would the mobile army of 150,000 men 
which I have estimated to be necessary for the 
defence of the Panama Canal Zone come from? 
Where the troops required for the defence of the 
Hawaiian Islands? Where those needed for the 
defence of Alaska? I do not speak of the defence 
of the Philippine Islands because I do not consider 
them to be defensible. 

If these possessions be protected by suitable 
armies, how many troops will be left for the 
defence of the United States? So few that we shall 
invite attack by our very helplessness. 

I do not attach too much consequence to the 
utterance of the German press under the stress 
of the present war, and yet it would be unwise to 
ignore entirely the element of warning to be found 
in the articles published, from time to time, in 
German papers, charged with suggestions of 
offensive action by Germany against the United 
States after the close of the present war. 

Today's New York Sun contains a dispatch 
dated London, November 20, 191 5, giving the 
following extract from the Frankfurter Zeitung 
which may be taken as cumulative evidence of a 
hostile sentiment in Germany toward the United 
States, which should be a warning to us to be 
prepared for any future action which Germany 
may take against us. 



264 West Point in our Next War 

Special Cable Dispatch to the ''New York Sun" 

London, Nov. 20. — The Daily Mail today prints the 
following extracts from an article in the Frankfurter 
Zeitung : 

"Few events of the war have caused such wide- 
spread or deep bitterness in Germany as the attitude 
of the United States after war was declared. A certain 
time will be required for Germany to recuperate. It 
would be a pity if this recuperation should be dis- 
turbed by commercial conflicts resulting from the 
present attitude of the United States. 

"When Germany has recovered from the war she 
will undertake a widespread, well engineered work of 
education in America as to the relative merits of 
Germans and Britons. If necessary the mailed fist 
will also be applied to American aberrations. 

"Meanwhile, Germany will show patience and con- 
sideration for certain weak sides of the American 
national character." 

Does the Secretary of War believe that his 
400,000 volunteers will be good enough soldiers, 
and strong enough in numbers, to meet the offen- 
sive of Germany? The United States needs at 
the very least a regular or active army of 200,000 
men, and a reserve army of 800,000 men, to be 
raised as I have proposed in this book, to make 
the nation safe within her boundaries, and to hold 
the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, and 
Alaska; and the only way that such an army can 
be raised is through conscription; 



Plan for National Defence 265 
Wherefore Conscription is the Issue of the Day! 

The Honourable Secretary has evidently for- 
gotten the experience of the country with con- 
scription in the great war when he says: "For it 
must not be forgotten that the one great lesson of 
all our wars is that they must be carried to a con- 
clusion by citizen soldiers." 

He should recall the fact that the South turned 
to conscription early in the great war to re-enforce 
her armies, and that the United States had re- 
course to conscription in 1863 to recruit her armies. 

The Copperheads of the North, and the people 
of the slums of New York City, rioted in opposi- 
tion to the draft, but they were reduced to order 
by the display of military force, and the draft 
proceeded. 

The Spanish War lasted so short a time that it 
made no precedents. The last precedent affect- 
ing the nation in war, is, that the nation, during the 
great war, resorted to conscription for the recruit- 
ment of its armies in the field. 

The country needs soldiers, not men who may 
have had "some training" in arms. The plan 
of the War Department will not give the country 
soldiers except in respect to the small regular or 
active army. 

The country needs armies with which to hold the 
Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska, 
as well as armies to defend the Pacific coast, the 



266 West Point in our Next War 

northern frontier, and the Atlantic and Gulf coasts 
of the United States, but the plan of the War 
Department will not supply these armies. 

The people of the United States are a brave and 
loyal people, and will readily support any measure 
deemed to be necessary to insure the national 
safety and the national defence. They will 
freely pay the expense of an efficient system 
of national defence, but it will be wrong to 
require them, through heavy taxation, to pay for 
what they will not receive, which the plan of the 
War Department will compel them to do. 

The Secretary of War has so thoroughly mani- 
fested in his official utterances an apprehension 
of the conditions of national defence that it may 
be permitted to us to hope that he will lead the 
nation to the light, and that he will yet bring 
the nation to the recognition of the fact that the 
only way to create and to maintain an army is 
through conscription. . 

M. VZ. W. 



DPr 9i< 1Q1Q 



